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Abstract
This work is an analysis of F. P. Ramsey’s philosophy of science. Twentieth-century philosophy
of science was marked by attempts to consider the relation between scientific theories and our
knowledge of the empirical world through considerations of abstract mathematical structure.
Such considerations led Bertrand Russell to an account of the relation between our theoretical
picture of the world and its real nature as a relation of structural similarity. Subsequently, Max
Newman gave what has become a well-known logico-mathematical objection to this account.
William Demopoulos recently showed that Newman’s problem applied not only to Russell’s
realist account, but also to a variety of otherwise disparate accounts of theoretical knowledge.
The common element underlying these accounts is a conception of theories as abstract for-
mal structures. Many such accounts have incorporated key elements of Ramsey’s views, most
notably the Ramsey-sentence. Moreover, Demopoulos has interpreted Ramsey’s own view of
theories as sharing the essential features of those abstract views, and therefore their common
problem. My analysis aims to show that this abstract conception of theories does not ade-
quately characterize Ramsey’s view. Namely, his account of theories was not an attempt to
do the epistemology of science in the fashion of Russell or Eddington, or of subsequent struc-
turalist views that have adopted the Ramsey-sentence. I show this by a broader exposition of
Ramsey’s work on the nature of theories, comparing his seminal paper with his many other
remarks on the nature and purpose of theories. I begin by discussing the historical context of
Newman’s objection, and a generalization of it that shows its broad applicability to abstract
characterizations of theoretical knowledge. I then reconstruct Ramsey’s view of theories, to
show how far it extends beyond the Ramsey-sentence picture. Finally, I discuss the relevance
of this view to contemporary debates concerning realism and instrumentalism. I characterize
Ramsey’s view as focused not on grounding our theoretical knowledge in abstract structure, but
instead on demystifying the role of theoretical language and concepts in a theory’s application
to the world.
Keywords: Ramsey; Ramsey-sentences; Newman’s objection; Scientific Realism; Struc-
tural Realism; Theories, William Demopoulos.
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Summary for Lay Audience
This work is an analysis of F.P. Ramsey’s philosophy of science. When we think of a scientific
theory, there is a plausible distinction in the vocabulary, or language, we use. On the one hand,
there are statements that have to do with things we more or less directly observe; on the other
hand, there are statements about theoretical entities and relations, e.g. electrons, forces, space–
time curvature. This plausible distinction suggests another distinction between how we come
to know or understand the two classes of statement. Theoretical knowledge seems inherently
more problematical than our knowledge of things through direct observation.
Twentieth century philosophy of science was marked by attempts to consider the relation
between scientific theories and our knowledge of the empirical world by appealing to abstract
mathematical structures. In particular, Bertrand Russell believed that an adequate notion of
structural similarity could explain the relation between what we experience, and the world
beyond our experiences. Max Newman gave a mathematical objection to Russell’s account.
However, subsequent thinkers in the philosophy of science continued to develop accounts of
theoretical knowledge that appealed to abstract mathematical structures. William Demopoulos
has shown that Newman’s objection generalizes beyond Russell’s theory to oppose any view
which shares specific features with Russell’s.
Many such accounts have incorporated key elements of Ramsey’s views. Demopoulos
has interpreted Ramsey’s work on theories as sharing the essential features of those views,
and therefore their common problem. My analysis aims to show that this interpretation does
not adequately characterize Ramsey’s view. I reconstruct Ramsey’s view of scientific theories
from his various remarks on the nature and purpose of theories. Crucially, I argue that Ram-
sey’s approach to theoretical knowledge does not share the problematical features that make it
vulnerable to Newman’s objection. Finally, I discuss the relevance of the reconstructed view I
provide to some nearby issues in contemporary philosophy of science.
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Twentieth-century philosophy of science was marked by attempts to understand the relation
between scientific theories and our knowledge of the empirical world through considerations
of abstract mathematical structure. Such considerations led Bertrand Russell to an account
of the relation between our theoretical picture of the world and its real nature as a relation
of structural similarity. Subsequently, Max Newman gave what has become a well-known
logico-mathematical objection to Russell’s account. This critique indicated that the notions of
mathematical structure and structural similarity Russell used are too abstract to be informative.
William Demopoulos recently showed that Newman’s objection applied not only to Russell’s
realist account, but also to a variety of otherwise disparate accounts of theoretical knowledge.
The work of F.P. Ramsey has played an important role in the history of those accounts. This
study seeks to reassess Ramsey’s work in light of its historical context and its significance to
contemporary philosophy of science.
1.1 Context
Russell represents an historical attempt to account for the classic problem of the relation
between appearances and reality by applying our understanding of mathematical structure to
the problem. Kant thought that we can only know things as they appear to us, according to our
forms of intuition and categories of understanding, and not as they are in themselves. Russell
sought to provide a framework in which he could articulate a notion of similarity that would re-
spond to the Kantian limitation to understanding the world outside our acquaintance. He argued
that the world really has a mathematical structure, and theories succeed to the extent that they
provide models that are structurally similar to the structure represented by our sensations. In
Kantian terms, Russell sought to provide a way to relate the phenomenal and noumenal worlds,
or things as they appear to us and things in themselves. Russell’s theory of propositional un-
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derstanding considered it fundamental that “every proposition which we can understand must
be composed wholly of constituents with which we are acquainted,” or analysable into con-
stituents with which we are acquainted. The noumenal world, however, is not given to us in
sensible intuition, and hence we are not acquainted with it. Moreover, for the Kantian problem,
we cannot assume that there are properties in common between the phenomenal and noumenal
worlds. The problem, or challenge, thus posed is of giving an account of what knowledge is
possible of the world beyond experience (or acquaintance) and how we are able to understand
it.
Russell’s response was that Kant saw the problem as intractable and devoted immense effort
to demarcating the limits of our knowledge. However, Kant lacked the sophisticated modern
logical characterization of similarity. Russell, having played an important role in develop-
ing that characterization, thought this purely logico-mathematical—and hence independent of
sensible intuition—understanding of similarity was capable of providing a sufficiently robust
account of the relation between phenomena and noumena, without attributing any of the sen-
sible properties and relations of the phenomenal world to the noumenal. While we cannot be
acquainted with the world beyond experience, Russell believed both that, contra Kant, we could
have knowledge of the ‘noumenal’, and that that knowledge could be expressed by means of a
similarity of structure using the modern resources of mathematical logic.
The mathematician M.H. Newman levelled a devastating criticism against Russell’s project:
using relatively basic mathematical and logical reasoning, he showed that Russell’s account
could not explain our knowledge of the world as given to us through scientific theory. Briefly,
Russell claims that we know nothing of how the world beyond experience really is, other than
its logico-mathematical structure, which is isomorphic to the structure of our experience. New-
man objects that this claim is trivial because any set can be represented as having an arbitrary
structure, provided that the structure is compatible with the cardinality (number of elements)
of the set. Russell’s structuralism therefore fails as an account of our theoretical knowledge:
according to Newman, Russell’s theory, insofar as it asserts that only structure is known, has
the unfortunate consequence “that nothing can be known that is not logically deducible from
the mere fact of existence, except[...]the number of constituting objects” (Newman 1928, 144).
F.P. Ramsey, aware of and partially in response to Russell’s work, developed a distinctive
analysis of theories that considered them as languages. He developed a logical representa-
tion of the relation of a theory’s theoretical vocabulary and its observational vocabulary that
is now known as the Ramsey-sentence of the theory. Carnap developed Ramsey’s basic idea
of theories as languages into the most sophisticated version of the logical positivist’s view of
theories—as formal languages that are connected to the empirical world through rules of in-
terpretation. While both Russell and the positivists viewed theories as logico-mathematical
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structures, the positivist view was an alternative to Russell’s position, abandoning Russell’s
realist view of theory. Instead, they emphasized the role of rules, decided by convention, for
interpreting those logico-mathematical languages empirically. Although the positivist program
was subsequently criticized for a variety of reasons, contemporary work of William Demopou-
los has argued that the problem faced by Russell’s structuralism is a problem for any view
of theories that treats theories as abstract structures satisfied by sets of objects. To temporar-
ily gloss the technical details of the point, any set, given that it is big enough, can satisfy
the abstract mathematical structure appealed to as a representation of theoretical knowledge.
This work has suggested that Carnap’s theory of theories is just as susceptible to Newman’s
objection as Russell’s.
Demopoulos and Friedman (1985), while addressing Russell’s structuralism and the im-
plications of Newman’s argument for Russell’s metaphysics and epistemology, articulated the
broader applicability of Newman’s objection. Subsequently, Demopoulos produced an instruc-
tive and wide-ranging account of several disparate approaches to theoretical knowledge that
suffer a common problem. He argued that they all share the abstract conception of theories1
which holds that the non-logical language of a theory can be partitioned into observational and
theoretical terms. Moreover, and essentially for the epistemological issue, the partition is a
reflection that our “understanding of the theoretical vocabulary is importantly incomplete and
problematic in a way that our understanding of the observation vocabulary is not,” (Demopou-
los 2012d, 140). According to Demopoulos, the abstract conception of theories gives rise to a
common principle held by the views of theoretical knowledge he critcizes. This common prin-
ciple is the structuralist thesis which holds that “the theoretical component of what our theories
express is wholly captured by statements which depend only on the logical category of their
constituent concepts,” (161). The common problem that arises from these considerations is that
structuralist accounts of theoretical knowledge are essentially trivialized by reducing them to
claims about satisfiability conditions in a structure. In that context, Newman’s objection, with
limited assumptions, guarantees our theoretical claims to be true in virtue of a matter of logic
and ambient set theory. This situation, Demopoulos argues, deprives our claims to theoretical
knowledge of the character of significant a posteriori discoveries.
The views of theoretical knowledge (or more precisely, those members of the abstract
conception of theories) that Demopoulos engages most thoroughly are what he considers the
broadly logicist discussions of scientific theory of Russell, Ramsey, and Carnap.2 Demopoulos’
criticism, however, is not restricted to those three figures of the broadly ‘syntactic’ tradition.
1. These notions are discussed in detail in 2.3.3 and contextualized more broadly in 2.3.2.
2. The extent to which Ramsey and Carnap’s analyses of scientific theory are genuinely attributable to a logicist
tradition, or rather something more of a hybrid involving aspects of Hilbert’s formalist approach, is disputable.
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Demopoulos argues in several places for an application of his criticism to semantic views of
theories as well. I have already emphasized that the concern is epistemological, but it is worth
making the point absolutely clear. Demopoulos considers the abstract conception of theories
as it runs through Russell, Ramsey, and Carnap as “not a merely schematic representation of
the general notion of an empirical theory, but the backbone of a general account of our knowl-
edge of the physical world,” (Demopoulos 2012c, 108). Moreover, it affects a surprisingly
wide class of views that do not share the basic metaphysical or epistemological orientation of
Russell’s The Analysis of Matter, including semantic approaches to theories like constructive
empiricism, and those forms of structural realism endorsing the Ramsey-sentence.
As it will be made more clear in the following chapters, the Demopoulos–Newman criti-
cism is essentially set or model theoretic. The mathematical aspects of the argument are indeed
unobjectionable and the views, as Demopoulos has presented them, fail, for the same reason
in each case, to give a satisfactory account of our theoretical knowledge in science. That set
theory is a good foundation for mathematics does not imply it is a good foundation for physics.
Indeed, the notion that a scientific theory is an abstract formalism is a bad starting point. My
analysis aims to show that this abstract conception of theories does not adequately characterize
Ramsey’s view. The views set out in his seminal paper “Theories” are not an attempt to do
the epistemology of science in a fashion like that of Russell or Eddington, or those views that
continue to dominate the philosophy of science. For Ramsey, a scientific theory is fundamen-
tally more than its logical structure. Demopoulos’ arguments notwithstanding, Ramsey’s own
view is to be distinguished from the structuralist views of most who have adopted the Ramsey-
sentence. Arguing for this thesis requires both exposition of Ramsey’s work and an attempt at
reconstructing, or perhaps constructing, a broader theory of theories in light of Ramsey’s other
remarks bearing on the philosophy of science.
1.2 Overview
Chapter 2 describes Newman’s objection in the original context of Russell’s account of the-
oretical knowledge. From there some general mathematical background is developed for the
subsequent discussion. Demopoulos’ application of the Newman objection from his “Three
views of theoretical knowlege” is then explained to show the wide applicability of the crit-
icism to seemingly disparate approaches to theoretical knowledge. Eddington’s philosophy
of science and ‘scientific epistemology’ is used as a contrasting case of structuralism to Rus-
sell’s, while simultaneously demonstrating another historical application of Newman’s objec-
tion. Lastly, Newman’s objection is given in a generalized, model-theoretic form to understand
its broad application.
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Chapter 3 develops a reconstruction of Ramsey’s thought contrary to Demopoulos’ inter-
pretation. To that end it emphasizes the philosophical context of Ramsey’s paper “Theories.”
The chapter begins by situating Ramsey’s work initially as a direct response to Russell’s views.
From there an exegesis of Ramsey’s “Theories” is developed in order to distance Ramsey’s
work from Demopoulos’ criticisms and the form of structuralism attributed to it. The recon-
struction of Ramsey’s views proceeds from there by placing “Theories” in the broader context
of his papers on general propositions and causality. Crucially, I argue that the Ramsey-sentence
is not meant to be an explication of our theoretical knowledge, but rather a tool for understand-
ing the inferential and conceptual role of theoretical terms when a theory is considered as a
language along the lines dictated by the philosophical context Ramsey inherited from Russell
and others.
Chapter 4 analyses the philosophical context Ramsey was investigating, but more signifi-
cantly, reconsiders the philosophical context best suited to the application of his views. Ram-
sey’s ideas have been variously attributed to forms of scientific realism, instrumentalism, and
structural realism. This chapter distances Ramsey’s work from questions about the preferred
interpretational framework for evaluating the truth of a theory. If the terms of the realism-
instrumentalism debate are to be applied to Ramsey, his remarks on various topics, including
the appropriate notion of truth, indicate that he was surely an instrumentalist; however, there is
good reason to think that his analyses were not concerned to argue for the metaphysical, episte-
mological, or semantic theses that divide realists and instrumentalists. It is shown that Ramsey
anticipates something like Carnap’s internal–external distinction. Demopoulos extends Car-
nap’s distinction and instructively applies it to the realism–instrumentalism controversy, using
the confirmation of the atomic hypothesis as a case where what seems to be an external ques-
tion on Carnap’s account is settled a posteriori by methods within the theoretical framework.
I show that a parallel extension is compatible with Ramsey’s reconstructed view. Moreover, I
argue that Ramsey’s analysis of Newtonian space–time, along with other remarks, uphold the
authoritative role of experience in our theoretical knowledge while illuminating the inferential
role that theoretical terms play in empirical judgements.
Chapter 2
The origins and applications of Newman’s
objection
2.1 Newman’s objection contra Russell
2.1.1 Russell on the external world
Newman’s objection to Russell occurs in the context of Newman’s criticism of Russell’s
causal theory of perception as formulated in The Analysis of Matter. While someone might
think this perhaps narrowly confines Newman’s cricticism, the fact is that the causal theory of
perception plays a central role in Russell’s book. There, Russell seeks to investigate the philo-
sophical outcome of physics, or rather more accurately, whether physics has a philosophical
outcome. Newman connects this question with the philosophical problem of our knowledge of
the external world. It is Russell’s attempt to solve this problem that Newman initially criticizes,
but also finds his objection applicable to Russell’s treatment of the problem of interpretation in
physics.
Like many of us, Russell has decided that the external world does, in some sense, exist. The
problem he faces, however, is that of giving an account of the world beyond our experience.
That is, Russell and Newman, the latter at least for the sake of argument, take for granted
several principles which frame the problem. Our experience serves as the data for forming
physical theories as well as the material by which which we test them. Everything else we
might include in the formation and testing of our theories is then at best an inference. This
is taken to imply a view of physical theory such that a theory just is the set of all predictions
about our sensations. The suitability of this view is not something to trouble ourselves with
now. Rather, the important point is to note, as Newman does, that this view of theories does
not entail that there is nothing but our experience or sensations. As Newman says:
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When the province of the physical has been marked off there still remains the
important question whether in fact predictions about our own sensations exhaust
all that can be said about the world, or whether there are other external entities
which are the sources of our sensations; and if it is held that these entities exist
there is the further question, what can significantly be said about them.(Newman
1928, 138)
Russell, of course after arguing against competing positions, defends the position that the
unperceived parts of the world included in physical theory do exist. Hence, my frequent refer-
ences to Russell’s realism. As for what can be significantly said about them, Russell’s account
is built around a notion of structure. I think it is remarkable that Newman emphasizes (139)
that ‘structure’ is not defined for these purposes, but rather that Russell depends on the concept
‘sameness of structure’. Without digressing too far from the main point, it is worth indicat-
ing why this is remarkable: first, Newman’s objection involves no such refined notions of
structure as would be found in later model theoretic (or modal logical or category theoretic)
discussions—though of course his characterization is perfectly in keeping with the way these
issues are dealt with by model theory; second, its impressive given the importance of the no-
tion of structure in twentieth–century philosophy of science that both then, and often now, it is
taken for granted that we either have, or do not need, a clear analysis of the concept of struc-
ture. The first point suggests the generality of Newman’s objection; the second that the history
and development of some of these concepts are rather murky—and it is not a mark against
Russell or Newman because in a similar fashion Godel and Skolem left structure undefined
though discussed satisfaction in a structure—inviting careful analysis of how, precisely, we are
to understand what seem obvious notions in their various applications.
Sameness of structure is defined by Russell as isomorphism. Russell’s appeal to this notion
is part of his attempt to overcome the apparent difficulty that we can talk about structures as
being similar only when we have direct epistemic access to both. Appealing to isomorphism
is thus an attempt to justify our epistemic claim to structural knowledge when we lack direct
epistemic access to one of the pair of similar structures. So that we do not to take the notion for
granted, Russell describes an isomorphism as a special kind of map, namely a (1,1) correlation.
Let’s call this map φ. Suppose we have a set A of objects and a relation R that holds for certain
subsets of A, and likewise a set B and the relation S. φ sets up a coordination of the objects
of A and B and the relations R and S such that when members of A have the relation R, their
correlates in B have the relation S (and conversely). Importantly, this definition of having
the same structure does not require the objects of A and B, nor the relations R and S to be
qualitatively similar. Russell does not take this lack of qualitative similarity to be a deficit,
but rather the reason for which structure is important: “when two relations have the same
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structure..., all their logical properties are identical” (Russell 1927, 251) and that “whenever
we infer from perceptions, it is only structure that we can validly infer; and structure is what can
be expressed by mathematical logic, which includes mathematics”(254). For Russell, then, our
knowledge of the world beyond perception is concerned exclusively with its logical properties,
and not its qualitative character. As he says, “our knowledge of physics is mathematical: it
is mathematical because no non-mathematical properties of the physical world can be inferred
from perception,”(253).
It would seem then, that Russell has explained in what sense the external world exists: it
is structurally similar to the world of our experience, and knowledge of structure amounts to
a knowledge of its logical properties. Of the intrinsic qualities of the world beyond experi-
ence, nothing can be said. Of course, as an account of the nature of the world as given to us
from our knowledge of physics, or perhaps equivalently an analysis of the knowledge gained
from physics, Russell’s account is disappointing. That, however, is partially unfair to Rus-
sell insofar as he is trying to establish a kind of realism for the world beyond our sensations
contra solipsism and phenomenalism. From that perspective, establishing that we have knowl-
edge of structure beyond our experience does prove an advance over those other philosophical
positions. In that sense, he is showing a philosphical outcome of physics.
One way to object to Russell is clearly to challenge his realist arguments and show that they
are not sufficient to refute solipsism or phenomenalism. The reader will have noticed that I have
not given Russell’s argument that the external world is structurally similar to our sensations.
This is not an oversight, but instead rather beside the point immediately at issue regarding
the Newman objection; later, when developing the general characterization of the structuralist
thesis given by Demopoulos, and Gupta’s analysis of the rational contribution of knowledge
to experience, we will see more clearly that both Russell’s causal theory of perception and
structuralism embed a propositional conception of the given in experience. However, whatever
merits or flaws Russell’s causal theory of perception and justification for the structural similar-
ity between the world and our sensations have, they are tangential to seeing the generality and
the force of Newman’s criticism. Rather, if we take the point for granted and assume that there
is a similarity of structure, Newman noticed that there is a lurking epistemological criticism
for Russell’s account of what can be meaningfully said about the world beyond experience, i.e.
the “further question” Newman remarks in the above quotation.
2.1.2 The objection
The key issue which Newman identifies is Russell’s commitment that nothing but structure
is known. As a result, we cannot say anything of importance about the world beyond experi-
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ence: lacking any direct, qualitative/intrinsic knowledge, all that can be known about the world
beyond experience is the number of objects it is required to have, but nothing at all about the
character of those objects. That is because any set of things can be organized to have a given
structure as long as the structural requirements are compatible with the number of objects (e.g.,
there being at least three objects). This might seem counter-intuitive, but from a set theoretic
perspective it is correct. This claim seems to be the central point at issue between proponents
of structuralism and its opponents—that while set-theoretically correct it either is applicable
to our arguments about the epistemological outcome of physics, or not. There is an important
sense then, that insofar as Russell has reduced our knowledge through structural similarity to
purely logico-mathematical properties, we could as well be talking about a numerical system:
any investigation of that structure would be like an investigation in pure mathematics, and if
suitably codified, as an investigation of an axiomatic system like geometry.
Whether this should deeply trouble Russell, I will leave unexplored except to say that he
very clearly endorses the proposition that of the world beyond experience we can only mean-
ingfully say what can be expressed by mathematics: “[t]he only legitimate attitude about the
physical world seems to be one of complete agnosticism as regards all but its mathematical
properties” (270). However, there is a subtle way in which Russell’s account and Newman’s
objection differ from later discussions of theoretical knowledge that will concern us in later
sections. I do not mean to suggest that in those later discussions Newman’s objection is misap-
plied; quite the contrary, it achieves a statement of its full generality in those contexts and we
will see that many of the considerations Newman applies to Russell’s analysis apply in those
contexts as well. I raise the point to highlight and distinguish the objection as it is applied to
Russell from the accounts given by Ramsey and Carnap. In any case, the mathematics involved
is essentially the same, though conceptually, the accounts differ. To bring this out, I quote a
passage of Newman’s in full:
These statements can only mean, I think, that our knowledge of the external world
takes this form: The world consists of objects, forming an aggregate whose struc-
ture with regard to a certain relation R is known, say W; but of the relation R
nothing is known (or nothing need be assumed to be known) but its existence; that
is, all we can say is “There is a relation R such that the structure of the external
world with reference to R is W”. Now I have already pointed out that such a state-
ment expresses only a trivial property of the world. Any collection of things can
be organized so as to have the structure W, provided there are the right number
of them. Hence the doctrine that only structure is known involves the doctrine
that nothing can be known that is not logically deducible from the mere fact of
existence, except (“theoretically”) the number of constituting objects.
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The generating relation of the structure of the world as conceived by Mr. Russell
I take to be what he calls “causal continuity,” i.e., if we make a map in space,
exhibiting the structure, the parts that are near each other in the map are those
that represent events causally continuous with each other. But the introduction of
this name does not help us, for if Mr. Russell’s principles are to be upheld this
statement must be merely the definition of causally continuous: if anything were
directly known about its nature we should know something not structural about the
external world. (Newman 1928, 144-145)
There are, I think, two fairly interesting features of Newman’s analysis here. Nowhere in
Russell’s chapter on the importance of structure does he mention a ‘generating relation’. He
does say that “the inference from perception to physics, which we have been considering, is
one which depends upon certain postulates, the chief of which, apart from induction, is the
assumption of a certain similarity of structure between cause and effect where both are com-
plex” (Russell 1927, 249). So, it is not unreasonable for Newman to suppose that causality is
supposed to play the role of the relation between our sensations and the external world which
establishes the isomorphism. Indeed, given Russell’s causal theory of perception this makes
sense. What the point brings out quite clearly is that on Russell’s account the sensations are in
1-1 correspondence to the external world, of which we know nothing beyond its logical prop-
erties. In the case of the Newman criticism as it is applied to Ramsey and Carnap, it is a theory
as a whole, specifically its theoretical part, which can be trivialised by arbitrarily mapping it
to a set of compatible cardinality; i.e. given a cardinality assumption a trivializing structure
can be generated for the theoretical partition of the domain of a theory. Those details, and
their relevance will be brought out in context later; for now I only mention that Russell is not
questioning the validity of the inference “from percepts to events which no one perceives” but
rather its scope: “i.e. how much we can know about unperceived events, assuming the causal
theory of perception” (226). On this point he never wavers: we know only the mathematical
properties of those events.
The second feature of the quotation from Newman is the suggestion that Russell is defining
‘causal continuity’ as the relation between experience and the unperceived world. Of course,
Newman is clearly correct that if it were not a definition then we would know something not
purely structural about the relation. What is not clear is that the relation “R” is supposed
to be part of the external world. Quite clearly, we do not perceive causal continuity. But
if as Newman interprets Russell “the world consists of objects, forming an aggregate whose
structure with regard to a certain relation R is known, say W...” then it seems that conceptually
R is not so much part of our knowledge of the external world, but rather that in virtue of
which we can have structural knowledge of the external world at all. That is, R induces the
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structural correspondence between perception and the external world. In that role, it is fitting
to describe it as a definition of causal continuity, for then we bypass any question of how we
have knowledge of causal continuity between percept and stimulus. Or moreover, why other
non-structural properties of the external world may not be directly known if causal continuity
were itself non-structural knowledge. Nevertheless it is important to understand that Russell
never intended his account to attribute anything more to our knowledge beyond perception
than mathematical properties; regardless whether those properties could be assigned to any
set of sufficient cardinality can seem rather beside the point when understood as part of his
explication of the causal theory of perception.
2.2 A mathematical interlude
2.2.1 Preliminaries
A central theme for the previous and subsequent discussions is the role of Newman’s ob-
jection, or more properly its general applicability to structural claims. Essentially, Newman’s
objection to Russell is a kind of permutation argument. While Newman applies his observation
to Russell’s account of our knowledge of the world beyond sensation, Putnam later applied it in
a model theoretic context. Button and Walsh (2018), go on to use the core insight in a variety of
contexts to generate epistemological, or rather doxastic (which is to say, questions about how
we can possibly have even beliefs let alone knowledge) problems primarily in mathematics and
the philosophy thereof. Those details and their arguments are not of immediate concern except
in this sense: if their project of problematizing how we can even have beliefs about mathemat-
ical structures is successful, it poses a genuine challenge to those epistemologies of science
which take the mathematical structures deployed by scientific theorizing as having a genuine
explanatory role. The bright side, I think, is that we can set this aside as a prior problem. That
is to say, we leave those problems to the philosophy of mathematics. Of course, if we could
not form beliefs about mathematical entities and structures, we could not appeal to our knowl-
edge of mathematical structure for explanatory or epistemological purposes in the philosophy
of science. So then, we take for granted that we do seem to have knowledge of mathematical
structures and leave the epistemology and doxology thereof to the philosophy of mathematics.
I mention this to indicate that permutation arguments like that found in Newman’s objec-
tion, first, have a more general form which cause a problem for structural accounts in the phi-
losophy of science other than Russell’s, and secondly, that this sort of argument has philosophic
interest extending well beyond the philosophy of science to the philosophies of mathematics,
language, and metaphysics. The first point is that which concerns us for better understanding
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the philosophical-exegetical issues at play with structuralisms in the philosophy of science.
To that end, what follows in this section is a brief presentation of the mathematical backbone
of Newman-style objections, or what we will call, following Button and Walsh, push-through
constructions. Indeed, Demopoulos’ quick treatment of the model theoretic version of the
objection in his papers has led to some doubt and attempts to refute his claims on logico-
mathematical grounds both in print, e.g. (Lutz 2020), and in discussion. Conceptually, the
push-through construction is a manner of defining a function, specifically a bijection, on one
mathematical structure that under the action of that function a new structure is created which is
isomorphic to the first. In other words, the function’s action on elements, sets of elements, sets
of sets etc. induces the required conditions for an isomorphic copy of the original structure.
The signature of a structureA is a set of three kinds of symbol:1 the set of constants ofA,
for each n>0 the set of n-ary relation symbols, and the set of n-ary function symbols. Hereafter
L will be used to signify signatures. If A has signature L, we call A an L-structure. L may
also stand for a language, which is convenient as we may think of a signature as a kind of
rudimentary language for talking about a structureA.
A structureA is a mathematical object consisting of:
1. A non-empty set A which is the domain ofA
2. An object cA ∈ A for each constant symbol ofA
3. For each n>0 a set of n-ary relation symbols on A, i.e., RA ⊆ An for each n-ary relation
symbol from L
4. A set of operations on A, i.e. maps such that fA : An → A for each n-ary function
symbol of L
2.2.2 Isomorphisms
Let M and N be L-structures. A bijection (one-one correspondence) from M to N ,
h : M → N , is an isomorphism if and only if (iff): for any L constant symbol, n-ary rela-
1. I follow Button and Walsh’s notation throughout for ease of reference because for the purpose of my dis-
cussion we only need snapshots from their project. It should be noted that their ~ below is an idiosyncratic usage;
readers may be disposed to understand it under the interpretation of Plank’s constant. In our context it is merely
an abbreviatory device to show its relation to the defined function h as acting over tuples.
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tion, and n-ary function symbols, and all a1 . . . an from M:
h(cM) = cN
a1 . . . an ∈ RM iff (h(a1), . . . h(an)) ∈ RN
h( fM(a1 . . . an)) = fN (h(a1), . . . h(an))
We writeM  N .
Hereafter the tuples a1 . . . an will be abbreviated ā. To make things snappier, let h : M→ N
be any bijection and let ā be from M. Then ~(ā) = (h(a1) . . . h(an)). Conceptually, what we are
doing is pushing the map h through sets of elements ofM and N .
An Aside: This extends to sets of sets of elements, etc., up the iterative hierarchy
of sets to define h on higher level objects if we wish. That is, for X ⊆ Mn, ~(X) =
{~(ā) : ā ∈ X} and similarly, for Y ⊆ ℘(Mn), ~(Y) = {~(X) : X ∈ Y}. Here, Y is a set
of sets of tuples. So the map h on a higher level object φ is defined as the set which
collects the action of h on all of φ’s members. In the example of Y we could see Y as
the range for n-place relation variables in a (second order) HenkinL-structure defined
on M. I mention this first to show that these notions generalize, but more importantly,
because appeals are sometimes made in the philosophy of science to non-standard
(i.e. Henkin) semantics though I have not seen it noted that the permutation argument
applies mutatis mutandis (that is, other than by Button and Walsh).
2.2.3 Push–Through
This follows Button and Walsh’s (2018) discussion closely.
Let L be any signature, M an L-structure with domain M, and let h : M → N be any
bijection. We can then use h to define an L structure N on the set N by defining sN = ~(sM)
for every L symbol s. I.e.:
cN = h(cM)
RN = ~(RM) = {h(ā) : ā ∈ RM}
fN = h ◦ fM ◦ ~−1 such that fN (~(ā)) = h( fM(ā))
(Here ~−1(b̄) = ā iff h(ā) = b̄; we know that ~−1 exists because we defined ~ to be
a bijection.)
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So what is the cash value of the push-through construction? If we think that model the-
ory (or mathematics generally) pins down the ideas of reference and truth, the push-through
construction can raise serious sceptical concerns regarding the indeterminacy of reference, and
thereby truth conditions. In fact, as we will see later, the issue of truth as it relates to Ramsey
and Carnap is a major concern in Demopoulos’ analysis.
A more recherché aside: There are examples in the literature that use toy examples
to make this more accessible; however, I do not always find them to be entirely il-
luminating. They certainly illustrate the point, but our intuitions about the ordinary
use of language, as well as truth and reference can make the examples seem like a bit
of a sleight of hand. Instead I will give a contrast that I think makes the point more
clear. In Tarski semantics we have a variable assignment which is a function from the
set of variables to the underlying domain of our structure. Two distinct variable as-
signments will differ insofar as they assign different elements to at least one variable.
Here h is a function which permutes the reference of our non-logical vocabulary (i.e.
constants, relations, functions). Where two variable assignments can make different
sentences true in the same structure (i.e. M, σ  ψ(x), butM, γ 2 ψ(x)), by construc-
tion of h, the structureN (the h image ofM) makes exactly the sameL sentences true
asM, despite the permutation induced by h. That is, by constructionM  N , hence
they satisfy all the same sentences, regardless of the permutation of the underlying
domain.
2.3 Three Views of Theoretical Knowledge: A critical exegesis
In order to appreciate Demopoulos’ application of Newman’s objection to Russell, and
to get a grasp of the situation for other forms of structuralism, it is advantageous to closely
examine his last published paper on these issues. There he isolates the role of both the abstract
conception of theories and the structuralist thesis.2 For the purposes of understanding the
Newman objection and its impact for structuralism in the philosophy of science generally, and
the work of F.P. Ramsey in particular, this paper of Demopoulos’ explores the relevant issues,
while emphasizing the generality of the underlying arguments and considerations.
2. Arguably, “On the rational reconstruction of our theoretical knowledge” is his most representative paper
characterizing together the views of Russell, Ramsey, and Carnap, but it is only in (Demopoulos 2012d) that
Demopoulos explicitly diagnoses the underlying problem for theoretical knowledge as arising from the abstract
conception of theories and the structuralist thesis.
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2.3.1 Context of the paper
“Three views of theoretical knowlege” is the culmination of a series of papers Demopou-
los wrote exploring the Newman criticism. In particular it extends the considerations in his
“On the rational reconstruction of our theoretical knowledge” where he also lays out Russell’s,
Ramsey’s, and Carnap’s views. There, his central thesis is that the reconstructive programs
of Russell, Ramsey, and Carnap fail to respect our “pre-analytic” intuition that the truth of a
theory, over its intended domain, is a significant a posteriori truth. Like Russell’s structuralism,
the Ramsey-sentence “approach” makes the truth of a theory depend on an assumption about
cardinality. In “Three views of theoretical knowlege,” Demopoulos offers a sharper diagnosis
of where structural views go wrong, emphasizing that it is the common underlying principle
he characterizes as the structuralist thesis stemming from the abstract view of theories3 which
causes the common problem for a wide range of approaches to theoretical knowledge. More-
over, he sketches a positive proposal in contrast to the structural views he criticizes.
Notice that I refer to a Ramsey-sentence “approach”. There are two points to be made here.
The first point is this: the following sections discuss this approach to follow Demopoulos, but
it is not clear in the histories of philosophical logic or philosophy of science that work done
involving the Ramsey-sentence can be characterized as engaging with a common approach;
certainly it engages with a common logical construct, but the research is not evidently con-
cerned with any unique application of that construct. The second point is that we need a clear
statement of what is meant by a Ramsey-sentence. The “Ramsification” of a theory is essen-
tially a technique for formalizing the structure of a scientific theory whereby:
1. the primary and secondary systems divide the language of the theory,
2. their interrelations are exhibited in some fashion, i.e., a dictionary or set of correspon-
dence rules, and axioms,
3. the reference to the secondary terms (or entities) is removed through existential general-
ization.
To give an idea of this, the following is how Ramsey suggested the ideal representation
of a theory should be written: “(∃α, β, γ) : dictionary · axioms”. That statement is Ramsey’s
infamous Ramsey-sentence. A more contemporary representation would take some theory T
with terms t1 . . . tn in the secondary system, i.e. T[t1 . . . tn], and replacing those terms with vari-
ables: ∃x1 . . .∃xnT[x1 . . . xn]. For immediate purposes, we are not going very far into Ramsey’s
characterization of theories, or the general idea of Ramsification beyond that outlined above.
3. Cf. 2.3.3 below and my remarks in the Introduction
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This serves a methodological purpose. To avoid pre-judging any of the relevant issues it is
important to have at hand a sufficiently general idea of Ramsification to understand Demopou-
los’ arguments in the following sections. In the context of Demopoulos’ analysis the primary
and secondary systems are assumed to be divided between observational and theoretical lan-
guages.4 When referring to a theory in the context of Ramsification, the convention I will
follow generally will be to refer to a given theory by ‘ϑ’ and the Ramsey-sentence thereof
‘R(ϑ)’, except in cases where it is more helpful to adhere to some other notation (such as to
remain consistent with a primary source), in which case the relevant notation will always be
clear in context.
2.3.2 Overview
The target of Demopoulos’ analysis is the structuralist thesis which he describes as un-
derlying the views of theoretical knowledge advocated by Rusell, Ramsey and Carnap. The
structuralist thesis implies that the Ramsey-sentence of a theory adequately expresses its fac-
tual content.5 This is to say that the theoretical component of our theories is captured by state-
ments which depend only on the constituent concepts having the right arity and logical type.
He argues that any empiricist view built on the thesis fails as a representation of our theoretical
knowledge because it conflates model theoretic satisfiability with truth. That is, the truth of our
theoretical statements becomes a fact of the ambient set theory or metalogic given only an as-
sumption about the cardinality of the underlying domain. This clearly violates our pre-analytic
intuition that the truth of our theoretical claims are substantial a posteriori discoveries.
In order to justify that last claim he demonstrates how Newman’s objection to Russell’s
structuralism can be applied to both Ramsey and Carnap’s reconstructive programs. New-
man’s objection essentially relies on a certain kind of argument for constructing isomorphic
structures. In the specific cases of Ramsey and Carnap, the construction requires the extra
stipulation that the new structure has an observation-language reduct which keeps the inter-
pretation of the observable part of the domain fixed. All this can be proven. Notice that the
problem the Newman objection poses to all three views is not only the difficulty in specifying
an intended model among a class of isomorphic models, but the deeper point that the truth of
our theoretical claims is reduced to satisfiability in any, hence, all of the models. For Russell,
the objection deflates his realism regarding positing extensions of the domain for theoretical
entities; for Ramsey, we have no apparent reason to oppose Russell’s realism; for Carnap, as
4. I label the above in terms of primary and secondary because I believe that framing Ramsey’s views in
terms of a strictly observational/theoretical partition is a major example of subsequent theorists misattributing a
substantive philosophical position to Ramsey which he did not obviously share.
5. Cf. Button and Walsh 2018 Proposition 3.5 and its corollary Proposition 3.2 for a proof that a Ramsey-
sentence of a theory is observationally equivalent to the un-Ramsified theory.
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the culmination of the structuralist thesis, theoretical truth loses any semblance of its empirical
a posteriori character.
Demopoulos ends the paper with a positive view drawing on work by Gupta. The proposal
involves a shift away from the structuralist thesis and a reconsideration of the role for experi-
ence in interpretation. On the views characterized by the abstract view of theories, experience
gives us a priveledged class of statement, i.e. the observation language. While Gupta is not
engaging directly with the philosophy of science, his work seeks to provide an account of the
logical contribution of experience. Briefly, experience gives us an entitlement not to a proposi-
tion or a privileged class thereof, but to a proposition relative to a particular background view.
The given in experience is hypothetical, that is, it serves the role of something like a rule of
inference giving us hypothetical entitlements relative to the view we have adopted. Gupta, and
Demopoulos’ extension of his thought to issues of theoretical knowledge, try to account for the
authoritative role of experience in our knowledge, which has been undermined by misguided
forms of empiricism.
2.3.3 Target of the analysis
The target of Demopoulos’ analysis is theoretical knowledge as construed by the views, be-
longing to the abstract conception of theories, and which subscribe to the structuralist thesis.6
Abstract conception of theories:
I mean that view of theories which asserts first, the existence of a partition of the
non-logical vocabulary of the language of a theory into observation and theoretical
terms, and holds, secondly that this partition reflects the fact that our understanding
of the theoretical vocabulary is importantly incomplete and problematic in a way
that our understanding of the observation vocabulary is not. (Demopoulos 2012d,
140)
Structuralist Thesis:
The theoretical component of what our theories express is wholly captured by
statements which depend only on the logical category of their constituent concepts.
(161)
Moreover, it“implies that the Ramsey-sentence of a theory adequately represents the theory’s
‘factual’ content,” (140).
6. Notice that the way I have construed it has the views subscribing to the structuralist thesis as a subset of the
abstract conception of theories which itself is included in accounts of theoretical knowledge.
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Notice that he goes on to say that:
If this consequence of the structuralist thesis could be sustained, then any dif-
ficulty the theoretical vocabulary might be thought to pose could safely be ig-
nored. . . (Demopoulos 2012d, 140)
So, Demopoulos is bound to argue either that 1) the Ramsey-sentence of a theory does not cap-
ture a theory’s factual content, or 2) it does not obviate the difficulty the theoretical vocabulary
poses.
2.3.4 All that business about toy models and Craig transcriptions
The details here are rather technical, but it is not essential to venture too far into them to see
their value. First, Demopoulos constructs a toy theory whose purpose is designed to show that
the Ramsey-sentence, in a sense, has a content which goes beyond the observational conse-
quences of the theory. To do this he contrasts the Ramsey-sentence with a Craig transcription.
Craig transcriptions are a way of generating a model of the observational consequences of a
theory, but where unlike the Ramsey method, the theoretical terms are not existentially general-
ized away, but rather eliminated altogether while preserving the observational consequences of
the theory. I will not venture into the details here; for reference, Psillos 1999 contains a superb
discussion of Craig transcriptions in the context of the philosophy of science. I will only men-
tion that Craig transcriptions apply to first-order theories, where Ramsey-sentences are higher
order representations—Ramsey does not stipulate that they be only second order either, leaving
it open that Ramsey-sentences could characterize theories in nth order languages, though it is
generally taken that the Ramsey-sentence of a theory is a second order sentence. I mention as
well that Putnam (2012) provides a very similar proof for the same point that Demopoulos’ toy
model is intended to serve.
What Demopoulos’ toy model shows is that there are cases where we can have a model of a
Craig transcription of a theory, i.e. one in which all the observational consequences of a theory
are true, but where a model of the corresponding Ramsey-sentence for the theory fails. To put it
briefly, the toy theory requires for the truth of its Ramsey-sentence a non-standard model of the
natural numbers. When the theory is characterized using full second order logic (that is, using
the standard semantics where the domain of the relations ranges over the full powerset of the
domain of the structure) the Craig transcription of the theory is true, but the Ramsey-sentence
fails. The Craig transcription comes out true because the toy theory was designed to only
need standard numbers for its observational component. However, the Ramsey-sentence of the
toy theory, because it describes the ranges of relations of the theoretical component, requires
a non-standard model but, by a theorem of metalogic/mathematics (Dedekind’s Categoricity
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Theorem), all full models are categorical—which is to say that there are no non-standard mod-
els.7 So, we have a case where the Ramsey-sentence of the theory constrains the class of models
of the observational consequences of the theory. Before proceeding, we need to rehearse what
we mean by extensions and expansions.
Extension (subinterpretation):d f enlarging (contracting) the domain while keeping the language
fixed.
Expansion (reduct):d f enlarging (contracting) the language while keeping the domain fixed.
In slogan form: extensions change ontology; expansions, ideology.
2.3.5 Demopoulos reading Russell
Demopoulos recognizes that Russell neither proposed a theory of theories that required a
language partitioned into observational and theoretical terms, nor suggested that the Ramsey-
sentence of a theory adequately expresses its factual content. Russell developed his structural-
ism in The Analysis of Matter before Ramsey developed his own ideas. Russell was, however,
committed to the structuralist thesis and, in virtue of his epistemological project of analysing
propositional understanding on the basis of knowledge by acquaintance, he was similarly com-
mitted to the abstract view of theories. The structuralist thesis is, according to Demopoulos, the
fundamental assumption of any reconstruction along the lines of such a distinction/partition,
hence why we collect Ramsey and Carnap along with Russell.
On the account of knowledge derived from Russell’s theory of meaning, the causal theory
of perception, and his distinction between acquaintance and description, we require an account
of those properties and relations with which we can have no acquaintance. That is, we need to
have a different account of our knowledge of the unobservable or theoretical relations (and en-
tities) posited by our theory. As Demopoulos puts it: “Russell’s project is to recover a facsimile
of what passes for our knowledge of the world within the framework of epistemic constraints
imposed by his theories of perception and propositional understanding,” (Demopoulos 2012d,
149). Russell’s account thereof is, however, fundamentally impeded by Newman’s objection.
Here is Newman’s argument in a nutshell: For any modelM of our theory ϑ we can construct
7. Technically this is not quite right: Dedekind’s theorem addresses itself to second order Peano arithmetic and
not natural numbers per se. Indeed, the version I am familiar with uses “is a natural number” in the metalanguage
so we seem not to have stepped outside of the circle if we are trying to pin down “the” natural numbers. But
this is all just a bit of pedantry beside Demopoulos’ point. It should also be noted that Button and Walsh, in
their appendix to the discussion of Newman’s objection, raise some concern that the way these considerations
are formulated in Demopoulos 2012d can mishandle observables in the context of a modified Newman objection
using elementary extensions, but it is not clear that this is detrimental to the point about Ramsey-sentences and
Craig transcriptions.
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another model N which satisfies ϑ. We will (only very slightly) sketch an adaption of a proof
of Winnie’s (1967) to highlight the relevant points.8
Let L = Lo ∪ Lv and Lo ∩ Lv = ∅. Let M be any L-structure such that M  ϑ. Let
A be the part of the domain that is the observables. Let U be any set of cardinality κ where
κ is the cardinality of the unobservables in domain M, i.e. κ = |MA| and A ∩ U = ∅. Let
ϕ be a bijection ϕ : MA → U. Let ψ be a bijection ψ : M → (A ∪ U) such that ψ(x) = x
if x ∈ A and ψ(x) = ϕ(x) if x ∈ MA. Now define a structure N such that cN = ψ(cM)
and RN = ψ(RM) = {ψ(ā) : ā ∈ RM}. We can extend this to account for functions as well:
fN = ψ ◦ fM ◦ ψ−1 such that fN (ψ(ā)) = ψ( fM(ā)). To explain just what happened here, we
took the bijection we defined and used it to construct a new structure where the interpretation
of the non-logical vocabulary in the new structure is the value under ψ of our original structure.
By construction we kept the observable part of the domain the same, but we have “pushed
through” the values of the unobservables to their interpretation in the new structure.9
This is not quite Newman’s objection to Russell as we saw it in 2.1.2 because we are keep-
ing the underlying domain of observables fixed, but it is an adaption that makes perfect sense.
His general objection finds itself well illustrated model-theoretically by the push-through con-
struction (2.2.3). For comparison, recall what Newman did say contra Russell:
Any collection of things can be organized so as to have the structureW provided
there are the right number of them. Hence the doctrine that only structure is known
involves the doctrine that nothing can be known that is not logically deducible
from the mere fact of existence, except (“theoretically”) the number of constituting
objects. (Newman 1928, 144)
Note that in the text, Demopoulos frames the Newman objection in terms of extensions
instead of (as we just did; at least tacitly) in terms of expansions. Button and Walsh 2018
compellingly argue that the best form of the Newman objection contra the realist is (similar
to) that which we just offered: the “Newman Cardinality Objection”. They treat Demopoulos’
“Newman Extension Objection” and show that there is no way to rule out the possibility that
the elements of the enlarged ontology, which are intended to be theoretical, end up being des-
ignated such that they belong to ‘Ob’ in Winnie’s terms; where ‘Ob’ is a predicate to which
all and only the observable entities and relations belong—its role is as a technique to fix the
observables in the domain. Their discussion makes use of an overspill lemma (in this context it
is for non-standard models of Peano Arithmetic rather than analysis). In a slogan: the Newman
Extension Objection mishandles ‘theoretical’ entities. Though Button and Walsh’s argument
8. The subscripts indicate the observational and theoretical partitions of the language.
9. For all the details, see Button and Walsh chapters 2 and 3, 2018.
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is correct, I think Demopoulos was emphasizing a feature of Russell’s approach to logical
construction and Russell’s realist assumptions.10 While this runs the risk of mishandling ob-
servables, Demopoulos is right to challenge the realist assumptions Russell’s view employs,
namely that “the realist component of [Russell’s] theory consists in the assertion that there is
an extension of the domain of events that are known by acquaintance to one that includes theo-
retical events” (Demopoulos 2012d, 151). His conclusion contra Russell riffs on a now familiar
theme from the older papers. Here is the quotation in full:
But the structuralist component’s account of the nature of the knowledge expressed
by such assertions11 is actually in tension with the realist component, since it has
the consequence that statements about the theoretical part of the domain are true as
a matter of logic and an assumption about cardinality, a consequence that vastly un-
derstates the intended epistemic significance of theoretical statements and threat-
ens the robustness of Russell’s claim to realism about the theoretical part of the
domain. (159, my footnote)
It is worth nothing that while Russell did not seem to countenance the Newman objection
here, he understood something like it. He makes very similar points to the cardinality consider-
ations in his The Problems of Philosophy and specifically in his Introduction to Mathematical
Philosophy. The history of Russell’s response to Newman is unclear. We know that he accepted
the objection, but he also tried to suggest that Newman’s characterization of his position, and
hence the objection, misses the mark. Nevertheless, there are many points in Russell 1927
encouraging that interpretation, and Russell never clarified what he really intended.
2.3.6 Demopoulos reading Ramsey
Demopoulos’ interpretation of Ramsey focuses on a perceived difference between Ramsey
and Russell regarding positing an extension to the domain of entities described by observational
language in order to satisfy the claims in the theoretical part. He contrasts Russell’s realism
with what he describes as Ramsey’s anti-realism. As a result, much of Demopoulos’ discussion
focuses on the toy model of the natural numbers he develops to show that a theory can have
a true Craig transcription but a false Ramsey-sentence. While this discussion is interesting in
its own right, it runs the risk of overlooking one of Demopoulos’ central claims by focusing
on the toy model. That claim is that Ramsey’s approach to theories, characterized by the
10. Crucially, the point Button and Walsh are making about the Newman Cardinality objection is that notions of
consequence-conservation, and expansion-conservation align in the second order context of the Ramsey-sentence,
but fail to align in in the first-order context considering elementary expansions.
11. i.e., about events outside our acquaintance.
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Ramsey-sentence, endorses both the abstract conception of theories and the structuralist thesis.
Ramsey’s view, like Russell’s, is therefore held to be subject to Newman’s objection. Briefly, I
turn to discuss Demopoulos’ characterization of the difference between Russell and Ramsey.
Demopoulos notices that “for Ramsey, the secondary system introduces new parameters
that are defined on the domain of any application of the theory. . . ” (Demopoulos 2011, 191).
He contrasts Russell with Ramsey insofar as the latter does not require for the interpretation
of the parameters (theoretical variables) an extension of the observable part of the domain.
According to Demopoulos, “the purpose of the secondary system and the theoretical vocabu-
lary it introduces is to organize our knowledge of the things with which we are acquainted”
(191). The fact that the inclusion of the parameters need not enlarge the domain encourages
Demopoulos to suggest what he calls Ramsey’s Principle: “If the Ramsey-sentence of a theory
can only be modelled by an extension of the domain of a model of its Lo-consequences, then
this is grounds for rejecting the theory” (191).
He characterizes Ramsey’s view as a development of Russell’s earlier phenomenalism, con-
tra Braithwaite’s interpretation which claims that Ramsey’s goal was a refutation of Russell’s
project of logical constructions. Briefly, the refutation follows these lines: if we follow Rus-
sell’s program, we would have to explicitly define terms of the secondary system by terms in
the primary.12 Doing so would prevent the theory from being capable of growth, but we want
our theories to be dynamic, ergo Russell’s project cannot be right. Demopoulos instead argues
that the issue separating Russell and Ramsey relates to the legitimacy of extensions of the do-
main. The issue turns on how we are to understand the truth of a theory which Demopoulos
takes to be equivalent to asking “whether or not the truth of the theory requires extensions
of the domains of its application” (Demopoulos 2012d, 157).13 That is, whether we ought to
extend our claims to theoretical knowledge, as Russell would, to entities beyond those known
by acquaintance, or rather, as Demopoulos suggests of Ramsey, that our theoretical knowledge
ought only to be expressed in terms of a primary system even if the larger theoretical system
aids in expressing truths beyond what could be inferred with a primary system alone.
Notice this quotation:“Ramsey’s view of the role of theories and the interest he attached
to ramsification would then come down to the idea that a potentially infinite description in
12. Ramsey defines the primary system in terms of the secondary system in order to approach questions re-
garding explicit definitions (cf. Sahlin 1990, 135). This method of approaching the definitions would not be
allowed by Russell since in his case, we can assume any definition would need to come from the epistemologicaly
prior objects of acquaintance. This itself suggests Ramsey was not concerned with the issue of definability for
epistemological reasons, or at the very least, not directly.
13. Specifically, Demopoulos is looking at truth in these terms here. His “On the rational reconstruction
of our theoretical knowledge” and “On extending “Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology” to the realism–
instrumentalism controversy” are instructive accounts discussing different meta-theoretic attitudes to truth. Those
issues are discussed in chapter 4.
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terms of primary propositions is rendered manageable—finitely axiomatized—by the addition
of finitely many new ‘theoretical’ parameters,” (Demopoulos 2011, 190). Craig and Vaught
proved the finitely axiomatizability of systems through the addition of additional parameters in
1958. It is important to keep in mind that while the Ramsey-sentence may not be adequate to
express our theoretical knowledge, it need not be considered as a failed endeavour. There was
much work done in the middle part of the twentieth century to answer questions both about
the Ramsey-sentence, and issues it was suggested to solve, particularly regarding notions of
definability.
While Demopoulos may be right that “the phenomenalist contention that the secondary vo-
cabulary is eliminable is one that Ramsey’s analysis was intended to support” (Demopoulos
2012d, 157), he has not shown that for Ramsey it is an elimination for epistemological pur-
poses. Ramsey does explicitly deny the need for such eliminations, and doubts their value.
Applying the Newman argument only seems to make sense on the assumption that Ramsey is
trying to characterize our theoretical knowledge as knowledge of (or by) structure, and more-
over, that in “Theories” Ramsey is engaging with primarily epistemological concerns. The
next chapter will explain why we should doubt both these points. Two large questions remain:
to what extent did Ramsey mean to support elimination as part of a structuralist approach to
theoretical knowledge—so far that is a presupposition by Demopoulos for the purposes of his
targeted criticisms of the structuralist account of theoretical knowledge; and how we should
understand the notion of elimination itself. There is an entire literature14 regarding in just what
sense we can say that the theoretical terms are ‘eliminated’: that while they are generalized
away, reference to theoretical concepts remain through the higher-order variables and the (sets
of) tuples of the domain satisfying them (this should be contrasted with Craig’s transcriptions,
cf. 2.3.4 or the especially lucid discussion thereof in Psillos 1999).
Demopoulos is quite right regarding the virtues of reading Ramsey this way. It presents
an interesting contrast with Russell and a context for Carnap’s development of the Ramsey-
sentence. I also agree that the point of Ramsey’s paper “Theories” is far from transparent.
Indeed, Demoupoulos’ interpretation has the value of showing how a structuralist approach
to theoretical knowledge along these lines can go wrong. I disagree that it is a correct or
charitable reading of Ramsey. Demopoulos, like most commentators based his interpretation
of Ramsey largely on “Theories,” though he also made use of unpublished notes from the
Ramsey archives. However, a more complete picture emerges from the texts Demopoulos does
not consider, particularly “General Propositions and Causality” and “Causal Qualities.” The
14. Of course, the existence of an entire literature does not necessarily imply there is a meaningful issue; how-
ever, in this case there has been not only philosophical analyses, but also concrete logico-mathematical results
(e.g. van Benthen, 1978).
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next chapters consist in my reconstruction of Ramsey making heavy use of those works and
other papers to situate “Theories” in its larger philosophical context.
2.3.7 Demopoulos reading Carnap
The treatment of Carnap focuses on the argument that Carnap represents a resolution (syn-
thesis) of Russell’s realist and Ramsey’s anti-realist accounts. He claims that for Carnap, the
role of the observational vocabulary is to contribute to the evidential basis of theoretical claims.
Notice, this suggestion is specifically concerned with evidential and epistemological issues.
Demopoulos notes that all three figures recognize that “the observational vocabulary is fully
understood in a way that the theoretical vocabulary is not” (Demopoulos 2011, 195). But, no-
tice as well that we lack a characterization of this understanding—we are simply told that we
do understand the primary system, but not the character or range of that understanding. De-
mopoulos frames it as a problem regarding the evidential base and the truth of our theoretical
claims. We could, however, plausibly suggest that the way our understanding is incomplete is
that we do not understand the semantic or conceptual role of our theoretical vocabulary when
we consider a theory as a language for expressing facts in the primary system. Indeed, as
Hempel shows with the theoretician’s dilemma, there is a sense in which, on the latter con-
strual, our understanding of the primary system is also incomplete, or at least problematic,
because we do not yet understand the systematic connections imposed on it by the secondary
system; that is, the role of the secondary system in forming inductive, and not only deductive,
connections.
Nevertheless, let us follow Demopoulos in considering the defect in our understanding as
roundly epistemological concerning truth and the evidential base for theoretical claims. He iso-
lates the problem, as construed by Carnap, as the the issue of finding a way of (non-arbitrarily)
marking an analytic-synthetic distinction in the theoretical vocabulary.
For Carnap, the factual component is captured by the Ramsey-sentence, while the analytic
component can be isolated through the Carnap sentence, i.e. the meaning postulate of the the-
ory. We will not go into any of those details here.15 Instead, note that to suggest that a theory’s
factual content is captured by the Ramsey-sentence is to recognize that the content of the theory
exceeds any construction that only preserves the Lo-consequences, like a Craig transcription.
Regarding the issue of extensions or expansions, Carnap deflates the issue by suggesting that
indeed, there exist logico-mathematical entities to enable us to operate the theory. So, Carnap
seems open to extensions, unlike Ramsey, but unlike Russell, those extensions need only be
understood mathematically.
15. Cf. Winnie 1970.
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“To run Newman’s objection against Carnap it is unnecessary to appeal to an em-
pirical assumption about the cardinality of the domain of theoretical events, since
for Carnap the ‘abstract’ model N of the lemma16 that figures in that objection
already suffices for the interpretation of the theory.” (Demopoulos 2012d, 161, my
footnote).
We might wonder here whether there is any point in running Newman’s objection against Car-
nap. I suggest that he seems to be engaging with other concerns.
2.3.8 Demopoulos’ conclusion and suggestion
According to Demopoulos, the structuralist thesis underlying all three of these views is the
culprit for the violation of our pre-analytic conception of the truth of our theoretical claims.
Namely, that the truth of those claims are important a posteriori discoveries, and not truths
from metalogic. In each case, the structuralist thesis encourages the thinker in question to draw
specific conclusions17. However, in each case the Newman objection problematizes the posi-
tion developed. Russell’s account of knowledge of the real world has the consequence that we
can only know the number of constituting objects; for Ramsey’s account, we have no apparent
reason to oppose Russell’s realism; and for Carnap’s account, the truth of theoretical claims
is reduced to satisfiability in a model. It is not so much that the issues with the structuralist
thesis derive from the use of Ramsey-sentences or their proxies. Rather the thesis encourages
the view that the Ramsey-sentence expresses the factual content of the theory. Here, we are
left wanting an explication of the factual content, now that Demopoulos has argued that the
Ramsey-sentence does not adequately represent it. The structuralist thesis, because of New-
man’s objection, undermines any view of empiricism using it, because the thesis equates model
theoretic satisfiability of a theoretical claim with truth.
The positive view Demopoulos presents at the end suggests a reconsideration of the role of
experience such that its role is “equally provisional” in providing a model for the interpretation
of both theoretical and observational vocabularies. Notice that up to now we do not have any
suggestion how to interpret the theoretical vocabulary, except those views just undermined by
his analysis. He encourages a view that takes theories as dynamic, fluctuating, and respon-
sive to experience at both observational and theoretical levels. Notably, “this process is never
resolved by the prescription that a correct interpretation of the theoretical vocabulary is one
that fulfils the matrix of the Ramsey-sentence of the theory to which it belongs” (Demopoulos
16. The lemma referred to here is the ‘folk’ result Demopoulos cites from van Benthem. It is also in Button and
Walsh as Thm. 4.18 along with proof.
17. Cf. pp. 161 for Demoupoulos’ detailed description of these.
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2011, 200). We are no longer considering the so-called observational partition of our theory
as having some kind of epistemic privilege such that its interpretation can be explained by
some claim to ostension or direct access whereas the theoretical vocabulary’s interpretation, by
lying beyond observation, must be given by the satisfaction of some collection of conditions.
Moreover, it is not a straightforward task to give an adequate observational/non-observational
distinction so that the language of a theory can be partitioned. We saw with Russell that this
reduced to knowledge by acquaintance. The crucial problem Demopoulos identifies, however,
is not the difficulty in drawing an appropriate distinction between observational and theoretical
terms, but rather, that even if such a partition could be satisfactorily (in both a philosophical
and methodological sense) established, the central problem Newman raises would still arise in
virtue of the adherence to the epistemic difference attributed to the partition, exemplified in the
structuralist thesis.
The criticism Demopoulos raises cuts much deeper than any particular qualms, problematic
and genuine as they might be, for marking the boundary between observational and theoretical
language. Demopoulos’ suggested research program reconsidering the role of experience ties
in with Gupta’s program in Empiricism and Experience.18 Gupta recognizes that classical em-
piricism has trouble explaining experience as our main epistemic guide. He diagnoses the flaw
endemic to these forms of empiricism as the result of two related conceptions: the Cartesian
conception of experience and the propositional given. The Cartesian conceptions of experi-
ence are characterized as those varieties of classical empiricism that in one form or another
hold that the given in experience is something with which we are immediately acquainted. The
sense-data theory is a paradigm example of a Cartesian conception. The key feature of these
conceptions, despite whatever specific differences, is that they are committed to the given in
experience being propositional; e.g., with the sense-data theory the given is a proposition of
experiencing thus-and-so, here-and-now.
Gupta contends that the central role of experience can be maintained only if we aban-
don certain classical assumptions, in particular the assumption that the given in experience
is propositional in form. Instead of construing the given in experience as a special kind of
proposition (or class thereof), Gupta formulates an account where the given in experience is a
relative notion. Gupta’s main thesis in his novel account of empiricism is that experience gives
us an entitlement not to a proposition, but to a class of judgements or propositions relative to
a particular view. His goal is to understand the logical relationship between experience and
knowledge. More precisely he is concerned with the way in which experience contributes to
the reasonableness of a belief, where the given in experience is defined as the total rational con-
tribution of an experience. As an alternative to the Cartesian conception and the propositional
18. A brief overview of Gupta’s compelling arguments can be found in his (2009).
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given, Gupta argues the given in experience is a function which takes our current view (of the
world or some subdomain thereof) and then, with input of an experience, outputs a class of
judgements. Our current view has a fundamentally hypothetical character: given the view of
the subject matter that we hold, a particular experience can generate a class of judgements. In
Gupta’s symbolic representation we have Γe(v) where we read that as Γ, the given in experience
is indexed with some particular experience e, and view v, to give the judgements the experi-
ence yields relative to the view we have. The given in experience, relative to that particular
view is like a rule of inference giving us hypothetical entitlements internal to the view we have
adopted.
Demopoulos embraces Gupta’s claims against the propositional given, recognizing that the
structuralist thesis embraces this sort of conception. In particular, he rejects the idea that expe-
rience provides us with a privileged class of propositions that form the observational partition
of theories. It is appropriate in this sense to consider Demopoulos’ suggestion as a dethroning
of the privileged observational vocabulary because he encourages expanding the role of ex-
perience beyond the epistemic boundaries represented by the partition of a theory’s language,
while at the same time upholding the pillar of empiricism which holds that experience is our
main epistemic guide. Notably, this is contrary to the dogma Demopoulos sees as motivating
the epistemic distinction between the observational and theoretical:
The notion that the distinction is a distinction of epistemological importance is
fostered by the dogma that unless it is accorded such significance, an important
pillar of empiricism will collapse. But what the dialectic reveals is not a collapse
of empiricism, but the failure of any view which is led by its understanding of
empiricism to the structuralist thesis, and from that thesis to the equation of the
mere satisfiability of a theoretical claim with its truth. (Demopoulos 2012d, 164)
Demopoulos endorses Gupta’s proposal where the logical relationship between experience
and knowledge is functional rather than propositional, and identifies the assumption of a propo-
sitional given with the defect in the accounts of theories he criticizes. The research program he
suggests is one which takes account of this functional, hypothetical character of views, adapted
to the context of scientific theories. It abolishes the epistemic privilege of the observational vo-
cabulary while simultaneously extending the role of experience for revising our theoretical
beliefs and the interpretation of our theoretical terms. According to Demopoulos the views
he has criticized are all committed to the notion of a propositional given insofar as they are
committed to the structuralist thesis. He describes the situation as follows:
In the accounts we have been discussing, the commitment to the propositional
given is expressed by the epistemologically privileged role these accounts accord
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observation sentences, and by the special epistemological status they accord the
vocabulary with which observation sentences are expressed. . . But exactly how the
epistemically privileged status of the observation vocabulary is spelled out is of
less importance than the contrast all three of the views we have described draw
between observation and theoretical vocabulary. For each of these views, not only
are propositions expressed with theoretical vocabulary not part of the given in ex-
perience, but because we are not given the meanings of their constituent theoretical
terms, theoretical statements are accorded an analysis that conforms to the struc-
turalist thesis. (Demopoulos 2012d, 166)
This suggests that the extent to which Ramsey and Carnap’s views are subject to the New-
man objection depend on whether they in fact adhere to the structuralist thesis; Russell clearly
does. Ramsey’s own more nuanced views, which I reconstruct in the following chapters, will be
seen to have a kinship and compatibility with the position developed by Gupta and encouraged
by Demopoulos. For now, I turn to another characterization of the epistemological significance
of structure and invocation of Newman’s objection.
2.4 Newman’s objection applied to Eddington
2.4.1 Summary of The Philosophy of Physical Science
Eddington’s book, which was based on his Tarner lectures, provides a clear statement of
a position in the philosophy of science which is roughly contemporary with Russell’s, and
which also had Newman’s objection applied to it. The contrast it provides sheds further light
on Russell’s position, as well as on the scope and applicability of Newman’s objection. A fur-
ther methodological reason for examining this book of Eddington’s is that it was written for
a more general audience than his technical books on physics, but unlike other less technical
(or popular) works he wrote, The Philosophy of Physical Science addresses itself to specif-
ically philosophical concerns, while at the same time exhibiting a continuity with the more
philosophical remarks throughout his corpus, e.g. Space, Time, and Gravitation. Despite this
seeming continuity in his views, some caution is required; Eddington seems to show a more
sophisticated, or at least a more careful understanding of structure in his Report on the Rel-
ativity Theory of Gravitation. Hence, the following discussion is confined primarily to The
Philosophy of Physical Science and critical responses to it.
It is helpful to consider part of the contrast between Russell and Eddington as two ways
of responding to Kant. Russell’s account is clearly intended to be a posteriori. Even as we
move behind the causal theory of perception in order to construct the world beyond experi-
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ence, any of those constructions are fundamentally reducible to our primitive experiences of
sensation. Russell is concerned to show that we can in fact say something of substance about
the world beyond our experience, namely its logico-mathematical properties. Eddington by
contrast provides an a priorist account of our scientific knowledge. Instead of rebutting Kant’s
circumscription of our knowledge to the phenomenal, he goes on to examine something like
the conditions for the possibility of our empirical knowledge, from which, he claims that he
can deduce fundamental propositions of physics which, ordinarily seem to be the result of ex-
perimental discovery. He seems to embrace the Kantian idea of a transcendental argument for
fundamental physical principles.
Eddington broaches his characterization of our physical knowledge with a consideration
explicated by a charming metaphor. He describes an ichthyologist who wishes to know the
creatures in the sea. Eddington takes the dialectic to be this: the ichthyologist could sweep
and catalogue the sea with his net, categorizing creatures and coming to various conclusions
about the lifeforms underwater. However, the ichthyologist is perforce using a net. This net
will set limitations on the sorts of creatures he can collect, most notably he will fail to collect
all those which are smaller than the structure of the net. Eddington thinks that these same con-
clusions could be drawn by the epistemologist if they were only to consider the characteristics
of the net. This, for Eddington is scientific epistemology: the epistemological investigation
of those frames of thought within which our scientific endeavours take place. The following
is representative: “[o]ur purpose is to expose, not necessarily to justify, the frame of thought
underlying the expression of our physical knowledge. . . ” (Eddington 1939, 121)
Eddington’s views are clearly of interest to other issues in the philosophy of science beyond
structuralist epistemology. For example, it is tempting to take his considerations and explore
the subtle connections between discussions of theory mediated measurement with Eddington’s
conception of scientific epistemology and his notion of good observation. This temptation is,
however interesting and valuable in its own right, beside the point for understanding Edding-
ton’s conception of our knowledge of the physical world. The issue for Eddington is prior
to any idea of stepping outside of the theory-ladeness of observation, assuming as it does the
possibility of a bifurcation between some objective world which we hope the phenomena can
somehow reveal. Rather for Eddington the point is to decry the notion of objectivity in science
whatsoever: in virtue of features of our epistemological constitution there is an ineradicably
subjective character to our physical knowledge. In Eddington’s explorations of the proper defi-
nition of physical knowledge he is led to reject the idea that objectivity plays the role of a defin-
ing property. Indeed his epistemological definition precludes any sort of difference between the
physical universe and the universe of physics.19 The latter is that which is inextricably bound
19. This discussion may be interestingly compared to the difference in the conception of phenomena between
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up with our epistemic condition.20
The following excerpts give a sense of his main contentions. The numerals indicate steps
in his argument summary of the first half of the book.
(12). . . epistemological principles play a part which was formerly taken by physical
hypotheses, i.e. generalisations suggested by an a posteriori study of the results of
observation.
(13). . . It appears that when the epistemological scrutiny of definitions is system-
atically applied, and its consequences are followed up mathematically, we are able
to determine all the “fundamental” laws of nature (including the purely numerical
constants of nature) without any physical hypothesis.
(14) This means that the fundamental laws and constants of physics are wholly
subjective, being the mark of the observer’s sensory and intellectual equipment; for
we could not have this kind of a priori knowledge of laws governing an objective
universe.
(16) The subjective laws are a consequence of the conceptual frame of thought
into which our observational knowledge is forced by our method of formulating
it, and can be discovered a priori by scrutinising the frame of thought as well as a
posteriori by examining the actual knowledge which has been forced into it.
(18) Epistemological laws (if correctly deduced) are compulsory, universal, and
exact. Since the fundamental laws of physics are epistemological, they have this
character—contrary to the view usually advocated in scientific philosophy, which
has assumed that they are merely empirical regularities.
The next four chapters will be devoted to a more intensive study of the conceptual
frame referred to in (16). (Eddington 1939, 104-105)
The intensive study indicated in the last excerpt leads to the result that our knowledge is
inherently structural. I will be the first to admit that Eddington’s book contains subtle and valu-
able insights for the philosophy of science. An entire book could (and should) be written to
detail the explication of his views and the interconnections with other philosophers of science.
However, in spite of whatever positive value his suggestions might contain, his overall account
Newton and Kant. For Kant, and it seems Eddington as well, the phenomena include all objects of experience,
including causal and dynamical information; whereas for Newton, and his deduction from phenomena involve the
relative motions of the (then) observable bodies in the solar system from which causal and dynamical inferences
are deduced. Cf. Friedman 2020, §2.
20. The reader is referred especially to the discussion from pp. 157-162 as well as 102-105
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is prey to the same kind of structural issues as beset Russell. We will see in 2.4.2 the applica-
tion of Newman’s objection to Eddington. For Eddington, the highly mathematical character
of physics today results from, in his words, our putting the mathematics there. Mathematics,
he claims, gains its foothold not through mathematical nomenclature but by the recognition of
group-theoretic structure.21 In order for an abstract notation not to disappear along an infinite
regress, we require a terminable collection of operations. He identifies groups as an adequate
such collection of operations. In a remarkably similar passage to Russell’s discussion in his
defense of the causal theory of perception, Eddington explains how there is no way for individ-
uals to compare their sensations with one another. Rather, they can only compare the structure
of their sensations. In this way, we step outside our private experience and can begin to discuss
a world that is independent of our private sensations. However, what is independent and which
is communicable between persons is knowledge of structure. As we extend our knowledge
from sensation to broader realms, we reach physical science, but:
Physical science consists of purely structural knowledge,22 so that we know only
the structure of the universe which it describes. This is not a conjecture as to the
nature of physical knowledge; it is precisely what physical knowledge as formu-
lated in present-day theory states itself to be. In fundamental investigations the
conception of group-structure appears quite explicitly as the starting point; and
nowhere in the subsequent development do we admit material not derived from
group structure. (142)
In light of our previous discussion of purely structural knowledge, we should already be
cautious of Eddington’s position. While for Russell we begin with sensa and through causal
theory of perception we reach the mathematical properties of the external world, with Edding-
ton’s scientific epistemology, while we begin with experience—and I note that he too starts
with sensa and observation—through discerning the group-theoretic character of our experi-
ence we can gain purely structural knowledge of physics. But recall the purpose of scientific
epistemology: it is to investigate the net by which we gather experience like the ichthyolo-
gist gathers their sea life. So while for Russell we gain logico-mathematical knowledge of a
world beyond our experience, an objective world, on Eddington’s account we gain structural
knowledge of the world, but of the world fundamentally as we must receive it. His a priorism
cuts against empiricism: instead of experience being our main epistemic guide, it is only able
21. For Eddington’s argument in full, cf. Eddington 1939, 139ff
22. This seems to be a place where Eddington diverges from his Kantian influence. Kant does not claim that
our scientific knowledge is purely structural, nor that we seek to characterize the noumenal in structural terms. A
transcendental argument concerning the structure and conditions of our experience is significantly different from
an argument that claims physical knowledge is structural knowledge.
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to exhibit the structure revealed by epistemological laws that are compulsory, universal, and
exact.23 Demopoulos’ objection to the structural thesis impresses itself with full force. On the
abstract conception of theories as he has explicated them, we lose the character of our theo-
retical claims being significant a posteriori discoveries. With Eddington’s a priorism, we see a
structuralist view that deliberately divests theoretical knowledge of its a posteriori character.24
2.4.2 Braithwaite and Solomon’s criticism
Braithwaite’s criticism of Eddington has a mocking tone to it, and the way he frames it, it
is difficult not to be surprised by the view Eddington puts forward given that his a priorism is
advanced around the middle of the twentieth century by someone who deeply understood 20th
century physics.25 In the previous section I tried to remain more charitable, but even so sug-
gested grounds to be troubled by Eddington’s view. Braithwaite’s review criticizes Eddington’s
a priorism, as well as Eddington’s approach itself. He raises several technical objections to Ed-
dington, to which Eddington later responded. Those details are not so useful for the purpose
at hand. Whether Eddington was justified in his epistemological considerations for using his
chosen mathematical apparati, or whether it is as absurd as Braithwaite attempts to show (e.g.,
that we get the structure of the physical world out of the “rump” of the propositional calculus),
is beside the point to understand the general view being put forward. Other than the admirably
clear exposition of the main thread of Eddington’s book, and indeed its situation in the con-
text of Eddington’s other physical and philosophical writings, Braithwaite applies Newman’s
objection to Eddington’s structuralism. Eddington’s subsequent rebuttal, that Newman’s objec-
tion to Russell applies to a less sophisticated conception of structure than his own is a rebuttal
recapitulated by later structuralist philosophers which through some appeal or other claim that
they have a more refined notion of structure that is not subject to the Newman argument.
As I mentioned before, 2.1.1, Russell does not define his notion of structure, though he does
refer the reader to his Principia Mathematica where his notion of structure is defined as a ‘rela-
tion number’. Eddinton’s suggestion that his notion of structure, which he defines to be group
structure, is more sophisticated than Russell’s, is misguided. While Russell did not appeal to
group structure or any other algebraic structure specifically in his claims regarding structural
knowledge, on Russell’s account, groups, rings, what-have-you, could all be expressed using
the apparatus of the ‘relation number’ since a relation number is essentially an isomorphism
class of models (in the modern, model theoretic sense) of a system of relations. Group theory
23. Cf. (16) in the long quotation.
24. In a sense, of course, Eddington’s argument escapes Demopoulos’ objection, because Eddington apparently
does not want to be an empiricist.
25. Unless, of course, one is not surprised by a priorism or Kantianism.
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is just one example of the kinds of structure that could be characterized using the resources of
Principia Mathematica. The following quotation from Solomon clears up some of the termi-
nological issues, and, he notes as well that for physicists at the time Eddington was writing,
group structure was taken as the paradigm abstract structure. The content in the quotation is
attributed to personal correspondence between Wilfred Hodges and Solomon:
Russell’s concept of structure is to be distinguished from the concept of structure
treated in textbooks like Model Theory (1973) by C.C. Chang and H.J. Keisler, and
Jane Bridge’s Beginning Model Theory (1977). In these texts, structure consists of
a domain (a set of elements) and a family of indexed relations and functions on the
domain. A model is a structure that belongs to a class of structures satisfying a set
of (mathematical) laws that are expressed in some formal language. For Russell
a structure (or, in Principia Mathematica, a relation-number) is an isomorphism
type of systems of relations. A system of relations is very much like a model
theoretical structure; the principal differences being that the domain of a system of
relations need not be a set and that Russell has no concept of indexing the relations
in the system. In model theoretic texts the set of indexes for a structure (model)
is its signature. All structures in a class of structures have the same signature.
Indexing is a useful notion, and one Russell would have no reason not to adopt.
(Solomon 1989, 500)
The theory of groups is exactly the kind of structure that is treated in contemporary model
theoretic texts. Moreover, in Russell’s terminology, a particularly defined group is a system of
relations, and the isomorphism class of that system is a structure in his sense. In the modern
terminology, the defined group is a structure, a model thereof is a structure which satisfies the
laws governing the group, and an isomorphism class is a class of models of the group structure,
all of the same cardinality. Indeed, this is why it makes little sense to ask how many models
exist for a given structure, but rather the meaningful question is how many isomorphism classes
of models the structure has. These terminological issues are not just mere pedantry, but a bog
through which the researcher needs to travel, without stepping off the paths and getting mired in
confusion. Talk in modern, model-theoretic terms is apt,26 since model theory arises precisely
as the study of abstract structures and formal languages through which they are defined, and
moreover, it abounds in meta-mathematical results of the kind so crucial to figures like Russel,
Ramsey, Braithwaite, and Carnap. Kleene’s veritable bible of mathematical logic Introduction
to Metamathematics is itself instructive as it represents a clear point of transition where the
26. And should also be familiar from 2.2—I have deliberately framed things in modern model-theoretic terms
for consistency with some of the best contemporary discussions of structure available.
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terminology of systems is being couched in the more familiar terms of contemporary model
theory.
The point at issue is not to defend model theory as the best methodological tool for philoso-
phers of science or physicists; perhaps category theory is a better candidate for certain pur-
poses. Or indeed, perhaps graph theory or Ramsey theory (the branch of pure mathematics
which he also established bearing a close relationship to graph theory) are better tools for
particular explicative purposes. Rather, the point is to highlight that appealing to a more so-
phisticated abstract structure (or in Eddington’s case a token kind of abstract structure which
is compatible with Russell’s characterization) does not itself sidestep the epistemological con-
siderations raised by Newman’s criticism of Russell, nor Demopoulos’ application thereof to
the structuralist thesis. Braithwaite puts it thus when he criticizes Eddington’s structuralism
by invoking Newman: “[i]f Newman’s conclusive criticism had received proper attention from
philosophers, less nonsense would have been written during the last twelve years on the epis-
temological virtue of pure structure,” (R. B. Braithwaite 1940, 463). In the over ninety years
since Newman’s criticism, and especially after Demopoulos’ work, there has been an immense
amount written defending the epistemological role of structure. I will not hazard to call it
nonsense—at the worst, the attempts, even if they were to fail, and there is no consensus on
that, shed more light on the assumptions implicit and consequences latent, in modern struc-
turalism.
Solomon has pointed out, however, that Braithwaite’s application of the Newman objection
to Eddington is misguided. He argues, rightfully, that Newman’s argument targets Russell’s
claim that our scientific knowledge beyond that which we experience is knowledge of pure
structure, and moreover, a posteriori. By contrast, Eddington’s epistemological deduction is an
attempt to show that our knowledge of the physical universe is purely structural, and a priori.
Obviously Eddington’s position runs afoul of the pre-analytic intuition that our theoretical
knowledge consists in genuine a posteriori discovery. Indeed, for Eddington, even though he
says it is possible we could come to our physical laws a posteriori, his entire purpose, like that
in the parable of the ichthyologist, is to deduce those same laws a priori. But in that context,
the claim that our theoretical knowledge is one of structure does not need Newman’s criticism.
Newman showed that the a posteriori knowledge we gain on Russell’s account is virtually null.
With Eddington, we do not even need experience as our main epistemic guide. Of course,
specific observations and specific instances of laws, on Eddington’s account are found through
experience. However, the character of our theoretical knowledge does not require experience;
rather, his Kantian programme of scientific epistemology is supposed to give us the structure
of the physical world a priori into which any experience is forced to fit.27 Eddington only
27. Hence any contemporary commentator (e.g. French 2003) seeking to defend Eddington’s structuralism
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avoids Newman’s objection to the extent that he gives up empiricism and the intuition that
our theoretical claims constitute a posteriori knowledge; if he upheld the a posteriori character
of theoretical knowledge, his choice of group theory as the paradigm of structure would not
bypass Newman’s claims in virtue of its complexity.
2.5 Newman’s objection applied to Ramsey-sentence struc-
tures
It should be clear from the generality of the discussion that the push-through construction
of 2.2.3 can be applied to a wide variety of structures. What is essential is that the map from
one structure to another is a structure preserving map. For example, with sets, the map must
be injective and surjective. Sets with relations defined on them, such as a group operation,
need to be the kind of structure preserving map appropriate for group theory, i.e., (bijective)
group homomorphisms. Indeed, the model theoretic standpoint taken in Demopoulos’ work
and most contemporary discussions show this nicely. In general the mathematical structures
are sets with gadgetry and particular rules governing how that gadgetry works.28 Model theory
need not be privileged. Category theory also has impressive resources for considering structure
and the transformation of structure (including preservation). But, the philosophical literature
deals more with model theory regarding scientific theories than it does with category theory
(though this is changing in some respects), and the model theory is more familiar for most
audiences coming to grips with the philosophical issues, plus, as we saw in the pedestrian
2.2 it is rather straightforward to get to the substance of the argument. Model theory has the
resources for the philosophical reflection on mathematical structure that is relevant, but I make
no claim to its superiority to alternative approaches.
It should be clear, on the basis of how I (and any textbook) have defined languages and
structures, that contra Eddington’s claim, group theory does not present a more refined notion
of structure which allows it to bypass the Newman objection. The push-through construction,
for example, has been applied by Button and Walsh to set theories themselves. It should not be
surprising then, with all the additional rules, axioms, relations and functions, that a Ramsey-
sentence might involve, that the Newman objection applies here as well. Unlike Eddington,
structural realists who advocate a Ramsey-sentence method generally appeal to a more com-
plex structure than Eddington’s identification of structure with group theoretic structure. Their
notion is more in line with Russell’s insofar as it is supposed to be the structure of the world be-
carries a heavy burden. They must either make peace with his a priorism and defend it, or find a way to salvage a
meaningful structuralism from the wreck of Eddington’s a priorism.
28. Cf. Geroch 1985.
36 Chapter 2. The origins and applications of Newman’s objection
yond our experience.29 However, appealing to more complex structures, and Ramsey-sentences
in particular, does not bypass Newman’s claim.
Among the literature and the disputes they contain, Button and Walsh have recently given a
general proof of Newman’s objection applied to Ramsey-sentence structures. The technical de-
tails are important, but not for the main philosophical point. Rather than repeating the material
they develop to provide the main theorem, I will describe it so that it is clear that Newman’s ob-
jection does indeed apply to Ramsey-sentences. Simply stating the theorem without explaining
all of their terminology will likely lend itself to confusion. Recall the very quick ‘proof’ given
in 2.3.5. There I gave a quick sketch largely following Winnie’s theorem’s from his (1967).
In his Theorem One, he showed how by keeping the observational part of the structure fixed,
you could permute the theoretical portion, so that entities which in the first case satisfied the
structural role of say electrons, in the permuted model, play the role of protons. His Theorem
Two goes on to show how you can generate an arithmetical model of the Ramsey-sentence by
assigning classes of numbers to the theoretical partition. Button and Walsh’s theorem shows
that for any structure represented by a Ramsey-sentence, you can generate a trivializing struc-
ture in the sense that there is always some set with cardinality κ such that κ is the cardinality of
the relative complement of the observational partition in the domain.
In other words, you can always generate a model of the entire Ramsey-sentence, by defining
the theoretical relations and functions appropriately in some set of sufficient size. While it is
true that there is no obvious way to rule out arithmetical or unintended interpretations, and
that Demopoulos recognizes this problem, the deeper problem which he, as well as Button
and Walsh identify is that all it takes for a theory to be true over and above being empirically
adequate (i.e., all statements about observable phenomena being true) is that there are enough
unobservables. I should clarify something: Button and Walsh’s theorem and discussion do
coincide with the claim that theoretical truth collapses to model theoretic satisfiability. They,
however, make the somewhat misleading claim (66) that the problem this poses is for the
scientific or structural realist to somehow rule out the trivializing structures as unintended
interpretations. This might be true, but it obscures the point that Demopoulos emphasizes
more than ruling out unintended interpretations: it divests our theoretical knowledge of the
character of significant a posteriori truths, insofar as the truth of our theory reduces to a claim
that, we know from mathematical logic, is almost always satisfiable.
My main concern is not to defend Newman’s objection; I think that the best characterization
of it has been given, and that while there are interesting alternative approaches, such as with
sorted languages, for example, I am not interested in defending Newman’s claim. In other
29. I am aware that some structural realists, e.g. Elie Zahar and John Worrall, try to describe where Russell went
wrong, but those subtleties do not clearly bypass the applicability of the Newman objection to their own position.
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words, if after going through all the technical details given in Philosophy and Model Theory
someone still does not accept the Newman objection, I do not believe any argument of the same
kind will persuade them. In this case I think it owes something to the intuition, which I also
hold, that there has to be a meaningful (i.e., non-trivial) way to understand structure, though I
am persuaded by Demopoulos that it cannot serve the epistemological role that it is given in
the structuralist thesis. It has been essential so far to be clear on the objection’s origins and
applications, but one of my main philosophical concerns is engaging Demopoulos’ attribution
of the structuralist thesis to Ramsey. For that purpose, the theorem itself is something like a
ladder that can be thrown away once we begin dealing with other issues.
2.6 Summary
In this chapter we began by situating and exploring Newman’s objection to Russell’s struc-
turalism in the context of Russell’s causal theory of perception and analysis of propositional
understanding in The Analysis of Matter. We proceeded in 2.3 to a critical exegesis of De-
mopoulos’ “Three views of theoretical knowlege” in order to get a grasp on the general appli-
cability of the Newman objection and to set the stage for later chapters for the exposition and
reconstruction of Ramsey’s view of scientific theories and Carnap’s structuralism.
The target of Demopoulos’ analysis is the structuralist thesis which he describes as un-
derlying the views of theoretical knowledge advocated by Russell, Ramsey and Carnap. The
commitments involved in the structuralist thesis result in any empiricist view built on the the-
sis violating our pre-analytic intuition that the truth of our theoretical claims are substantial a
posteriori discoveries. They thus fail as a representation of our theoretical knowledge because
the truth of our theoretical statements becomes a fact of the ambient set-theory or metalogic
given only an assumption about the cardinality of the underlying domain. The positive research
program Demopoulos’ suggests is a framework based on Gupta’s novel account of empiricism
where the logical relationship between experience and knowledge is functional and not propo-
sitional. That is, one where the rational contribution of experience does not rely on a division
of theoretical and observational language in which the observational component has an epis-
temic privilege. Rather, “[w]ithin this framework the contribution of experience to the semantic
properties of observation terms is methodologically on a par with its contribution to theoretical
terms” (Demopoulos 2012d, 167).
We proceeded in 2.4 to consider Eddington’s characterization of ‘scientific epistemology’
and his structuralism to contrast with Russell’s structuralism, and to show another application
of Newman’s objection. In 2.5 we saw the general applicability of the Newman objection
to Ramsey-sentence structures. This emphasized Demopoulos’ criticism of the structuralist
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thesis by showing how easy it is to generate a trivializing structure for our claims to theoretical
knowledge if we subscribe to that thesis. In the next chapter we turn to reconstructing Ramsey’s
theory of theories in order to claim that while the Ramsey-sentence has been taken up in the
development of structuralism in the philosophy of science, Ramsey’s own account of theories
is not one which seeks to advance a structuralist position.
Chapter 3
Ramsey and Theories
It is clear that Ramsey’s reflections on theories, near the end of his life, begin as a reac-
tion to Russell. As in his “The Foundations of Mathematics,” where he responded to Russell’s
logicism and project of logical construction by providing a type theory which simplified Rus-
sell’s ramified theory of types, Ramsey’s remarks on scientific theories begin by responding
again to these aspects in Russell. In the fragment from Ramsey’s Nachlass titled “Physics
Says,” he engages directly with Russell’s The Analysis of Matter. Despite the various ends to
which Ramsey’s work has been applied, and the views that have been imputed to him, Braith-
waite saw Ramsey as engaging Russell and exploring an alternative conception of theories and
theoretical terms. Significantly, Braithwaite does not give any indication that Ramsey was ad-
vocating a kind of structuralism. Indeed, we have seen that Braithwaite not only understood
Newman’s objection to Russell, but advanced it against Eddington’s structuralism. Of course,
omissions are possible, but charity suggests that Braithwaite understood Ramsey to be devel-
oping something different from a structural explanation or characterization of the world beyond
experience. The task of this chapter is to represent and “rationally reconstruct” Ramsey’s work
on the theory of theories.
This chapter begins by articulating the context of the fragment “Physics Says.” Then, I
provide an exegesis of the infamous paper “Theories.” That exegesis is supported and further
developed by an examination of “General Propositions and Causality” and “Causal Qualities,”
particularly in contrast with the view of theorizing in “Universals of Law and of Fact” which
Ramsey explicitly abandons and replaces by the view in “General Propositions and Causality.”
While my main point is to exhibit that Ramsey is not advocating a structuralist program, I seek
also to piece together Ramsey’s “theory of science”.
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3.1 Theories
3.1.1 Responding to Russell: What Physics Says
Russell, within the span of a couple pages in the introduction to The Analysis of Matter,
distinguishes two notions of truth, and adopts several assumptions about the nature of theories.
In “Physics Says,” Ramsey is prompted to respond to several of these aspects. Russell claims
that apart from any philosophical issues concerning the meaning of truth, there is an ambiguity
in the question whether physics is true. He claims that in “the narrowest sense, we may say that
physics is “true” if we have the perceptions it leads us to expect” (Russell 1927, 8). Russell
refers here to Leibniz, but we can also see that in this sense, the “truth” of physics is as compat-
ible with idealism or solipcism as Newtonian mechanics is with Berkeley’s idealism. Since, as
Newman so cleary notes in his article, Russell is concerned to argue for a philosophical upshot
of physics contra idealism and solipcism, Russell endorses a different notion of truth:
This wider sense, which I regard as the more important, is as follows: Given
physics as a deductive system, derived from certain hypotheses as to undefined
terms do there exist particulars, or logical structures composed of particulars,
which satisfy these hypotheses: If the answer is in the affirmative, then physics
is completely “true.” (8)
Notice that Russell equates the truth of physics in this wider sense with whether there exists
particulars or logical structures composed thereof which satisfy the hypotheses of physics.
This is the claim which Newman’s objection has shown to be trivially satisfiable. Russell does
go on to suggest that he thinks some notion of “event” will prove fundamental and it is the
task of logic to construct out of events, the objects and relations required by mathematical
physics. Altogether separate from any philosophical interest in his notion of event, the issue
Russell frames is one of logical construction. We should also notice that Russell assumes that
physics is a deductive system. Ramsey, despite exploring the deductive character of theories, in
particular physics, considers them to be more than a deductive system.1 “Physics Says” should
be seen as Ramsey’s first engagement with issues and questions which Russell set. Bearing
this in mind, we can avoid the temptation to see Ramsey’s remarks as advocating a kind of
structuralism, or endorsing what Demopoulos calls the structuralist thesis. Instead we can see
him as exploring Russell’s suggestions, but in turn, dispensing with views of Russell’s in favour
of his own reflections on general propositions.
1. Hence Hempel’s Theoretician’s Dilemma could never be aptly applied to Ramsey’s views since Ramsey
rejected the idea that theories were only systematizations of experience for deduction.
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Ramsey’s understanding of Russell is captured in the following where he refers to the pre-
vious quotation:
Physics says=is true if
(∃α, β, . . .R, S ) : F(α, β . . .R, S . . . ) (1)
Russell p. 8. (Ramsey, n.d., 251)
Immediately, we can notice a similarity to the Ramsey sentence as it is formulated in “Theo-
ries,” because here, if we keep with the notation of Principia Mathematica, the Greek letters
refer to class variables and the Latin letters refer to relations in extension. Coupled with Ram-
sey’s comment regarding the Ramsey-sentence (Ramsey 1929d, 131) that its variables may be
taken extensionally, we have in both instances an extensional characterization of what physics
says. But the similarity between Ramsey’s representation of Russell’s view and the Ramsey-
sentence should not be taken as an endorsement of Russell’s view. In fact, Ramsey is defending
the narrower sense of truth, contrary to Russell. That is, Russell demands for his notion of truth,
that we are able to construct out of percepts (the basic logical events in his causal theory of
perception) all the resources for a modern physical theory. It is remarkable that Russell was
able to realize that a given abstract structure may be satisfied in various ways, and assert that
we typically operate with an intended or “important” (Russell 1927, 5) interpretation, and yet
he failed to notice Newman’s point. Ramsey rejects that notion of interpretation and the wider
sense of truth demanded by Russell.
Of what sort is the argument for (1).
“We must find an interpretation of physics which gives a due place to percep-
tions; if not, we have no right to appeal to empirical evidence”, Russell p. 7.
He does not really think we can find such an interpretation because the only
R’s with which we are acquainted in his view are compresence and time interval
which are not enough.”
Say perhaps “partial interpretation” also perhaps some restriction on the inter-
pretation of the other variables. i.e. all we know about β, S is not that they satisfy
(1).
Any evidence must give us not an interpretation exactly but a dictionary; it
must be Physics ⊃ I perceive p
I perceive p
∴ Physics
42 Chapter 3. Ramsey and Theories
In exact contradiction to Russell ps. 90ff.2 (Ramsey, n.d., 251)
What is in exact contradiction to Russell is the notion of truth that Ramsey is suggesting.
The quotation begins with Ramsey asking what Russell’s argument is for requiring that the
truth of physics depends on the existence of an appropriate (and appropriately constructed)
logical structure. As an alternative, Ramsey tentatively proposes a partial interpretation, where
instead of requiring an interpretation, let alone the “important” interpretation, we allow evi-
dence to give us a dictionary. Notice, Ramsey understands that Russell thinks we can only
bring empirical evidence to bear provided that we can construct our system out of percepts.
On the contrary, Ramsey allows that we can have a partial interpretation of our theoretical
system—that is, of those undefined terms which Russell is concerned to construct—whereby
perception allows us to infer the broader physical theory we are considering. Ramsey’s partial
interpretation is intended to dispense with Russell’s logical constructions. Ramsey obviously
does not give any details here regarding the precise role of experience or the nature of the dic-
tionary. But notice the pseudo-syllogism that he gives. Physics, or better yet, our theory under
consideration, is taken as a hypothetical which, if true, entails that we have certain kinds of
perceptions. Given that we have the perceptions we are led to expect on the assumption of the
theory, we justify our assent to the theory. None of this inferential machinery, however, is sug-
gested to give an epistemic account of the world beyond experience, nor make robust claims
thereof to account for the “narrower” notion of truth which Ramsey adopts. As Ramsey must
have known, this hypothetico-deductive argument is fallacious if taken in Russell’s stronger
sense. Hence Ramsey’s use of the term “dictionary”. He is telling you what “physics says”
means instead of explaining its truth in Russell’s sense.
I grant that this reading of Ramsey’s brief remarks adds content to the skeletal statement
he provides, but this reconstruction fits exactly with his later analysis of general propositions.
Moreover, in “Theories” Ramsey characterizes a theoretical system and the role of general
propositions therein. Under the interpretation, or rather extrapolation, I have just given, we see
a continuous development to Ramsey’s reflections on theories, as well as an integration of his
theory of general propositions. In other words, while it is clear that this Nachlass fragment does
not give us a precise characterization of Ramsey’s thought, the reconstruction I have provided
is continuous with Ramsey’s subsequent development of these issues. Before turning to expli-
cating those later contributions, several problems should be emphasized. Ramsey certainly is
guilty of suggesting a partial interpretation. What is yet to be seen, however, is whether his no-
tion of partial interpretation is as susceptible to Newman’s objection as Demopoulos suggests.
Is Ramsey, by advocating a partial interpretation, subscribing to the structuralist thesis? Or is
2. Cleary this is an error where Ramsey is referring to the discussion on page 8 and following.
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he presenting a view which, because of having a partial interpretation, collapses our theoretical
knowledge to a question of cardinality? The partial interpretation is effected by the dictionary:
does Ramsey’s use of the dictionary bring Newman-type worries against Ramsey, even if he
rejects Russell’s stronger sense of truth and logical construction? I think these questions can all
be answered in the negative, but to see that we need to wade through Ramsey’s investigations
and the form of empiricism he develops.
3.1.2 Exegesis of Theories
Ramsey, unlike Russell, did not develop his account of theories to construct the world of
physics from percepts, nor unlike Carnap, Ramsey did not develop the device of Ramsification
in order to demarcate the analytic from the factual content of a theory. His goal, rather, appears
to have been to shed light on how a theory functions and the role that theoretical terms play
in it. There is textual evidence that in “Theories,” Ramsey was concerned with the relation
of a theory as a formalized language and particular properties thereof such as equivalence,
containment, and definability. Indeed, he opens “Theories” with the thought that a theory is a
language for expressing the facts the theory purportedly explains.
To ask whether a theory is a language raises further questions about the relations between
realism and instrumentalism (and anti-realism) in the philosophy of science. In becoming clear
on just what sort of language a theory would be if it is one at all, we might bring ourselves
one step closer to answering whether we ought to understand our scientific theories instru-
mentally or realistically. Ramsey was not discussing these issues directly or in these terms in
“Theories,” but throughout the three papers “Theories”, “General Propositions and Causality”,
and “Causal Qualities” there is evidence to conclusively show that Ramsey was not advocating
anything like what we would now call scientific realism. This issue is taken up in 4.1. For
the current exegesis of “Theories” the concern is to clarify how this paper is in part a contin-
uation of Ramsey’s response to Russell in “Physics Says.” That is, it is an elaboration of the
proposal he makes to considering a theory as a partial interpretation by means of a dictionary,
for expressing the facts a theory leads us to expect. This reading of Ramsey is contrary to
that which considers the Ramsey-sentence as a means of reconstructing our theoretical knowl-
edge and eliminating theoretical vocabulary. We will see shortly that Ramsey addresses the
question of elimination because it is an agenda set by others, but not something he claims as a
desideratum for an analysis of theories. In most respects, Ramsey’s investigation in this paper
is logico-mathematical. That is, it is not driven by an eliminitavist, reductionist, or foundation-
alist motive. Notice in the passages to follow, just how carefully Ramsey adumbrates the issues
he takes himself to be addressing, and notice especially that he is not suggesting Ramsification
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is a complete philosophical analysis of a theory. It is worth emphasizing this now in order to
frame, from the outset, that while Ramsey does recommend the Ramsey-sentence as the best
way for writing a theory, that in no way needs to imply that he was proposing Ramsification as
an epistemological or metaphysical analysis of our theoretical knowledge.
Theories and Languages
The paper “Theories” begins by suggesting that a theory be considered as a language.3
After elaborating the parts of the theory-as-language, Ramsey goes on to develop a toy theory
as an example of the construction. Once developed, he poses six questions, some of which are
directed specifically to his toy theory, others directed to theories in general. Ramsey does not
go so far as to suggest any of the now standard descriptions of a language structure as, say, an
ordered triple of domain, relations, and distinguished elements. He does, however, take care
to suggest desiderata that a formalization of a theory-as-language ought to meet. The paper
is dense, and gives little by way of preamble. Moreover, littered throughout are remarks that
suggest a concern for the application of his method. Nonetheless, a concern that the structure
presented in the paper could be applied is no argument against a logico-mathematical reading,
anymore than physicists using developments in pure mathematics in their work is an argument
that the pure mathematicians were really concerned to give an explication of physics. The
paper opens, with this suggestion:
Let us try to describe a theory simply as a language for discussing the facts the
theory is said to explain. This need not commit us on the philosophical question of
whether a theory is only a language, but rather if we knew what sort of language it
would be if it were one at all, we might be further towards discovering if it is one.
We must try to make our account as general as possible, but we cannot be sure
that we have in fact reached the most general type of theory, since the possible
complication is infinite. (Ramsey 1929d, 112)
Three points can be readily taken away from this passage. First, Ramsey is making a proposal
to consider a theory as a language—he is not claiming here that a theory is a language. Second,
he is well aware that considering a theory as a language may not exhaust a correct philosophical
account of the nature of theories. Third, at least part of the purpose in describing a theory as a
language is to investigate what properties it would have, qua language, if it were one at all.
Leaving many of the technical details involving the toy theory aside, his discussion pro-
ceeds through considerations for formalizing a theory which is in some sense already given
3. This need not be taken as a mysterious turn of phrase. The simple idea is that a theory is a language (possibly
a set of sentences) for expressing a particular empirical content. However, the devil is in the details.
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to us. The general remarks begin by distinguishing a primary system, with its universe of
discourse, from the secondary. The terms of the primary system are represented by numbers
and the propositions by one-valued numerical functions. The secondary system introduces
first new propositional functions, then axioms which are propositions about the values of the
truth-functions of the secondary propositional functions. In addition there must be a dictionary
giving definitions of the functions of the primary system in terms of those in the secondary. By
considering the definitions as equivalences, Ramsey suggests that we can then derive proposi-
tions (presuming we have values as inputs for the propositions) in the primary system. These
primary propositions are laws or consequences as whether they are respectively general or
singular. Speaking about theories generally, Ramsey says:
If we take it in its mathematical form we can explain the idea of a theory as follows:
Instead of saying simply what we know about the values of the functions with
which we are concerned, we say that they can be constructed in a definite way
given by the dictionary out of functions satisfying certain conditions given by the
axioms. (119)
The formalization of the theory reaches a point where it becomes self-contained as a de-
ductive system. Here it is useful to contrast Frege and Hilbert. Frege held that the purpose
of a deductive system was to determine the truths of a specific content matter. Hilbert on the
contrary allows the content to be shed—at some point the actual content drops out and you
are left with a system, where the reference of the system becomes irrelevant. Clearly, in its
application to the world, a formalized theory is being used to deduce specific consequences
about the world. On the other hand, this application need not preclude the possibility of other
domains satisfying the structure in question. Ramsey is not suggesting that the content of an
empirical theory be shed, but by examining a theory from the perspective of a language, we
are viewing it schematically, and not with regard to any notion of an ‘important’ interpreta-
tion. Indeed, in the Nachalass fragment “Notes on Theories” Ramsey suggests that the idea the
Ramsey-sentence appeals to is formal in Hilbert’s sense, where, if the scheme is consistent it
“can of course be constructed with numbers or anything else” (Ramsey 1929c, 229).4It is worth
noting that the term ‘system’ was widely used by logicians until it was replaced by ‘structure’.
In many places, what Ramsey says about systems is parallel to what is discussed in terms of
structure. Nonetheless, the mere fact that Ramsey is using the term ‘system’ is not sufficient to
suggest he is advocating any kind of structuralism.
4. This fragment in the Nachlass is problematic. Galavotti notes that it was included in the archive with
a note not in Ramsey’s hand which says it was notes for the paper “Theories,” whereas some internal evidence
suggests that these are further thoughts on theories after the eponymous paper’s composition. Having successfully
convinced myself on different occasions that it is logically prior and posterior to “Theories,” I refrain from drawing
on it much at all. It also does not help that many statements in that collection are obscure or sentence fragments.
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Question and Answer
Given this formulation of theories, Ramsey poses and gives answers to the following six
questions about the nature of theories. Working through the connections between the answers
helps to explicate his conception of the Ramsey-sentence.
1. Can we say anything in the language of this theory that we could not say without it?
(Ramsey 1929d, 119)
2. Can we reproduce the structure of our theory by means of explicit definitions in the
primary system? (120)
3. ...Is this necessary for the legitimate use of the theory? (129)
4. Taking it then that explicit definitions are not necessary, how are we to explain the func-
tioning of our theory without them? (130)
5. What do we mean by speaking of equivalent or contradictory theories? Or by saying that
one theory is contained in another, etc.? (132)
6. ...in what sort of theories [sic] does every ‘proposition’ of the secondary system have
meaning in this [indirect] sense? (134)
Notice that it is not clear Ramsey intends these answers to generalize for all theories or
only his toy theory. He explicitly says prior to the first question “before we go on to discuss
systematically the different features of the example and whether they occur in any theory, let us
take some questions that might be asked about theories and see how they would be answered
in the present case,” (119). There is no discussion of questions 1 and 2 to suggest or reject
their generalization to all theories. Questions 5 and 6 are clearly the most general. Questions
3 and 4 seem somewhat in between. Ramsey answers the first question negatively, “for we can
easily eliminate the functions of the second system and so say in the primary system all that the
theory gives us” (119). If we grant that this is all the theory gives us and the elimination of the
secondary system reduces the theory to its observational consequences, it becomes clear that
Ramsey’s investigation, while compatible with the later positivistic reductions of theories, is
not motivated in order to produce such a reduction, nor is it clearly motivated as a reconstruc-
tion of our theoretical knowledge. That is, as I argue, his interest in theories lies elsewhere:
in exhibiting the functional-role the theoretical terms play, when a theory is considered as a
language.
With respect to the second question, Ramsey answers positively: we can always reproduce
the structure of the theory by means of explicit definition. Sahlin gives a more detailed account
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of how Ramsey uses the dictionary to answer the issue. For our concern we note that Ramsey
asks the question of explicit definitions in the first place “because Russell, Whitehead, Nicod
and Carnap all seem to suppose that we can and must do this” (120). That is, Ramsey is
exploring an issue posed by the agenda of others, but doing so here in the logico-mathematical
context of a theory-as-language. That we can always make these explicit definitions, however,
does not show that it is necessary for us to do so, contra Russell et al., in order to legitimately
use the theory. His exploration of how to explicitly define the secondary system in terms of the
primary includes a passage where he countenances the arbitrariness of proceeding with explicit
definition:
Supposing the laws and consequences to be true, the facts of the primary system
must be such as to allow functions to be defined with all the properties of those of
the secondary system, and these give the solution to our problem. But the trouble
is that the laws and consequences can be made true by a number of different sets of
facts, corresponding to each of which we might have different definitions. So that
our problem of finding a single set of definitions which will make the dictionary
and axioms true is still unsolved. We can, however, at once solve it formally, by
disjoining the sets of definitions previously obtained... (120)
From this remark, it is clear that Ramsey recognizes that the secondary system can be re-
constructed in more than one way. As a result, the theory with the secondary system eliminated
through explicit definition is not able to furnish a representation of our theoretical knowledge
because the choice of giving just those explicit definitions is arbitrary, or if not strictly arbi-
trary,5 compatible with alternative definitions. The formal solution to the problem is to take the
logical sum of the sets of different definitions which correspond to the different sets of facts
which make the laws and consequences true.6 Considering the explicit definition as a logical
sum is to say that among the disjoint sets of facts and corresponding definitions, one is true.
Although Ramsey does not say it explicitly here, this is clearly what he has in mind based on
his earlier work on propositional functions in extension:
A logical sum is not like an algebraic sum; only a finite number of terms can have
an algebraic sum, for an ‘infinite sum’ is really a limit. But the logical sum of a
set of propositions is the proposition that these are not all false, and exists whether
the set be finite or infinite. (Ramsey 1925, 219)
However, Ramsey is critical of this method of disjoining the possible definitions. First, the
complexity of the disjunctive list is impractical for the actual use of the theory. More important,
5. Because of the mentioned conditions imposed by the primary system.
6. Note that more than one set of definitions may correspond to a given set of facts.
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however, is that this way of explicitly defining the secondary system is arbitrary. The selection
of which among the disjunctive set of definitions is the correct one is arbitrary insofar as the
sets of definitions can be chosen in many ways. This charge of arbitrariness can be further
formulated into the Newman-style triviality of the Ramsey-sentence after some preliminary
groundwork is laid for the discussion of his fifth question.
After exploring other ways to explicitly define the terms of the secondary system Ramsey
concludes that the position we are left in is very close, in terms of arbitrariness and complexity,
to the general disjunctive definitions he first suggests. That is, we are unable to avoid a high
degree of complexity generally. More significantly, it is not the case that the axioms and the
dictionary are true whenever the theory is applicable by defining the propositions in the sec-
ondary system by their criteria in the primary, which is to say in accordance with the positivist
verification principle. This latter point is significant because of the contrast that it draws with
some later remarks in his discussion of the fifth question, where he seems to be endorsing a
verification criterion for empirical significance. His rejection of the positivist attitude to empir-
ical meaning in his discussion of explicit definition gives us reason to suspect that those later
remarks are not to be read as a plea for verificationism.
Postponing for the moment the issue of verification and meaning, we can see that the an-
swer to his third question is that it cannot be necessary to explicitly define the secondary system
in order to genuinely use the theory. According to Ramsey, explicitly defining the secondary
system would make the theory no use at all because any modification or addition to the defi-
nitions would alter the stock of definitions and their relations and hence we would not be able
to account for a theory as something in a process of growth: “that is to say, if we proceed
by explicit definition we cannot add to our theory without changing the definitions and so the
meaning of the whole” (Ramsey 1929d, 230). This is a way of making the rather obvious point
that when we take a given formal language L and make additions or modifications to it we end
up, with a new language L′. But it also clearly shows Ramsey’s concern with a theory being
something that we use. In line with what physics purportedly says, a theory must lead us to
the experiences we expect, but also given that we actually use theories, that they must also be
capable of growth and the accommodation of new facts.
We may now proceed to his fourth question where the several themes of the discussion con-
nect. Here Ramsey gives the famous passage regarding how we are to best write our theories:
“(∃α, β, γ):dictionary · axioms” (131).7 This notation means nothing more than what has al-
ready been described; the terms of the secondary system are replaced by higher order variables
of the appropriate type and by way of the dictionary and axioms we may correlate the variables
7. Keeping with Ramsey’s notation I use ‘·’ as a mark of conjunction when referring to formulae from his
work.
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with the terms of the primary system. This can all be taken extensionally and does not appeal
to an intended or important interpretation. Historically, Ramsey developed his propositional
functions in extension as a tool to resolve issues in the 1910 Principia’s theory of types. In
doing so he had to confront again the axiom of infinity. In contrast to his earlier work on the
axiom, which is to be found in the archive of his notes, Ramsey employs his propositional
functions in extension to analyse the axiom.8 Setting the interesting questions about the axiom
of infinity aside, we can understand the extensional propositional functions as mirroring the
contrast between the logical understanding of a class and the mathematical understanding of a
set. Following Demopoulos:
If ϕ is extensional but not predicative, the class determined by ϕ is the class of
all individuals a which ϕ maps to truths. Under an extensional understanding of
propositional functions, there is not in general a correspondence between proposi-
tional functions and predicates of the language, so that the association with propo-
sitions is in this sense “arbitrary.” It is also arbitrary in the stronger sense of al-
lowing all possible pairings of individuals with truth values. (Demopoulos 2012a,
248)
My suggestion here is that at the time of writing “Theories” Ramsey could not have failed
to recall the propositional functions in extension which he employed four years earlier. Taking
(∃α, β, γ):dictionary · axioms to be the best way to write our theory, it is clear that the dictionary
is a set of equivalences between the primary and secondary systems. What Ramsey says here
substantiates the connection to his earlier work on propositional extensional functions:
Here it is evident that α, β, γ are to be taken purely extensionally. Their extensions
may be filled with intensions or not, but this is irrelevant to what can be deduced
in the primary system. (Ramsey 1929d, 131)
The remarks on the arbitrariness of the mapping of individuals to truth, that is, the arbitrary
correspondence of individuals to propositions in line with the broader mathematical notion of
set, would mean that no particular set of facts or definitions has priority over the others; the
theory is, regarding the judgements we are to give through the laws and consequences, “simply
a language in which they are clothed” (231). In this context it makes no sense to attribute
to Ramsey any attempt to characterize our knowledge of unobservables, nor to attribute any
realist notion of characterizing natural relations of the secondary system. Ramsey is explicitly
highlighting the arbitrariness of any attempt to define the unobservables or theoretical entities
8. Michael Potter (Potter 2005) has determined this to have been written prior to Ramsey’s essay “The Foun-
dations of Mathematics.”
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by those of the primary system. If he could be considered at all as characterizing “theoretical
knowledge” it is apparent that he is suggesting that what we know is a collection of singular
and general propositions in the primary system relative to the overall formulation of the theory.
That is, the most we can say is parallel to “Physics Says”: given the assumption of a physical
theory, we can expect to make given observations, and the realisation of those observations
justifies our adherence to that theory.
When we examine the Ramsey sentence extensionally, the Newman style objection cannot
fail to arise because, modulo an assumption about the cardinality of the domain, the functions
in the Ramsey-sentence can map to any of the combinatorial possibilities of individuals to
propositions in the secondary system.9 In Ramsey’s vocabulary, it is a matter of indifference
which among the sets of definitions (the members of the logical sum) and facts satisfying
them, we choose to be the interpretation of the theory because formally, they are all equivalent
granting the cardinality of the domain. That is, they each represent the structure of the Ramsey-
sentence.
By looking to the last questions Ramsey asks about theories, we find more evidence he
would have reasonably been aware of the fault with the Ramsey-sentence as an account of the-
oretical knowledge. Through the entirety of the paper we see Ramsey grappling with logico-
mathematical questions. These are questions which, in their way, foreshadow important dis-
coveries in logic. For instance, Beth’s definability theorem is a well-known basic result, which
states (roughly) that if a term is implicitly definable, then it is explicitly definable.10 Ramsey
asks whether we can “reproduce the structure of our theory by means of explicit definitions
within the primary system,” (Ramsey 1929d, 220) and concludes, at least for the case of the
toy theory that this is always possible. Similarly, when Ramsey asks whether we can say any-
thing in the language of the theory that we could not say without it (219) is, as Suppe notes, an
early statement of the non-creativity of explicit definitions (Newton-Smith 2000, 390). More
interestingly, the fact that Ramsey was concerned with this kind of question indicates that he
was thinking of the formalized theory as though it were an abstract structure, and the question
of definability was one about preserving the structure itself.
The logico-mathematical aspect of Ramsey’s thought in this paper appears most clearly at
the end. There he is concerned with the relations between theories, in particular when they
are equivalent or contradictory, or when one is contained in another. Ramsey distinguishes
here between two aspects of a theory: its symbolic form, and its meaning or content. Leaving
aside the question of symbolic form, Ramsey claims that “[t]wo theories are called equivalent
9. Recall that the permutation argument for the observable part of the domain is the identity map.
10. For relevant, precise statements of theorems, see texts such as Model Theory or A Course in Mathematical
Logic.
3.1. Theories 51
if they have the same content, contradictory if they have contradictory contents, compatible if
their contents are compatible, and theory A is said to be contained in theory B if A’s content is
contained in B’s content,” (Ramsey 1929d, 233). These same questions appear in all virtually
all model theory texts. Consider, for instance, Robinson’s Consistency Theorem to the effect
that two theories, Σ and Π are consistent with one another provided that there is no sentence ϑ
such that Σ |= ϑ and Π |= ¬ϑ. Of course, discussions of substructures and embeddings parallel
the idea that a theory A’s content is contained in a theory B’s content.11 Moreover, English
1973 and Demopoulos 2012 have both shown that under Ramsification, two theories cannot
have equivalent primary systems and incompatible secondary systems.12 In other words, if
there are two secondary systems Γ,∆ both of which share a primary system Υ, then Γ may be
eliminated and stated in terms of Υ. Then via the appropriate dictionary transformed into ∆.
And conversely for the translation of ∆ into Γ. Likewise Ramsey himself seems to have under-
stood something like this point because when considering equivalent theories, he acknowledges
that the functions of A could be definable in terms of B (or conversely) because “each set of
functions can be defined in terms of the primary system and therefore of those of the other
secondary system via the dictionary” (233).
So far I have claimed that Ramsey’s consideration of theories consists in the technical or
formal investigation of the response to Russell outlined at the end of his “Physics Says,” and
that response necessarily includes addressing issues like explicit definition as part of the agenda
set by Russell and contemporaries. This stands in contrast to the view that sees Ramsey as en-
gaged in a project where the elimination of theoretical vocabulary by means of Ramsification is
both a philosophical account of the nature of scientific theories, and a way of reconstructing our
knowledge as given to us by a theory. On the contrary, there are considerations that show that
the project in “Theories” is a restricted project analyzing a particular conception of theories,
but does not purport to be an exhaustive articulation of Ramsey’s view on theories. Indeed,
the theory of science Ramsey was developing can hardly be called a completed view. When
considered as an epistemological tool, namely as a rational reconstruction of our knowledge in
science of the world beyond experience, Newman’s objection contra Russell comes into force.
The benefit of understanding Ramsey as exploring the logico-mathematical properties of his
response to Russell, is that much of the bite is taken out of Newman’s objection—Ramsey’s re-
jection of Russell’s stronger notion truth and of logical construction should warn us at the outset
that he is not trying to give a structuralist reconstruction of physics. Indeed, Newman’s objec-
11. Detailed discussion of Ramsey-sentences and elementary substructures can be found in van Benthem 1978.
12. Demopoulos thinks that English misattributes to Robinson’s theorem what should be attributed to Craig’s.
English’s reasoning, however, is correct. Robinson’s theorem can be proved independently of Craig’s lemma,
whence the latter comes as a corollary. Likewise, Craig’s lemma can proven independently of Robinson’s theorem
and then used to derive it.
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tion is rendered an observation if Ramsey is not trying to give an epistemological-structuralist
explication of theory. Ramsey can give an account of the functional role of theoretical terms
in empirical judgements without committing himself to a particular epistemological thesis re-
garding the world beyond experience.
The contrast between these ways of considering Ramsification, or more minimally, Ram-
sey’s discussion of theories as languages, can be illustrated by what Kleene calls the “full
picture” (Kleene 1952, 65) of the formalization of a theory. Kleene is, of course, obviously
discussing mathematical theories, but the distinctions apply nicely here. In the full picture
there are three distinct “theories” involved in any formalization. There is the informal or pre-
formalized theory with which we begin. Moreover, there is the formalized theory, which is the
result of formalizing the informal theory. There is also the metatheory, which is the theory in
which the formal system and its properties are investigated. Considering Ramsey’s remarks in-
volves identifying Ramsification as part of the formalization of our pre-formal theory. Once the
theory is formalized, we can ask specific questions about the relations internal to that system,
such as for example deriving laws and consequences in the primary system. In that sense, the
formal system has become self-contained as a deductive system. Understanding that formal
system, in turn, as a structure, and investigating the properties that it has such as theoreti-
cal equivalence, translation, definability, consistency, and containment, are all aspects of the
metatheory, or rather, logico-mathematic considerations that bear on the various properties of
the given formal system as a system. This tripartite distinction then, gives a richer picture
of Ramsey’s investigation of theories than an account which places his view and the Ramsi-
fication of a theory in the tradition of rational reconstruction or the abstract view of theories
characterized by Demopoulos.
There is no direct evidence that Ramsey was considering a Newman–style objection to
his work. However, we have good reason to think that Ramsey was aware of similar (if not
actually the same) issues because his remarks show that he was concerned by the arbitrary
correspondence of the sets of definitions in the Ramsey sentence of a theory. Moreover, even if
he was not directly considering the defects of a structural explanation of theoretical knowledge,
there is sufficient evidence to show that most of Ramsey’s concerns in “Theories” were logico-
mathematical, and stimulated in response to the agenda set by Russell. These considerations
raise the prior question that given the arbitrariness of the Ramsey method, and thereby its
inability to significantly serve as an epistemological explication of our empirical knowledge,
what, exactly was Ramsey’s motivation in urging the method of the Ramsey-sentence if it was
not to represent our empirical knowledge through theory? Was it only to address questions of
formalization and meta-theory?
I suggest that Ramsey was motivated to claim that (∃α, β, γ):dictionary · axioms is the best
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way to write our theories because it serves to demystify13 the relationship between the sec-
ondary and primary systems, and thereby the secondary system itself through the clarification
of that relationship. His discussion of the meaning of the theoretical terms has many connec-
tions with his attitude toward the meaning of general propositions, causal laws, and tautologies.
Those interesting issues have to be temporarily set to one side, however, in order to expose the
role that the Ramsey sentence plays in Ramsey’s elaboration of his notion of partial interpre-
tation. The method of Ramsification, in effect, amounts to an explication of the relation of the
primary and the secondary systems because it yields a representation of the theory in which the
functional role, or better yet the inferential role of the theoretical system is apparent.
The following discussion addresses how Ramsey’s understanding of additions to our theo-
ries helps us better explain this role of demystification. I have already discussed, in the context
of explicit definitions, how no modification or addition could be made to the definitions without
changing the meaning of the whole. This consideration is apparent when Ramsey discusses the
theoretical and practical differences of adding an axiom to the theory:
Any additions to the theory, whether in the form of new axioms or particular as-
sertions like α(0, 3),14 are to be made within the scope of the original α, β, γ. They
are not, therefore strictly propositions by themselves just as the different sentences
in a story beginning ‘Once upon a time’ have not complete meanings and so are
not propositions by themselves. (Ramsey 1929d, 131)
The “theoretical difference” is that when we ask for the meaning of the addition, that mean-
ing can only be given if we know the stock of ‘propositions’ of both the primary and secondary
systems to which the addition is to be made. The meaning is the resulting difference in the
primary system (its effect on the observational consequences) between (∃α, β, γ):stock and
(∃α, β, γ):stock ·addition.15
The “practical difference” is to adopt an attitude toward the addition which is different
than the attitude which we take to a genuine proposition.16 Ramsey’s attitude is to withhold
from making the addition whenever we may do so in our theory, that is, whenever the truth
of the addition is compatible with the truth of the (∃α, β, γ):stock. It might be the case that
the negation of the addition is likewise compatible with (∃α, β, γ):stock. Hence, we must also
consider what other future additions we might wish to make to our theory and whether our
13. In contrast to Carnap’s project of eliminating the secondary vocabulary.
14. This is a reference to his toy theory he was using as an example.
15. A way to understand this is by analogy with Carnap’s meaning postulate approach: by adding a meaning
postulate ϕ to a language systemL we possibly obtain a different set of derivable (analytic) consequences inL∪ϕ
from those which were derivable in L alone, (cf. Winnie 1970).
16. We will see more about genuine propositions in the next section.
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addition is liable to be more suitable than its negation. We adopt an attitude where we refrain
from making the addition (or its negation) because we hope that experience will lead us to
formulating a new law as opposed to deciding arbitrarily what additions to make to our system.
Given that the propositions of the secondary system are not complete in themselves but
depend on the meaning of the whole, Ramsey makes a remark which anticipates Carnap’s
internal-external distinction. Working from his metaphor about characters in a story, Ramsey
claims that there is no problem with these propositions being incomplete as long as any of the
modifications are seen as taking part within the original story, i.e., within the scope of the exis-
tential quantifiers of the Ramsey sentence: (∃α, β, γ). He says, famously, “that the incomplete-
ness of the ‘propositions’ of the secondary system affects our disputes but not our reasoning”
(Ramsey 1929d, 132). The disputes are those questions which can be asked meaningfully in-
ternal to a given theory—where within the scope of the prefix all the logical combinations take
place. Our reasoning on the other hand includes the principals and framework in which we
make the inferential connections. Disputes need not be resolvable within the theory merely by
reasoning from established principles of the theory. There are examples in “General Proposi-
tions and Causality” where Ramsey considers ways in which people might disagree but which
do not take the form of one asserting p and the other ¬p. The important contrast is between
questions which are posed within a theoretical framework and questions about the framework
or its principles themselves. By way of contrast one could consider the axioms and rules of
inference of a logical system on analogy with reasoning, and whether a particular proposition
is deducible therefrom on analogy with disputes. As Ramsey notes, our reasoning is unaffected
by the incompleteness of the secondary propositions, “for we can reason about the characters
in a story just as well as if they were really identified, provided we don’t take part of what
we say as about one story, part about another” (132), but our disputes crucially depend on the
collection of propositions that can be inferred from the theory. While this raises the problem
whether there is a way to affirm that a story is the right one, or better than another, we can
ignore this otherwise important question as tangential to Ramsey’s explication of a theory as a
language.17
The role of the Ramsey-sentence as a demystification of the theoretical system is thereby
made apparent. Ramsification allows us to determine the meaning, or more precisely the inter-
relationships, of the primary and secondary systems of a given theory and the functional role
of theoretical terms and propositions. This is aptly represented by the theoretical difference
that adding an axiom or particular assertion makes. The addition must be understood as taking
17. That is, as tangential specifically to the explication of a theory as a language per the discussion in “Theories”;
we will see in Ch 4, that Ramsey faces this philosophical challenge rather well in relation to his broader theory of
science.
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place within the scope of the quantification for the theory as a whole. Moreover, the practical
difference is that we must understand the additions or modifications to our theory in light of
other future additions we might want to make. More significantly, when considering an addi-
tion or modification, we should do so with an eye to generating laws on the basis of empirical
experience as opposed to an arbitrary choice when two alternatives are equally compatible with
a theory.18 Furthermore, we do not see a need in Ramsey’s account for an “absolute” notion of
the primary system, as we would regarding Russell’s criterion of knowledge by acquaintance.
‘Primary’ and ‘Secondary’ can be reasonably construed as a relative distinction,19 where we
have a some primary system, e.g. the relative motions of the observable bodies in the solar
system, and a target theoretical system, e.g. the causal and dynamical information to be de-
duced from the aforementioned ‘primary’ phenomena. Ramsey’s own toy theory, it should be
remarked, does not mark a strict line between acquaintance or sensation and the theoretical—
both systems relate to unproblematically observable conditions.
3.2 General Propositions, Causal Considerations
3.2.1 “General Propositions and Causality”
Ramsey’s “General Propositions and Causality” poses several interpretive problems which
I suggest can be resolved by framing it in the context of a development of a broader view
of Ramsey’s philosophy of science, and thereby situating it in the context of “Physics Says,”
“Theories,” “Causal Qualities,” and “Universals of Law and of Fact.” First, it is among the
collection of ‘Last Papers’ in the Braithwaite edition of The Foundations of Mathematics and
Other Logical Essays where it is suggested Ramsey was writing for himself, rather than prepar-
ing a manuscript for publication: there is some question regarding the exact motivation and
argument structure. Second, for adapting it to present purposes it is not clear that this is meant
to be part of an argument or characterization of his views in the philosophy of science. Sahlin
(1990), for instance, treats this paper separately from Ramsey’s account in “Theories,” but
he recognizes that Ramsey is using concepts there which he critically elaborates in “General
Propositions and Causality.” I claim that it is correct to emphasize the connections between
these papers as elaborating Ramsey’s views on theories, especially given the contrast between
Ramsey’s earlier view of general propositions and of theories in “Universals of Law and of
Fact” which he explicitly rejects and reevaluates here. Nonetheless, while Ramsey certainly is
engaging with concepts, specifically that of causal necessity and causal laws, that are part of
18. That is, when our theory is compatible with the addition of either ϕ or ¬ϕ.
19. We could perhaps usefully compare it to the relative notions of the a priori or analytic in Carnap’s thought
where those notions are relative to a given framework.
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the philosophy of science, he is approaching them here not primarily as a philosophical treat-
ment of scientific theories, but from a theory of belief and propositional attitudes. It might be
appropriate to say, that insofar as he is analysing causal laws and necessity from a theory of
belief, he is giving an account of scientific theorizing, but it is clear in the paper that his ac-
count is meant to have a broader scope than scientific theories. On the other hand, he does refer
specifically to his ‘theory of science’ and the examples of causal laws do make the connection
to scientific theory explicit (though, they indicate as much applicability to psychology as to
physics).20 Hence, while the view Ramsey develops applies to general propositions in general,
it is crucial to understanding his approach to theories to understand the role of general proposi-
tions therein. I claim that the considerations Ramsey develops concerning general propositions
here serve as an elucidation of the role that general propositions play in our reasoning regarding
the phenomena our theory seeks to explain.
It is not clear that Ramsey had a mature, or definitive view on these issues; they could
equally be taken to be probative and exploratory attempts to elucidate the problems he ad-
dresses, but there is evidence that he clearly was developing what he calls a “theory of science.”
Indeed, it is more plausible that Ramsey’s views were under ongoing development. Neverthe-
less, that development does not give sufficient reason to think that Ramsey was proposing a
structuralist view of theories. It is worth mentioning that Ramsey’s thoughts on chance and
probability have a prominent place in “General Propositions and Causality,” but because De-
mopoulos’ application of the Newman objection to his reconstruction of Ramsey and the ex-
tension to contemporary forms of structuralism bypass these views entirely, we can sidestep
them as well. This is not, however, to say that an adequate theory of theories may not require
an account of belief and probability in some fundamental way, but rather that the account of
the world beyond experience, as given by a theory and theoretical terms, does not obviously
need to wade into any of the problems in the philosophy of probability. Sahlin (Sahlin 1990,
112ff) contextualizes how “General Propositions and Causality” can be added to Ramsey’s
philosophy of probability. In note (2) of this paper, Ramsey himself suggests that “[c]hance
and law are used in the same way in a theoretical system as in a primary system,” and also, in
note (1) that “[a]ll theories, chances and laws are constructed with a view to supplementation
by discovery of further facts. . . ” (Ramsey 1929b, 162). This suggests that chance, at least
with respect to a theory of science, can be considered in the same way as laws with respect
to their role in theories. Minimally, since the issues with probability arise in the same way in
Ramsey’s primary and secondary systems, i.e., insofar as general propositions occur in both,
any special philosophical problems in probability are applicable to both domains and need not
20. Sahlin gives examples in his discussion of framing Ramsey’s economic theory in the context of Ramsifica-
tion. This suggests how Ramsey’s insights are certainly much more broadly applicable than only to physics.
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be an obstacle to understanding the relation between and philosophical explication of the two
systems.
Ramsey’s argument touches on a variety of conditional statements, what it means to reject
them or disagree, general propositions, realism in science, necessity, and causality. His analysis
of causal laws proceeds from a analysis of a kind of general proposition which he labels a
‘variable hypothetical’. He concludes that causal necessity is not a fact, and the assertion of a
law is the assertion of a variable hypothetical. Strictly speaking, he concludes that a variable
hypothetical is not a proposition, but rather like a schema for deriving propositions.
On the view that we have been explaining, causal necessity is not a fact; when
we assert a causal law we are asserting not a fact, not an infinite conjunction,
nor a connection of universals, but a variable hypothetical which is not strictly a
proposition at all, but a formula from which we derive propositions. (159)
Notice that causal laws in Newtonian physics seem to exemplify this: we are given an
abstract/schematic account of how to determine the forces in an interaction. We are not told that
there are such forces, nor the causal mechanism; rather, we are told that if there are any forces
at all as described within the theoretical framework of the laws of motion, we can go about
determining them on the basis of the observed relative motions. Notice as well, that describing
causal laws as variable hypotheticals, and hence as judgements on Ramsey’s account, we see a
point of similarity with Gupta’s approach to the given in experience as a judgement relative to
a background view.
Ramsey claims that general propositions come in two kinds: conjunctions, and variable
hypotheticals. Those that are conjunctions, on his analysis, are general statements which we
would now say have bounded universal quantifiers. His example is ‘Everyone in Cambridge
voted’ and he suggests that the variable is not people in Cambridge, but rather a restricted
region that is relative to the intended definiteness of ‘Cambridge’. Variable hypotheticals, by
contrast appear to be what we would now describe as having unbounded universal quantifiers—
e.g. ∀x(φx −→ ψx)—and Ramsey denies that these could be conjunctions.21 It is important
to note two points regarding the analysis so far. First, Ramsey is engaging a topic that had
contemporary interest, as there was debate regarding the meaning of quantifiers among the
logicians of his day; he is not broaching the topic without any precedent. Second, Ramsey’s
21. This denial of universal quantification as an infinite conjunction could be taken as a consideration against
infinitary languages. I do not know of any place where Ramsey considers such a language, but clearly Ramsey
could, as a philosopher of science and as an epistemologist, deny such constructions for particular areas of in-
quiry, but entertain the idea as a mathematician. This is to say that I think his remarks on quantification here
should be used only very cautiously in regard to understanding the late developments in Ramsey’s philosophy of
mathematics.
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analysis of general propositions need not be correct, rather all we need is to understand his
claims regarding them so that we can understand the role they play in his thinking about the
philosophy of science. This latter is simply to recognize that philosophical issues surrounding
counterfactuals, as well as laws, persist and have a dedicated literature whose concerns well
exceed Ramsey’s remarks.
Granting that a variable hypothetical is not a proposition, Ramsey poses how one can be
right or wrong. He notes that many sentences can express cognitive attitudes without being
propositions. Ramsey analyzes variable hypotheticals as a kind of habit or disposition. The
following passage is the clearest statement of Ramsey’s position:
Variable hypotheticals are not judgments [sic] but rules for judging ‘If I meet a φ,
I shall regard it as ψ. This cannot be negated but it can be disagreed with by one
who does not adopt it. (Ramsey 1929b, 149)
There is not a lot by way of argument leading up to Ramsey’s view. Much of the rest of
the paper involves his responses to anticipated objections, and giving examples of the way in
which speakers can disagree. The second part of the paper does take up the issue whether
“causation is a reality or a fiction; and, if a fiction, is it useful or misleading, arbitary [sic]
or indispensable?” (153). He rejects a realistic view of causality, however, denying a ‘real
connection of universals’ as nonsense, and, he also rejects the analysis of a causal law as an
infinite conjunction. Ramsey explains away causality this way:
The world, or rather that part of it which we are acquainted, exhibits as we must all
agree a good deal of regularity of succession. I contend over and above that it ex-
hibits no feature called causal necessity, but that we make sentences called causal
laws from which (i.e. having made which) we proceed to actions and propositions
connected with them in a certain way, and say that a fact asserted in a proposition
which is an instance of causal law is a case of causal necessity. This is a regular
feature of our conduct, a part of the general regularity of things; as always there
is nothing beyond the regularity to be called causality, but we can again make a
variable hypothetical about this conduct of ours and speak of it as an instance of
causality. (160)
If “General Propositions and Causality” is obscured by the various considerations and as-
sessments of a variety of conditional statements, the two points that need to be taken away
regarding the philosophy of science are the rejection of a realist view of causality, and the em-
phasis on laws being not judgements, but schemata for judging. Ramsey’s “Causal Qualities,”
despite its brevity, more clearly emphasizes connections in the philosophy of science. Indeed,
it sheds light on those two key points made in Ramsey’s analysis of variable hypotheticals.
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3.2.2 “Causal Qualities”
“Causal Qualities” is peculiar insofar as Braithwaite and Mellor, in their respective edition
of Ramsey’s papers, locate its relevance differently. Braithwaite places it among Ramsey’s last
papers, following “General Propositions and Causality” and other papers, presumably because
of its emphasis on causal laws and the notion of a variable hypothetical, which are introduced
and systematically discussed in “General Propositions and Causality.” Mellor, by contrast,
claims that “Causal Qualities” is a postscript to “Theories,” since it deals explicitly with sci-
entific concepts. I suggest that its most fruitful to read “Causal Qualities” juxtaposed with
both papers for mutual clarification. In these notes Ramsey considers issues of definition with
respect to particular terms. He again utilizes the distinction between a primary and secondary
system. Here, however, he notes that primary system is dealt with as part of a fictitious sec-
ondary system, which allows both fictitious qualities and fictitious entities. There is no dif-
ference between singular propositions of the primary system and singular propositions of the
secondary system: they are both believed with various degrees of probability. He claims that
in singular propositions, the fictitiousness is ignored when we reason with them. The differ-
ence between singular propositions of the primary and secondary systems is that “we are not
ultimately interested in fictitious propositions, but use them merely as intermediaries: we do
not care about them for their own sake” (Ramsey 1929a, 260). General propositions in the
secondary system, on the contrary, are just like variable hypotheticals (and as he discusses in
“General Propositions and Causality,” so too just like chances).
Ramsey makes one of his most explicit statements regarding what we would call his theory
of theories: “A theory is a way of saying the primary propositions and the variable hypothet-
icals that follow from it” (260). This remark might seem peculiar; recall in “Theories” that
Ramsey does not think that a theory needs to explicitly define away its theoretical terms in
order to be properly used. Here, he seems to suggest that the theoretical aspect of the theory
is only of use for expressing propositions of the primary system. This reading would be too
quick: because Ramsey claims we treat general propositions of the secondary system just like
variable hypotheticals—indeed, following from his analysis of general propositions, they are
variable hypotheticals—a theory then is a way of saying both singular primary propositions,
and variable hypotheticals of either system (the singular propositions of the secondary system
are inferential intermediaries). This implies that the variable hypotheticals of the secondary
system are crucial for imposing the connections in the primary by way of which we can arrive
at singular propositions of the primary system. Ramsey is moreover explicit in his analysis of
general propositions that they are not superfluous, but rather essential to our thinking (Ram-
sey 1929b, 153). In order to remain consistent, then, Ramsey cannot suggest that the general
propositions of the secondary system ought to be eliminated, or subscribe to reductionism, that
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infamous second dogma of empiricism. In this regard, his account of scientific theories stands
apart from forms of logical positivism which sought to reduce a theory to its observational
system.
Here, as in the case of causal laws, Ramsey dismisses the realism with respect to theoret-
ical terms. He considers this kind of realism “foolish” and that asserting the existence of a
theoretical term, like the quality ‘mass’, “is nonsense unless it means merely to affirm the con-
sequences of a mechanical theory” (Ramsey 1929a, 138). His attitude can be at least partially
explained in this remark:
No proposition of the secondary system can be understood apart from the whole
theory to which it belongs. If a man says, ‘Zeus hurls thunderbolts’, that is not
nonsense because Zeus does not appear in my theory. I have to consider it as
part of a theory and attend its consequences, e.g. that sacrifices will bring the
thunderbolts to an end. (137)
Ramsey is suggesting that Zeus and his thunderbolts are meaningful relative to the theory
in which they appear, and more specifically to the consequences of that theory. In the same
way he suggests that asserting the existence of mass means affirming the consequences of a
mechanical theory. The claim that understanding a proposition from the secondary system
requires the theory as a whole, coupled with Ramsey’s rejection of realism about theoretical
terms, suggests an almost Hilbertian attitude. That is, rather than trying to refer to entities
which lie beyond our experience, the meaning of the theoretical terms come from the theory
itself. Of course, this clearly is an extension of Ramsey’s claims, but it suggests a plausible
analysis: the terms and propositions of the secondary system are meaningful in virtue of the
axioms of the theory and the systems of laws and consequences connecting them to the primary
system. In this sense, theoretical terms are defined by the theory, and not by any images or
associations we have.
3.2.3 Drawing Together
We can draw these various threads together by contrasting Ramsey’s view of theories and
general propositions in “Universals of Law and of Fact.” There, he is concerned with deter-
mining a difference between between universals of law, and those of fact. In “General Propo-
sitions and Causality” he dispenses with demarcating that distinction, and as we saw, focuses
on developing his notion that general propositions are not propositions at all, but rather vari-
able hypotheticals, which upon analysis, are like schemata for making judgements. Running
through these three papers is a concern for understanding causal laws, and as Ramsey puts it,
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“whether causation is a reality or a fiction...” (Ramsey 1929b, 153). In that regard, while Mel-
lor considers “Causal Qualities” to be an addendum to “Theories,” we can see that its content is
shared between the main concern expressed through the papers focused on variable hypotheti-
cals and causation, as well as the issues in “Theories” for understanding a theory as a language,
where, just before the close, Ramsey claims that causal axioms belong to the secondary sys-
tem and must be put into the theory. Clearly, then, it makes sense to consider the papers
together. But doing so allows us to see explicitly a view of theories and an interpretation of
“Theories” which he now clearly rejects. In “Universals of Law and of Fact” Ramsey criticized
Braithwaite’s view that universals of law are general statements believed on non-demonstrative
grounds. In “General Propositions and Causality,” he repeats his criticism of Braithwaite, but
he also rejects his own earlier position:
I, therefore, put up a different theory by which causal laws were consequences
of those propositions which we should take as axioms if we knew everything and
organized it as simply as possible in a deductive system.
What is said above22 means, of course, a complete rejection of this view (for
it is impossible to know everything and organize it in a deductive system) and a
return to something nearer Braithwaite’s. (150)
After this, Ramsey turns to giving an account of what we mean when we talk of an unknown
law of nature. He draws a comparison to the finitist theory of mathematics regarding unknown
true mathematical propositions. For someone to say that a new theorem has been proven, means
that someone has constructed a proof of a certain limited size. Similarly, “an unknown truth in
the theory of numbers cannot be interpreted as an (unknown) proposition true of all numbers,
but as one proved or provable,” (151). Here, provability is being taken as a kind of limitation
imposed on the assertion of the existence of a true mathematical proposition. In the case of an
unknown causal law, Ramsey asks what corresponds to the process of proof which holds in the
mathematical case. His solution is the following:
Clearly only the process of collecting evidence for the causal law, and to say
that there is such a law, though we don’t know it, must mean that there are such
singular facts in some limited sphere (a disjunction) as would lead us, did we
know them, to assert a variable hypothetical. But this is not enough, for there must
not merely be facts leading to the generalization, but this when made must not
mislead us. (Or we could not call it a true causal law.) It must therefore also be
asserted to hold within a certain limited region taken to be the scope of our possible
experience.
22. That is, in his reflections in the paper up to this point.
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There was nothing corresponding to this in the mathematical case, for a math-
ematical generalization must if proved hold in any particular case, but an empirical
generalization cannot be proved; and for there to be evidence leading to it and for
it to hold in other cases also are separate facts. (Ramsey 1929b, 152)
Recall in “Theories” where Ramsey discusses the addition of a new axiom or assertion
to the theory. There, both a theoretical and a practical difference were made by adding an
assertion. The theoretical difference is between the consequences of the theory before and
after the addition. But the practical difference is to “adopt an attitude rather different from
that which we should adopt to a genuine proposition” (Ramsey 1929d, 131). In this case, the
addition is not a genuine proposition because it does not have a complete meaning independent
of the theory and the stock of propositions the theory already contains. That is, there is a kind of
meaning holism involved with the interrelated definitions and propositions of the theory, much
as in the sense of a Hilbertian scheme. Moreover, the crucial point is that Ramsey encourages
us not simply to make an addition when it is compatible with a theory, but rather, in keeping
with his description of collecting evidence for a causal law, we wait and “hope from observed
instances to find a law and then to fill in the unobserved ones [i.e. instances]23according to that
law, not at random beforehand” (132).
It is clear then that Ramsey considers a theory to be something more than a deductive
system for organizing known facts as simply as possible. In both “Theories” and his notes at
the end of “General Propositions and Causality” he asserts the importance of a theory being
capable of growth. Describing his view he says the following:
(5) As opposed to a purely descriptive theory of science, mine may be called a
forecasting theory. To regard a law as a summary of certain facts seems to me
inadequate; it is also an attitude of expectation for the future. The difference is
clearest in regard to chances; the facts summarized do not preclude an equal chance
for a coincidence which would be summarized by and, indeed, lead to a quite
different theory. (Ramsey 1929b, 163).
Not only must a theory be capable of growth—something which would be lost if it were neces-
sary to explicitly define the secondary system—but that growth is methodologically connected
to our ability to not simply collect facts and form new generalizations, or new hypotheses, but
more precisely to our ability to assert a variable hypothetical on the basis of singular facts in
some limited sphere and that this generalization must not mislead us within the scope of our
future experience. Theoretical terms, like variable hypotheticals generally, are crucial to our
23. The parenthetical remark is mine.
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thinking, and moreover, crucial to our ability to form the judgements pertaining to the conse-
quences of the primary system. While the analysis Ramsey gives in “General Propositions and
Causality” is meant to apply to how we reason with variable hypotheticals in general, and not
exclusively in scientific theorizing, the case of disagreement in the context of theorizing might
seem problematic. In fact, I think that its exploration elucidates the role variable hypotheticals
play in our scientific theorizing.
Recall that variable hypotheticals are found in both the primary and secondary systems. I
suggested in §3.2 that we see a nascent form of the internal–external distinction when Ramsey
remarks that the incompleteness of the meaning of secondary ‘propositions’ affects our disputes
but not our reasoning. On that analysis, disputes are issues posed within a theoretical (or
conceptual) framework, and our reasoning involves the principles of the framework itself. But,
variable hypotheticals are described as inferential schemata: as formulae from which we derive
propositions or as rules for judging. It would appear then, that variable hypotheticals belong
to the framework of our reasoning. As part of our reasoning, we might then wonder how
someone could disagree with a variable hypothetical, or how speakers could disagree.24 There
are, I think, two straightforward ways.
Suppose the variable hypothetical is part of the secondary system. We know that there is
a kind of meaning holism at work in “Theories.” Recall what Ramsey says about adding an
axiom or secondary ‘proposition’: the meaning of that proposition amounts to the difference in
the primary system between the stock of propositions of the theory before and after the addi-
tion (cf. Ramsey 1929d, 131). Here, it is easy to see that even though the variable hypothetical
has the status of something like an inference rule, if it fails to agree with a course of experi-
ence or with predictions in the primary system, then we have grounds to reject it. That is, in
agreement with the long quotation above, our generalizations must not mislead us; the variable
hypotheticals “must therefore also be asserted to hold within a certain limited region taken to
be the scope of our possible experience,” (Ramsey 1929b, 152).
Now consider another case of disputing a variable hypothetical. In the previous case, the
general proposition was cast into doubt because it was misleading or failed to hold as the gen-
eralization that it is. In this second case, the dispute is at the level of forming the generalization
That is, some collection of facts suggests a law-like generalization. But our disputants disagree
about its formulation. Can Ramsey allow for this case? Of course. To see this, compare:
Two theories may be compatible without being equivalent, i.e. a set of facts might
be found which agreed with one but not with the other. The adherents of two
such theories could quite well dispute, although neither affirmed anything the other
24. Clearly there is a distinction between people disagreeing, and the notion of a disagreement within the propo-
sitions of a system.
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denied. For a dispute it is not necessary that one disputant should assert p, the other
p. It is enough that one should assert something the other refrains from asserting.
(Ramsey 1929d, 133)
and
Variable hypotheticals or causal laws form the system with which the speaker
meets the future; they are not, therefore, subjective in the sense that if you and
I enunciate different ones we are each saying something about ourselves which
pass by one another like ‘I went to Grantchester’, ‘I didn’t.’ For if we meet the
future with different systems we disagree even if the actual future agrees with both
so long as it might (logically) agree with one but not with the other, i.e. so long as
we don’t believe the same things. (Ramsey 1929b, 149)
This is consistent with Ramsey’s claim that variable hypotheticals, as rules for judging
cannot be negated, but can be disagreed with by one who does not adopt them. It is also
consistent with the endnote (5) quoted earlier where the “facts summarized do not preclude an
equal chance for a coincidence which would be summarized by, and indeed, lead to quite a
different theory” (163). Moreover, the claim in this context that a variable hypothetical cannot
be negated need not threaten the analysis in the first case. In that context is not a matter of a
proposition being affirmed or negated, but rather of a rule being accepted or rejected insofar as
it accords with the facts to be generalized, and does not mislead us in applying our judgements
in future cases.
There is one last sense in which the notion of a variable hypothetical can be seen in the
context of theorizing. So far the analysis has considered specific general propositions which
inhabit the the primary and secondary systems. But there is also a sense in which the entire
theory (or its Ramsey-sentence) could be take as a kind of meta-level variable hypothetical.
Ramsey remarks in endnote (4) to “General Propositions and Causality” “of course the theo-
retical system is all like a variable hypothetical in being there just to be deduced from; and a
law in the secondary system is at two removes of deduction,” (162). In this context, the theory
as a whole is conceived not as a statement which is either true or false, but rather as a scheme
of rules for forming the judgements with which we meet the future. That is, in Ramsey’s sense,
a forecasting theory.
Ramsey’s theory of science is one which does not reconstruct our knowledge of the world
beyond experience through logical constructions or appeals to the logico-mathematical prop-
erties Russell advocated in his structuralism. Instead, Ramsey’s theory of science explores the
inferential role played by variable hypotheticals and the secondary system in which our experi-
ence is embedded in a given theory. His investigations move through the logico-mathematical
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issues pertaining to definability and other inter-theoretic relations when considering a theory
as a language, but he is also led by his reflections on universals of law to a new theory of vari-
able hypotheticals and causal laws. Across these papers there is a remarkable degree mutual
elucidation and a clear emphasis on interrelated problems.
3.3 Summary
In this chapter we began in 3.1.1 by showing a fragment of Ramsey’s Nachlass to be a
response to and rejection of Russell’s remarks on theories in The Analysis of Matter. There
Ramsey suggests his notion of a dictionary, as well as some notion of a partial interpretation.
In 3.1.2 I proceeded to show how Ramsey’s paper “Theories” can be shown to be a deeper
articulation and exploration of the proposal he gives in the Nachlass fragment. More than that
though, I argue that Ramsey was responding to issues and questions set by others instead of
advocating the elimination of theoretical terms. Nor, I argued, was Ramsey trying to give an
epistemological account of the world beyond our experience in that paper, but rather exploring
the inferential or functional role of theoretical propositions and terms in their relation to a pri-
mary system. While Ramsey systematically describes the structure25 of a theory as a language
he does not articulate, nor advocate a structuralist thesis pertaining to the nature of our knowl-
edge of the world beyond experience. In 3.2 I argued that Ramsey’s views on the philosophy
of science should be seen in light of other papers. These explore issues to be found within
“Theories,” but also investigate Ramsey’s notion of a variable hypothetical as a special kind
of conditional statement crucial to our ordinary reasoning, and our reasoning with the laws
found in theories. In this broader context, where general propositions are explored as schema
for forming judgements, we do not see an endorsement of the structuralist thesis attributed to
Ramsey in chapter 2, but rather see Ramsey grappling with methodological questions involved
in both the formation of laws that transcend any given number of finite experiences, and how
we are to understand our reasoning with those variable hypotheticals.
I have not claimed that Ramsey had a fully developed theory of science. It is, however,
clear that he was seriously engaged with developing one. The nascent theory he had developed
was nonetheless not a species of structuralist explication of our empirical knowledge. Indeed
it was a rejection of Russell’s notion of the truth of a theory being a question of whether, as-
suming a theory as a deductive system, there exist particulars or logical structures composed of
particulars which satisfy the hypotheses of the theory. Ramsey rejects this notion of truth at the
outset in “Physics Says” and makes no indication of adopting it later. Moreover, he rejects the
view of a theory as a deductive system. Of course, deduction of the singular primary proposi-
25. Possible structure: he does not claim that his formulation here is the only way to give the idea.
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tions in a theory or of the singular propositions from a variable hypothetical is a crucial aspect
of theorizing, but Ramsey shows a sensitivity to understand a theory as something more than
a deductive system. Overemphasis on the logico-mathematical issues in “Theories” unduly
assimilates Ramsey to a project like Russel’s, when it is clear by now, that Ramsey was at-
tempting a much broader investigation into formulating a theory of science: namely one which
focuses on methodological aspects of theory change, growth, interrelations, as well as how we
reason with theories. Considering a theory as a language, like Ramsey says clearly, is focusing
on theories from one perspective. That perspective, and more specifically the abstract view of
theories and the Ramsey-sentence’s invocation by others, fails to do justice to the theory of
science Ramsey was developing.
Chapter 4
Structure, more broadly
The primary task of the previous chapter was to provide a reading or rational reconstruction
of Ramsey’s view of theories, particularly in light of his views of general propositions and
causality. The task of this chapter is to continue to reframe the philosophical context Ramsey
was investigating, but more significantly, to reconsider the philosophical context best suited
to the application of his views. The latter culminates in an extension of Ramsey’s views by
considering an implicit internal–external distinction therein which seeks to account for the
intuition that a theory ought to be able to account for advances in theoretical knowledge as a
matter of a posteriori discovery. I have argued that Ramsey is not using the Ramsey-sentence
as a reconstruction of theoretical knowledge, but rather investigating the functional role of
theoretical terms in a theory construed as a language, that is, as demystifying the conceptual
and inferential role theoretical terms have in a language structure in which we cannot presume
acquaintance with theoretical elements. His account can be extended, however, in such a way
that a theory is both a framework for and object of empirical enquiry. The former issue involves
contextualizing how Ramsey’s thought has been imported into other philosophical debates—
scientific realism/instrumentalism, and, in particular, recent debates over structural realism—
and whether it is necessary to frame it in these terms. Both goals of the chapter are, however,
to varying degrees intertwined.
The chapter begins by briefly looking at Ramsey within the realism-instrumentalism debate.
He has been variously interpreted as some sort of scientific realist or some kind of instrumen-
talist. More precisely, I respond to Psillos’ characterization of Ramsey as a kind of scientific
realist.1 While I think that if the terms of that debate are to be applied, then Demopoulos has
the correct reading, but otherwise there is a way to see Ramsey’s view as indifferent to that
debate.
It is difficult to adequately discuss Ramsey’s views and their relation to both structuralism,
1. Demopoulos, as we saw, understood Ramsey to hold a form of instrumentalism contrary to Russell’s realism.
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per the structuralist thesis, and their relation to the realism/instrumentalism debate without
considering the ways Carnap adopted and incorporated Ramsey’s idea. In this case, Michael
Friedman2 argues that we can understand Carnap as developing a structuralism without meta-
physics, which is not hindered by Newman’s objection. While I am not concerned to defend
Carnap (Friedman accomplishes this better than I could), the notion of structuralism without
metaphysics provides a context in which Carnap’s internal–external distinction can be seen to
be implicit in remarks by Ramsey. I think that a reasonable way to put the issue is that we best
understand Ramsey’s relevance in the debate by understanding that he anticipated the internal–
external distinction and therefore anticipated important ways in which Carnap’s views can be
extended. Moreover, it is plausible that the conflicting views of Ramsey’s realism or instru-
mentalism arise from failing to appreciate that he was developing an account which anticipates
the distinctions of what is sayable in a framework, what is sayable of a framework, and what a
framework implies. I argue that the implicit internal–external distinction is then subject to an
extension wherein a theory can be both a framework for empirical inquiry as well as an object
thereof, without reducing to something like a pragmatic choice of linguistic framework. I claim
that this extension is likewise compatible with a theory giving us insight into the structure of
the world in a sense that does not deprive it of its character of a posteriori discovery.
4.1 Scientific Realism, Instrumentalism, and Ramsey
From the previous chapter it should be rather clear that Ramsey was not articulating his
views as either a form of, or an endorsement of scientific realism. If a label is to be applied
to his views, it seems most appropriate to consider Ramsey an instrumentalist. We can briefly
review some of those considerations: a Ramsified theory can be taken purely extensionally;
that the terms and functions of the secondary system were described as fictional; that causality
is a fiction; that the nature of general propositions is such that they govern behaviour and
expectations; and that the existential claim that there is such a quality as mass is nonsense
unless it means only to affirm the consequences of a theory in which it has a role.3
Stathis Psillos, in his “Ramsey’s Ramsey-Sentences” argues instead that Ramsey’s own
view is a kind of scientific realism. Debating and trying to establish conclusively what Ram-
2. Recall that Friedman was a co-author with Demopoulos in “Bertrand Russell’s The Analysis of Matter: its
historical context and contemporary interest” which brought Newman’s objection back to contemporary attention.
3. The relevant passage for this last remark, should be sufficient to dispel any attribution of scientfic realism:
It is possible to have a ‘realism’ about terms in the theory similar to that about causal laws, and this
is equally foolish. ‘There is such a quality as mass’ is nonsense unless it means merely to affirm
the consequences of a mechanical theory. (Ramsey 1929a, 138)
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sey’s own preferred conception was, however, yields diminishing returns when situated in its
proper context. Russell was a kind of realist and posited his appeals to structure to grant
us knowledge of the world beyond experience. Granting that Ramsey was an instrumentalist
might serve to distance Ramsey’s work from the adoption of the Ramsey-sentence by contem-
porary structural realists. Yet creating that distance lacks a proper philosophical motivation.
The fact that an idea of Ramsey’s, the Ramsey-sentence, has been deployed in Carnap’s
neutralism, incorporated into modern structural realisms, and even advocated as a form of
scientific realism, shows at the very least that the method of Ramsifying a scientific theory
does not lead to exclusively one ‘-ism’. Even if it could be shown to imply a particular meta-
theoretic attitude, the debates and issues in those areas would be largely unaffected since the
Newman objection has already been applied to these positions and addressed, successfully or
not, by their proponents.4 Moreover, nothing is to be gained in regards to settling the issue of
the so-called syntactic and semantic views of theories. Newman’s original target was axiomatic
structures as considered by Russell, but Demopoulos showed that the same criticism applies to
theoretical structures considered from the semantic point of view.5 There is a sense in which
Newman’s point is made even more obvious in the semantic view: if you want to talk about
models of a theory you implicitly acknowledge that the relations of that theory can be variously
instantiated in abstract models—knowledge of structure, in this case will be knowledge of
common structure across models.
Appealing to an empirical hypothesis that the world is a model of the theory is no more
or less philosophically insightful than asserting that we have developed our theory in order to
represent the world.6 Recent work of Halvorson has questioned the received view of the dif-
ferences between syntactic and semantic approaches,7 but has also sought to show how in the
formalism of category theory we can appropriately represent the structure of scientific theories
and explore important notions of equivalence and reducibility. Indeed, I think that the meta-
mathematical spirit of Ramsey’s efforts find themselves a twenty-first century kinship in that
kind of approach, though I am not concerned to argue that claim here. The metamathematical
issues involved in developing the best, or at least an adequate set of axioms, or the question
of the appropriate formalism for representing the structure of a theory are by no means idle.
In logic and mathematics, syntactic methods have yielded deep results, and semantic methods
4. Structural realism in particular.
5. Recall that Winnie’s 1967 and Button and Walsh’s generalization of Newman’s objection are from a model
theoretic context.
6. This is one way in which it could be suggested that the semantic view of theories turns on an implicit realist
assumption: if there is to be a difference between ‘believing’ a theory and ‘accepting’ one, we might ask on what
that distinction turns.
7. William Craig, by contrast emphasized the important interplay and mutual enrichment of considering both
methods, cf. (Craig 1957)
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have taken our understanding to a level of abstraction and unification likely undreamed of in
the crisis in the foundations of mathematics of the early twentieth century. The importance
due to formal issues, and issues of formalization, however can provide genuine philosophical
elucidation, such as Minkowski’s formulation of special relativity and characterization of the
‘world-postulate’, and it is not necessarily an idle question to ask whether a given formulation
is ‘best’ or at least more informative.8 Even if the ‘best’ way to write out theories is not the
Ramsey-sentence as Ramsey suggested, or if an excessive fascination with formalization in the
style of the logical positivists is inappropriate, it does not follow that metamathematical inves-
tigations of theories are idle. Questions about formalization have led to interesting results, but
the difference between axiomatic and model theoretic representations does not obviously affect
the evaluation of Ramsey’s account of theories.
While in the semantic approach to theories the positivist preoccupation with rigorous ax-
iomatization was set aside, nevertheless talking about models of a theory, and especially the
‘empirical hypothesis’ that the world is one of its models, takes for granted precisely that
which is supposed to hold true in any theory: the axioms and laws thereof. Investigating the
role of Ramsification and the Ramsey-sentence in these various debates certainly does not lack
historical interest, nor perhaps the possibility of shedding light on nuances in the conceptual-
ization of those various philosophical positions. Nonetheless, these investigations can, indeed
have, bypassed the reconstruction of Ramsey’s thought I have given in the previous chapter.
The contemporary relevance of a deeper understanding of Ramsey’s views lies not so much
in their subsequent philosophical appropriation, but how they might be extended and applied
to understanding the physical interpretation of formal structures. Of course, this is not to say
that some of the mentioned positions are not attempting to answer the question of the physical
interpretation of formal structure. The positivists certainly were engaged in that task. How-
ever, post-positivist accounts of theories have not helped to address the problem raised against
positivist views, as characterized by Demopoulos, namely, how to translate structural claims
as genuine empirical knowledge instead of trivial claims. The issue becomes whether we can
develop Ramseyan insights to achieve a kind of philosophical understanding of physical in-
terpretation of formal structures, and indeed characterize our theoretical knowledge, without
automatically falling into the debates of the late twentieth century.
8. N.B. the difference between Minkowski’s and other formalizations of special relativity is independant of the
difference between axiomatic and model theoretic representations of them.
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4.2 Structuralism without metaphysics?
Psillos’ (1999), other than being a defense of scientific realism, clearly lays out the histor-
ical progression of the two language approach to theories, albeit primarily through the devel-
opment of Carnap’s contributions. While I am not concerned to defend, nor lay siege to, any
particular form of realism or instrumentalism, it is in the context of that debate that structural
realism arises. Structural realism, at least in its modern incarnation in Worral’s “Structural Re-
alism: The Best of Both Worlds?*” was supposed to take account of the best intuitions of both
realists and anti-realists, while also ideally dispensing with the limitations of the respective
positions, in particular that over the course of theory change the referents of theoretical terms
can radically change or altogether disappear.9 Moreover, modern structural realism advocates
the Ramsey-sentence of a theory as representing the structure of which they are either ontic or
epistemic realists about.10
Psillos explicates Carnap’s mature position as attempting to avoid metaphysical and meta-
theoretical debates regarding realism and instrumentalism, and to embrace a genuine kind of
neutral position through the logico-mathematical apparatus of the Ramsey-sentence. He argued
that Carnap’s development of the position collapses at different times towards realism or instru-
mentalism. It is claimed that the best that can be said is that it characterizes a kind of structural
realism. However, structural realism faces problems of mulitiple realizability and of the gen-
eration of trivialising structure through permutation arguments like that presented by Newman
contra Russell’s The Analysis of Matter. Lastly the structural realist is supposedly placed in a
dilemma where their position collapses either toward scientific realism, or trivialization where
the truth of an empirically adequate theory is guaranteed by ambient set theory.
Psillos is clearly aware of Newman style considerations and deploys them effectively. How-
ever, Psillos suggests that they might be addressed by restricting the domain of quantification
and relations from full models. Nevertheless, he does not acknowledge that permutation ar-
guments and adaptations of Newman’s argument can be applied to Henkin structures as well.
There is a deeper objection as well: even if we had reason to restrict the domains of quantifica-
tion for the theoretical terms, there is the prior question in virtue of what do we know how to
restrict those domains. That is, we lack a principled way to restrict domains. We can pose the
issue in the form of a dilemma. If all we know is structure, we do not have a well motivated
reason to restrict the domain. If we know something more than structure, we require an exact
9. Cf. (Friedman 2020) for a characterization of Howard Stein’s project in juxtaposition with Worrall’s and in
the context of aspects of Newtonian and Kantian methodology.
10. This use of the Ramsey-sentence transforms Russell’s inherently unverifiable claim about things in them-
selves into a trivial claim. This exemplifies the dilemma outlined by Newman and Demopoulos—either we cannot
spell out the truth conditions for structural realism, or it is trivially true.
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account of that epistemic access to the theoretical domain that does not prejudge the issue in
favour of any particular thesis of the scientific realist.11
It is in this context that we can best see the motivation for Friedman’s defense of Carnap.
In his (2008) and (2011) Friedman argues in defense of Carnap’s anti-metaphysical and anti-
epistemological stance in his Wissenschaftslogik. To explicate Carnap’s position and attempt to
dissolve rather than resolve traditional problems in the philosophy of science, Friedman con-
trasts Carnap’s understanding and subsequent development of the Ramsey-sentence approach
to theories with Hempel’s understanding thereof. While Carnap does not see an appeal in us-
ing Ramsification for the formulation of a scientific theory, and prefers instead to deal with
theoretical terms as constants in deductions from axioms in keeping with scientific practice,
he sees residual value in Ramsification for explicating the analytic and synthetic component
of scientific theories. A Ramsey-sentence, coupled with the Carnap sentence,12 allow for the
demarcation of the analytic and synthetic content of a theory, as well as the empirical content,
since on his formulation, the synthetic does not exceed the empirical content. Carnap’s pref-
erence for keeping theoretical terms as constants fits the Hilbertian implicit definition of terms
and Carnap recognizes the successes in physics that modern axiomatics have led to, shedding
the reliance on any kind of intuitive understanding for successful manipulation and investiga-
tion involving the highly abstract concepts introduced in modern physics. Moreover, Friedman
argues that Carnap is not susceptible to the Newman objection, and that Demopoulos’ argu-
ment to that effect relies on a realist intuition insofar as our theoretical claims are required to
be discoveries. He also shows how van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism, despite being a
defense of instrumentalism, belies a realist attitude when it marks a difference between accept-
ing a theory and believing one (i.e., if you were truly an instrumentalist you would not need to
base a distinction between acceptance and belief on the notion that what is believed is that the
theory is, beyond saving the phenomena, in some sense moreover true).
Friedman’s defense of Carnap involves a detailed examination Carnap’s semantic analy-
sis of theoretical terms from 1939 onwards. The crucial aspect for satisfactorily extending
Ramsey’s view, regardless of the success of Friedman’s argument, is to highlight the contrast
with Psillos’ characterization that Carnap’s neutralism, and indeed his form of structuralism
collapses to realism or instrumentalism. The contrast Friedman draws is clear in the following:
The circumstance that Carnap has this much in common with both van Fraassen’s
11. To be fair to Psillos, the exact arguments regarding Henkin structures and permutation arguments, though
straightforward to produce in model theory, are not explicitly stated in the philosophical literature for more than
two decades after his book’s publication.
12. Given a Ramsey-sentence Rϑ, its Carnap sentence Cϑ is the statement: Rϑ → ϑ. So, given a Ramsey-
sentence and adopting the Carnap sentence as a meaning postulate, we have an implication of the original theory
itself, encouraging Carnap to prefer adopting the Carnap sentence as a meaning postulate and treating theoretical
terms as constants, rather than in their Ramsified form. Cf. (Winnie 1970) for technical details.
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instrumentalism and contemporary structural realism suggests, at least to me, that
Carnap’s attempt at neutrality may have succeeded after all. He may in fact have
articulated a version of structuralism that recognizes the strengths of both instru-
mentalism and realism while simultaneously avoiding the philosophical “pseudo-
question” on which they appear substantively to differ. But this can only be fully
appreciated, I shall argue, when we place Carnap’s views on theoretical terms
within his wider conception of the task of philosophy of science—which he calls
Wissenschaftslogik, the“logic of science”—more generally. (Friedman 2011, 252)
and
Whereas formal logic, throughout much of the modern philosophical tradition (be-
ginning with Leibniz and culminating in the twentieth century mathematical phi-
losophy articulated by Frege and Russell) has had a fundamental importance for
epistemology and metaphysics, mathematical logic, in Carnap’s hands, has a fun-
damental importance for anti-epistemology and anti-metaphysics instead: its role
is precisely to safeguard our ongoing practice of developing empirical scientific
theories within formal mathematical frameworks from epistemological and meta-
physical contamination. (Friedman 2008, 295)
The issue that Friedman’s analysis fundamentally brings into the foreground is the man-
ner in which Newman’s objection is purportedly avoided by Carnap. There is no attempt by
Carnap to suggest any kind of metaphysical, epistemic, or semantic thesis which nullifies New-
man’s claim. Indeed, Carnap’s characterization of Wissenschaftslogik is fully compatible with
Newman’s observation; after all, Carnap acknowledges that theoretical claims require for their
satisfaction only that there exist classes, classes of classes, etc., which, whether cognisant of
the fact or not, anticipates Winnie’s proof of arithmetical models of theoretical structure. By
contrast, Carnap’s emphasis on the logic of science and his preoccupation with the analytic and
synthetic distinction make no attempt to justify which theory it is whose logic we are inves-
tigating. Rather, he sought to show how the addition of meaning postulates, in particular the
Carnap sentence, could help to isolate those claims in a theory which were true analytically,
and those which were empirical questions. That is, the issue was not one of analytic or a priori
statements in any kind of absolute sense, but rather in a relative sense: given a specific theoretic
structure characterized with a theoretical and observational partition, can we demarcate state-
ments which require for their truth observations from those which are true simply on the basis
of the system? Moreover, if so, can we subsequently add meaning postulates to the theory and
determine their effect on analytic and synthetic content? These questions need not be tied to
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the question of how well, and to what degree, our theory choice was well motivated. So, New-
man considerations do not matter for Carnap’s structuralism because permuted or arithmetical
models have no bearing on the success or failure of answering the specific questions Carnap
was posing in this context.
We know that Carnap’s approach eventually failed—he imposed conditions which were not
adequate to the task—but Winnie (1970) did carry on to show in a rigorous and exact way how
we can have a relative notion of theoretical analyticity, which repaired the defects in Carnap’s
own approach.13 In this context, the inadequacy of Carnap’s approach is eclipsed by the sig-
nificance of his internal–external distinction for articulating the difference between the kind of
question an answer to which can be framed inside a theory, and meta-theoretical questions in-
cluding metamathematical properties of the theoretical structure, as well as theory choice and
change. The greater failure was that despite emphasizing a relative notion of a priori knowl-
edge, that is, a notion of necessity correlated with the postulates of a given theory, Carnap rel-
egates the issue of external questions to a pragmatic issue of language choice and the adoption
of conventions for stipulating frameworks. This exemplified the logical positivists emphasis on
abstract formalism and conventional coordinative principles for interpretation, which itself rep-
resented a resistance to considering mutually empirically adequate theoretical frameworks as
the objects of rational and philosophical investigation beyond their formal properties in order
to support an anti-metaphysical and anti-epistemological neutrality. By the same token they
sought to deflate the realist-instrumentalist debate as a conventional choice of language form.
The question becomes, if there is evidence of something like an internal–external distinction
in Ramsey’s view of theories, does his view likewise strike a tenuous position between realism
and instrumentalism? Or does it rather have the resources to allow the distinction, while at
the same time accommodating the advance of science through genuine empirical discoveries?
That is, in cases where we clearly seem to advance our theoretical knowledge through a pos-
teriori discovery. Is Ramsey’s view compatible with a view of epistemic progress in science
which goes beyond demonstrating the functional role of theoretical language exemplified in a
Ramsey-sentence, and is his reconstructed view capable of an extension which preserves a no-
tion theoretical knowledge, including structural knowledge, that is not trivialized by Newman’s
observation?
13. This brilliant paper deserves careful study by anyone interested in these Carnapian issues—I have personally
found the study of Winnie’s proofs in his appendix to the paper more edifying than the discussion he provides on
its own.
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4.3 Extending “Theories”
Recall that the target of Demopoulos’ criticism were those views of theoretical knowledge
that subscribed to the abstract view of theories because their claims to structural knowledge are
trivialized by Newman’s observation. According to Demopoulos, there are two ways in which
Carnap’s approach casts doubt on the empirical character of scientific knowledge. One is the
epistemological emptiness of the Ramsey-sentence method as an expression of our theoretical
knowledge, given considerations of cardinality. Whether this is a fair assessment of Carnap’s
views we can leave to his detractors and defenders because it does not seem to impute anything
to Ramsey’s work as we have been considering it. The other problem is the difficulty of making
sense of empirical discovery in light of the internal–external distinction. In this latter case, it
seems that advances in scientific knowledge, such as the establishment of the atomic hypoth-
esis, indicate that there is something more fundamental at stake with our theoretical questions
than the mere pragmatic choice of linguistic framework. That is, the success of cases like the
confirmation of the atomic hypothesis gives us good reason to reject Carnap’s proposal that
what is at issue for external questions is a preference of language forms or frameworks.
We can consider the atomic hypothesis as a specific case of the more general issue be-
tween realists and instrumentalists regarding the existence of unobservable entities—or, for
the discussion at hand, the existence of the individuals and functions described by secondary
system. As Demopoulos argues, “realists and instrumentalists evaluate the truth of the Ramsey-
sentence relative to different interpretational frameworks” (Demopoulos 2012b, 66). That is,
it is a meta-theoretical question about the nature of theories in general that divides realists and
instrumentalists: whether theories express truths that transcend observation in a fundamental
way, or are only instruments to help us navigate the phenomena. If the dispute between re-
alists and instrumentalists amounts to a debate on an external question—or more specifically,
the controversy is one that concerns different views on the nature of theories—then success in
cases like the confirmation of the atomic hypothesis seems to amount to a refutation of Carnap’s
suggestion that the question of the existence of unobservables is a question of language choice.
His treatment of the internal–external distinction seems to suggest that ontological commit-
ments follow from commitment to a language form, thus ignoring the idea that a framework
might come with methods for posing and answering by empirical procedures, questions about
the existence of particular theoretical entities. Carnap’s view requires us to think that we settled
the external question by choosing a new language form, but this view dismisses the aspect of
empirical discovery that is involved in cases like that of the reality of atoms.14 Similarly, if
14. I note that I am largely not concerned with Carnap exegesis in this chapter. I understand that the issues
surrounding Carnap’s internal–external distinction are subtle, and disputed. In the chapter I deliberately keep my
interpretation of Carnap as close to that of Demopoulos and Friedman as possible. If their understandings deviate,
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there is an internal–external distinction at work in Ramsey’s conception of theories, his view is
subject to the same objection.
Ramsey’s position therefore seems to be threatened on two fronts. If the internal–external
distinction is shown to be contrary to our sense that empirical discovery can motivate theoret-
ical change, then so too is Ramsey’s view insofar as it embraces that kind of distinction. On
the other hand, if there is no genuine internal–external distinction in his work, there seems to
be little reason to see the Ramsey-sentence as part of a positive account of theories given the
Newman objection. The lack of such a distinction could then seem to collapse the distinction
between Ramsey’s metamathematical investigations and his views on general propositions into
a proposal for the nature of theories whose epistemological significance is hamstrung by New-
man’s observation. However, Demopoulos has shown how to extend Carnap’s work to mitigate
the issue faced by his internal–external distinction. I suggest that an analogous extension can
be made for Ramsey. The development and application of an extension to Ramsey’s work
has the benefit that although it is reasonable to doubt that the extension represents Carnap’s
view,15 there is textual evidence that it in fact serves as an accurate reconstruction of Ramsey’s
view. While Demopoulos’ extension of the internal–external distinction is illuminating for
the realism–anti-realism debate, it goes beyond Carnap’s own view. An analogous extension
of Ramsey’s view has the same merits, and arguably, represents his own view. Moreover, it
makes sense of his endorsement of the Ramsey-sentence despite recognizing the arbitrariness
of the Ramsification of a theory. Here, even if it is a mistake to claim that this is Ramsey’s
view, this says nothing against the potential philosophical interest such a reconstruction has.
Demopoulos suggests that the internal–external distinction might be extended in a way that
is consistent16 with “Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology.” The extension shows that what
appears as a single question might split into two or more different questions. He suggests that
questions such as that of the existence of atoms can be interpreted either as external questions
about the nature of theories, or as internal questions. Conceived as an external question, the
issue between the realist and instrumentalist is about which interpretational framework should
applied to theories: in particular, what notion of truth is appropriate and whether theories
express truths that transcend observation or are simply tools to help us navigate and predict
phenomena. As an internal question, while the example of the atomic hypothesis is a special
case of more general existential claims about unobservables, the issue is whether our ordinary
methods including our notions of rules of proof and evidence, are adequate to determining,
I follow Demopoulos’ interpretation for the obvious reason of developing my interpretation of Ramsey contra his
own.
15. Cf. (Demopoulos 2012a, 65-67).
16. Although this extension is consistent with ESO, Demopoulos gives good reason to doubt that Carnap would
accept it.
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within the framework, whether an existential claim can be confirmed. There are two cases
which must be distinguished with respect to possible external questions. In the first case, it is
an issue for which our ordinary methods fail to stabilize on a particular hypothesis, i.e., they
fail to yield a determinate answer. In the second case, the issue is one which falls entirely
outside the scope of our ordinary methods.
In the first case there is a speculation about the future results of scientific discovery which,
like in the case of the atomic hypothesis, might be overturned and thereby show that our meth-
ods can stabilize on a determinate answer, the success of which shows the speculation to be
mistaken. In this first case, what we might have had good reason to consider an intractable
problem for our ordinary scientific methods, like the existence of atoms in the early twentieth
century, is shown to be an issue which can be resolved within a given theoretical framework.
We can point out that in this case the realism/instrumentalism question about the nature of the-
ories in general, that is, the meta-theoretical question about the appropriate way to understand
theories, is left untouched. In cases like confirmation of the atomic hypothesis what seemed
like a possibly external question was indeed eventually amenable to the theoretical resources
and methods of physics. In the second case of possible external questions, our ordinary meth-
ods are such as to never compel us one way or another in the adoption of our meta-theoretical
views regarding the nature of a theory. That is, philosophers are in a position to adopt the
metaphysical, semantic, or epistemological theses of realism or instrumentalism, but are not
compelled either to do so or not on the basis of scientific discoveries, or the lack thereof.
For Carnap, what is at issue between realists and instrumentalists is whether they ought
to use theoretical vocabulary. As we have seen, Carnap’s neutralism was open to using the-
oretical terms in accordance with the practice of scientists, and in accordance with his anti-
metaphysical and anti-epistemological Wissenshcaftslogik he relegated the debate to an issue
of language preference. It is clear that Ramsey endorses the use of theoretical vocabulary since
he does not think it necessary to eliminate the secondary system through explicit definitions.
This, in itself, does not settle the question of whether Ramsey was a realist or an instrumental-
ist (or either), but Ramsey does seem to have anticipated Demopoulos’ framing as an internal
question whether our ordinary methods will stabilize on a determinate solution to a particular
problem. Consider the practical consequences of the claim that the propositions of the sec-
ondary system are not genuine propositions: we are not to add an axiom whenever its truth is
consistent with our theory, but rather we should both consider what other additions we might
make to the theory and ideally wait until we can generate a law from our experience rather than
selecting the new axiom arbitrarily. We could consider Newton’s method as an example here,
insofar e.g. as we do not add as an axiom or law that there is an inverse-square force holding
the solar system together, but rather investigate whether the laws of motion permit us to deter-
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mine the existence and nature of a force from the observed motions. We can see in Ramsey’s
remark about additional axioms that, considered practically, we ought to wait until our ordi-
nary methods stabilize on a determinate solution before opting to add an axiom to our system.
We might worry, however, that this is merely an inaccurate interpretation of a brief passage.
Although Ramsey makes similar remarks at other points both regarding the moon, and further
considerations regarding the meaning of propositions in the secondary system, those remarks
are likewise individually too brief to convincingly argue that Ramsey has this issue of stabiliza-
tion in mind. However, those mentioned considerations collectively, and in conjunction with
his remarks at the end of “Theories” regarding the teapot, provide reasonable grounds to apply
Demopoulos’ extension to Ramsey’s view of theories:
Take, for instance, the problem “Is there a planet the size and shape of a tea-
pot?” This question has meaning so long as we do not know that an experiment
could not decide the matter. Once we know this it loses meaning, unless we restore
it by new axioms, e.g., as to the orbits possible to planets.17
But someone will say “Is it not a clear question with the onus probandi by
definition on one side?” Clearly it means “Will experience reveal to us such a
tea-pot?” I think not; for there are three cases:
1. Experience will show there is such a tea-pot.
2. Experience will show there is not such a tea-pot.
3. Experience will not show anything.
And we can quite well distinguish (2) from (3) though the objector confounds
them.
This tea-pot is not in principle different from a tea-pot in the kitchen cupboard.
(Ramsey 1929d, 235)
The distinction between Ramsey’s (2) and (3) clearly shows that Ramsey distinguishes two
questions involved with our ordinary methods. (2) and (1) concern whether we shall obtain a
determinate answer, positive or negative, to our questions. (3) is whether the question fails to
17. Though I do not place any argumentative weight on this point in what follows, I do think this remark on
orbits is curious in the context of “Theories.” Up to this point he has only considered his toy theory, but now
we see a transition to an actual scientific consideration, for an albeit silly example. We might wonder whether
Ramsey is considering something like Newton’s theory-mediated measure of Jupiter’s mass on the basis of its
satellites, or the subsequent success of the Newtonian gravitational law in the discovery of Neptune on the basis
of perturbations of the orbit of Uranus. Of course, in the Newtonian case we could not settle if the planet had
the shape of a teapot, because the gravitational calculations treat the planets as points of mass regardless of their
distribution; though, the oblateness of the earth was determined through experimentation with pendulums, so it is
not absurd to suggest that an experiment (or observation through an incredibly powerful telescope) might allow
us to determine at least approximate shape.
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be addressed either positively or negatively by our methods. We read (3) this way as opposed
to saying that experience might be inconclusive, which might be no more than a temporary
setback, because were it only a temporary setback, (3) would then collapse back into one of (1)
or (2)—there would be no reason for Ramsey to disagree with the imagined interlocutor in the
quotation unless he thought that (1) and (2) were not exhaustive, and hence, why it is a mistake
for the objector to “confound” (2) and (3). The cases Ramsey distinguishes here align nicely
with Demopoulos’ analysis. When considering a question of the existence of a theoretical
object, experience, rather than language choice or definition, has a crucial role. Initially in
the case of the confirmation of the atomic hypothesis, experience was inconclusive. However,
by our theoretical resources it became a tractable issue in which experience stabilized on an
answer. If it were a truly external question, experience would not show anything: the use
of a framework that postulated atoms would be a choice for theoretical expedience, but not
motivated by empirical evidence. Notice, however, that Ramsey is not making a suggestion
about the nature of theories; instead he is distinguishing cases within a theoretical framework
where experience has an authoritative role for our assertions of the existence of a theoretical
object. These remarks address one horn of the dilemma described earlier: that if Ramsey does
subscribe to an internal–external distinction he is vulnerable to the same kinds of objection
to which Carnap’s proposal is subject. Recall that the suggestion earlier was that if we have
reason to reject Carnap’s proposal, then we likewise have reason to reject Ramsey’s view to the
extent that he embraces an internal–external distinction. On Demopoulos’ extension, however,
the success of a science in answering what Carnap would classify as an external question (the
confirmation of the atomic hypothesis) need not undermine the internal–external distinction
itself. Therefore it need not be an objection, let alone a decisive one, to Ramsey’s view either.
As for the other horn of the dilemma, we still need to understand how Ramsey’s view of
theories can accommodate a representation of our theoretical knowledge in light of the con-
siderations of arbitrariness. A particular fragment from the Ramsey archive is instructive,
because it suggests that a satisfactory theory must have a complete dictionary and no superflu-
ous elements, and also because it emphasizes the role of experience in evaluating theoretical
parameters.
In a completely satisfactory theory I think we should
(a) have a complete dictionary
(b) have no superfluous elements.
(b) cannot be exactly defined; it means that we cannot get a simpler equivalent
theory. But we may be able to do so by a little transformation when we cannot by
simply leaving out a part as it stands.
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Weyl’s requirements (p. 87) are Einstimmigkeit and no überflüssigen Be-
standteile.
Which seem to mean that every theoretical quantity can in principle be evalu-
ated and that all ways of evaluating it lead to the same result.
In principle must here mean merely that certain possible courses of experience
would determine its value.
If not, of course, there is something superfluous e.g. our velocity in absolute
space could not be determined, and so some truth-possibilities of theoretical func-
tions give equivalent theory.
∴ some economy ought to be possible, but it is not clear how without a good
deal of thought.
That makes indeed a good exercise.
What is the proper form of Newtonian mechanics, which gives absolute accel-
eration a meaning and absolute velocity none.
It must be a sort of geometry containing straight lines and a fixed direction.
One must give an axiomatic description of such a geometry.
Even here there is a sort of superfluous element through all places in this space–
time being equivalent, but that will appear in the theory simply as a permutation of
names, or can be arbitrarily fixed.18
A permutation of parameters is always possible and cannot be regarded as an
objectionable superfluity. (Ramsey 1991, 233)
His example of a superfluous element is the formulation of Newtonian mechanics19 that
includes the conception of absolute velocity. Ramsey suggests that the proper form of New-
tonian mechanics gives absolute acceleration a meaning, but absolute velocity none. More
precisely, since Newtonian mechanics does not involve absolute velocities, the proper space–
time formulation of it should reflect this fact, whereas the original formulation maintained it as
a superfluous element. Under a formulation of the space–time theory that does not contain this
notion, questions about absolute velocity are not genuine questions internal to the framework,
but rather can only be posed as external questions such as whether we have reason to adopt a
theory in which velocity is an absolute quantity.
This passage of Ramsey’s is remarkable because he so succinctly separates Newton’s for-
mulation of his theory of absolute space from the physical geometry implied by the theoretical
framework of the laws of motion and their corollaries. Not only is this an affine structure
18. It seems that here Ramsey is considering permutations of position and velocity in a Galilean transformation.
19. My remarks on Newton, and issues concerning space–time are indebted to various works by DiSalle, e.g.
(2006). It goes without saying that any misunderstandings are my responsibility.
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with sameness of direction as a dynamically intelligible notion, but Ramsey sees that New-
tonian mechanics allows for a group of transformations that define an equivalence class of
allowable reference-frames (i.e. inertial frames). While Newton had the genius to recognize
a distinguished class of dynamically equivalent relative-spaces, i.e. those of different states of
uniform motion in which force, mass, and acceleration would have the same measurable val-
ues, he retained a privileged absolute space. Ramsey, on the contrary, could pose the question
what space–time structure is implied by the mathematical structure in Newtonian mechanics.
Moreover, Ramsey could distinguish two kinds of superfluity. In the first case there is the un-
objectionable class of transformations of spatial coordinates, which is no defect of the implied
space–time structure but only illustrates the lack of physical motivation for postulating an ab-
solute space. It is this absolute space which is the objectionable kind of superfluity: we ask
what kind of geometry is required by a theory which gives absolute acceleration a meaning,
and absolute velocity none, and this is one that does not have absolute space. Notice the way
Ramsey poses the issue. It is one of the functional role of a theoretical term: absolute velocity
is meaningless because it is a theoretical quantity which cannot in principle be evaluated within
the theoretical framework of Newton’s laws.
With this insight, we can make more sense of Ramsey’s seemingly silly example of the
moon.
It is highly relevant to this question of whether propositions have meaning, not
merely what general axioms we include in our theory, but also what particular
propositions. Has it meaning to say that the back of the moon has a surface of
green cheese? If our theory allows as a possibility that we might go there or find
out in any other way, then it has meaning. If not, not; i.e. our theory of the moon
is very relevant, not merely our theory of things in general. (Ramsey 1929d, 134)
The crucial aspect of posing the theoretical question regarding the moon involves the pos-
sibility, in principle, of our methods to determine an answer. For a less silly example consider
the theoretical quantity of mass. Is it meaningful to ask the mass of Jupiter in the context of
Newtonian mechanics? It is, because as Newton showed we can calculate planetary mass on
the basis of the behaviour of a planet’s satellites and their orbits, but only as a theory–mediated
measurement; as an internal question of the theory. So while we might resist Ramsey’s char-
acterization of the question of the constitution of the moon as possibly meaningless, we can
see that as an internal question the issue is fundamentally whether the question is meaningful
given the resources of the theory. As an external question, we might consider a theory of the
moon that fails to make a question of its constitution meaningful as an inadequate theory,20 but
20. N.B. that this kind of external question about adequacy is independent from the issue separating realists and
instrumentalists.
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whether it is made of cheese or not is irrelevant to a gravitational theory of orbital motion.21
Last, but not least, we see Ramsey recognize the possibility of permutations not only of the
underlying domain, but of entire theoretical components: in this case the equivalence of iner-
tial frames in the geometry required by Newtonian mechanics. Of course, he is not suggesting
a kind of argument like those of Newman or Winnie, because in those philosophical contexts
the issue is our justification for epistemological claims about the nature of the world, on the
basis of claims to knowledge of structure. Here, Ramsey is not suggesting that the Ramsey-
sentence expresses or characterizes our physical knowledge. At best it shows the mathematical
structure of the Ramsified theory. In the example from the Nachlass, Ramsey is not giving
an epistemological argument regarding the nature of physical knowledge on the basis of the
Ramsey-sentence. Instead he is asking, given a particular theory, here Newtonian mechanics,
what space–time structure is implied such that absolute acceleration is meaningful but absolute
velocity is not. In other words, the question posed is what sort of structure do we attribute to
the world by saying that it conforms to Newton’s laws? Notice that a realist and an instrumen-
talist can give the same answer to this question while maintaining, as Demopoulos suggests,
different attitudes toward the theory. Ramsey’s analysis in the fragment does not imply a meta-
theoretical attitude or constrain the range of attitudes we might chose to take.
Perhaps the Ramsey-sentence of a theory is the best way to represent the theory’s math-
ematical structure for determining theoretical relations and those which might be superflu-
ous. Perhaps not: Minkowski’s formulation of special relativity, for instance, was surely more
deeply illuminating for the development of general relativity than whatever special relativity’s
Ramsey-sentence would have been (in particular the Ramsey-sentence of Minkowski space-
time). This is not an objection to Ramsey’s larger approach to theories however, but a method-
ological question about formalization—an inadequacy of higher-order logic for representing
the mathematical structure of a physical theory is not likewise an argument against a recon-
struction of Ramsey’s broader view. Ramsey’s deeper insight is that in this context, a permuta-
tion of parameters is not objectionable. The case at hand allows the Galilean transformations
which are structure preserving in the sense appropriate to Newton’s theory (affine transforma-
tions which preserve metrical relations for time and space). This is a sense in which we have
knowledge of structure that is not threatened by Newman’s objection. Unlike structural real-
ists, Ramsey does not claim that either what is real is structure, or what we can know is purely
structural, but rather that, given a theory we can ask what structure it ascribes to the physical
21. Unless it were relevant to our gravitational theory whether our gravitational measure of mass is compatible
with the possibility that, e.g., it has the density of the densest cheese. But this would only tell us this compatibility;
not affirm that it was in fact cheese. Regardless, Ramsey is not talking about the moon’s constitution per se, but
only, through a silly example, about some part of its surface. A more serious example could be the presence of
ice on the moon’s surface.
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world. Moreover, Ramsey’s reflections allow the rational reformulation and simplification of a
given theory through the elimination of superfluous elements.22 The theory itself is an object
of empirical inquiry, and not just a framework.
The Ramsification of a theory assumes that the theoretical formulation of the secondary
system is correct. Here, however, we see Ramsey suggesting the elimination of elements in
the secondary system of a theory. This indicates that he does not see the Ramsey-sentence as a
characterization of our theoretical knowledge. Rather, Ramsification makes clear the relations,
especially in terms of meaning, of the secondary and primary systems of a theory, but it does
not give a representation of the knowledge that we take the theory to give us. The theory
as a whole is still subject to considerations of conceptual analysis which may show that the
formulation of the secondary system is inadequate to the task of representing our theoretical
knowledge. In this sense then, the Ramsey-sentence is only a tool for understanding a theory as
a language and for understanding the relations internal to its structure. It is not a representation
of our empirical knowledge.
In the case of the atomic hypothesis, experience (that is, theory-mediated measurement)
ended the speculation regarding the future results of science: our methods did in fact stabi-
lize on a determinate answer to the question.23 In this case, a partially interpreted element
in the propositional functions of the secondary system was able to be confirmed. While the
Ramsey-sentence shows how the secondary system is related to the primary so that the conse-
quences of the theory are empirically meaningful, the confirmation of the existence of atoms
enables a modification to the theory where an element of the secondary system could plausibly
be imported into the primary. Of course, I do not suggest that the confirmation of the atomic
hypothesis made atoms ‘observable’,24 but Ramsey does not impose on the primary and sec-
ondary distinction Russell’s knowledge by acquaintance nor the positivist sensation language;
it is enough to recognize that in “Causal Qualities” Ramsey considers the primary/secondary
distinction to be relative. There it is relative between observers, but it is also plausible to see it
as a relative distinction between e.g. the data in astronomical charts about relative positions in
the celestial sphere and claims about the orbits and motions of planets.25
In contrast, Ramsey’s discussion of the elimination of superfluous elements does not ad-
dress itself to how the relations of the primary and secondary systems are modified upon em-
pirical discovery. Rather, in the elimination of superfluous elements, Ramsey is arguing that
22. I.e. the elimination of absolute space from the characterization of the space–time structure because absolute
velocity is not capable in principle of evaluation.
23. As Poincaré recognized, whether we discovered some deeper structure to the atom, we have learned some-
thing definite about the composition of matter: that chemical composition operates with an integer ratio.
24. Though Poincaré does talk about ‘seeing’ atoms as a result of Perrin’s and others experiments.
25. Another explicit reference to the relativity of the primary/secondary distinction is (Ramsey 1929d, 114).
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the propositions of the secondary system—which acquire meaning only through the whole—
must be analysed so that those secondary ‘propositions’ which are not empirically meaningful
in the primary system are eliminated. There is a marked contrast between the space–time case
where it is in principle impossible to get an empirical decision about absolute velocity, and
therefore position in absolute space—it is a superfluous element in the theory—and cases like
the atomic hypothesis where we were uncertain for a while whether experiment will ever be
able to provide a determinate answer. This contrast parallels the methodological difference
between assuming the correctness of the system and its Ramsification, and in taking the frame-
work itself as an object of analysis as in the Newtonian example. Moreover, it is not simply an
issue of analysing for superfluous elements, but more significantly in this case for asking what
space–time structure is implicit in Newtonian mechanics: that is, what does the mathematical
structure of the theory imply regarding the correct space–time formulation of the theory if we
simplify and eliminate superfluous elements.
So, on the one hand we have Ramsey’s injunction that any addition or modification to our
system be a result of our ordinary methods determining a course of experience which justifies
that change. On the other hand, Ramsey cannot fail to include conceptual analysis among our
methods, since he so fruitfully makes use of it himself in such cases as, among others, his
analysis of general propositions and causation, and his analysis Newtonian space–time. The
question of stabilization is more nuanced than the adoption of a positivist criterion for mean-
ingfulness. While the propositions of the secondary system only achieve meaning through
the whole, the Ramsey-sentence coupled with Ramsey’s recognition of the difference between
a negative result and a lack of result emphasize the possibility of theory–mediated measure-
ments which could settle a seemingly external question. The theory must still be subjected to
and tested by our ordinary methods, including conceptual analysis of fundamental terms and
principles, like absolute space (or, e.g. absolute simultaneity). The Ramsey-sentence is merely
a formal tool to aid in that process.26
In that sense, although the Ramsey-sentence is subject to the Newman objection, the ob-
jection is only detrimental when the role of the tool is misunderstood. Properly understood,
the Newman objection is instead a relatively harmless, though insightful, logico-mathematical
observation. It is only relatively harmless because it is still a powerful objection to other
conceptions which seek to represent the epistemological content of a theory through purely
26. This point echoes Poincaré’s analogy of comparing science to a library where experimental physics is en-
trusted with the purchases:
As for mathematical physics, its task will be to make out the catalogue. If the catalogue is well
made, the library will not be any richer, but the reader will be helped to use its riches.(Poincaré
1913, 130)
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structural relations, e.g., Russell’s structuralism, constructive empiricism, and perhaps Car-
nap’s application of the Ramsey-sentence. In effect, the Newman objection serves as a check
on what we can be taking ourselves to show with the Ramsey-sentence. It is an observation
something like a limitative result in logic: rather than showing us, e.g., limits to provability
in a given system, it is epistemologically limitative insofar as it dramatically limits appeals to
theoretical knowledge in virtue of structure. It is not an objection to Ramsey’s approach to
theories. Rather, aware of the arbitrariness of the Ramsey-sentence, he nevertheless urges it as
the best way of writing our theories. There is no tension in that, as the Ramsey-sentence serves
its purpose of demystifying theories as linguistic frameworks. We can now see that while the
Ramsey-sentence is subject to the charge of arbitrariness, that charge is a threat only when the
Ramsey-sentence is considered as a proposal for the reconstruction of our empirical knowl-
edge. Instead, we ought to understand the Ramsey-sentence as motivated by Ramsey’s claim
that he is investigating what kind of language a theory would be if it were indeed a language.
The Ramsey-sentence achieves this task of elucidating the nature of the secondary system.
Given the reconstruction and extension of Ramsey’s views I have presented, it is helpful to
consider a case of theory change. In “Theories” Ramsey reflected on theoretical equivalence
and containment. There he remarked in a clear connection with his remarks on general propo-
sitions27 that “[t]wo theories may be compatible without being equivalent, i.e. a set of facts
might be found which agreed with both, and another set too which agreed with one but not
with the other,” (Ramsey 1929d, 133). In “General Propositions and Causality” he adds as a
postcript note:
As opposed to a purely descriptive theory of science, mine may be called a fore-
casting theory. To regard a law as a summary of certain facts seems to me inade-
quate; it is also an attitude of expectation for the future. The difference is clearest
with regard to chances; the facts summarized do not preclude and equal chance for
a coincidence which would be summarized by and, indeed, lead to a quite different
theory.(Ramsey 1929b, 163).
Other than explicitly connecting his views in “General Propositions and Causality” to his the-
ory of science28 this passage continues the point that a collection of facts might be compatible
with two separate theories, though a further collection may not be. To these reflections we
should recall his attitude to adding axioms: that we should not add them so long as they are
27. And counterfactuals more generally.
28. This, and the fact that “General Propositions and Causality” is written as an explicit response to his previous
paper on “Universals of Law and of Fact” where he is considering natural laws and scientific theorizing makes it
seem incredible that his thought on the philosophy of science is often reduced not just to the content of “Theories”
but to the Ramsey-sentence representation of a theory.
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consistent with the theory, but in view of formulating a law on the basis of experience. Given
his analysis of Newtonian mechanics we can pose this question: to account for the null result
of the Michelson-Morley experiment, should we add the Lorentz contraction as a law or not?
Assuming, per 19th century electrodynamics, that light is an electromagnetic wave in the
ether means that the rest-frame of the ether should have a distinguished role; however, no
attempt to measure its velocity was successful and all electromagnetic phenomena were seem-
ingly independent of the velocity of the ether, in particular the velocity of light. Like in the
case of Ramsey’s analysis of Newtonian space–time, we have a velocity we cannot measure.29
However, unlike Ramsey’s analysis there where absolute space is a superfluous element, in the
case of the velocity of the ether, there should be a phenomenal effect. So it is not simply a case
of eliminating a superfluous element, but providing an account of why we fail to measure a
theoretical parameter which we seemingly should. Lorentz’s hypothesis of contraction is one
alternative. In the context of Ramsey’s attitude to adding new laws or axioms to the theory, this
seems to be a case where we have what should be a theory-mediated measurable parameter,
and phenomena which contradict it. Adding the Lorentz contraction would be consistent with
the theory, and serve as an explanation of the null-results of electrodynamic phenomena. We
could save the phenomena and save the theory.
In contrast, Einstein’s conceptual analysis of the relativity of simultaneity (“frames in rel-
ative motion can agree on the velocity of light only if they disagree on simultaneity” (DiSalle
2020b, 39)) which led to the special theory of relativity, has a closer kinship to Ramsey’s anal-
ysis of Newtonian mechanics. Ramsey considered that theoretical parameters be evaluable and
dispensed with absolute space because absolute velocity was in principle unevaluable. This
is in keeping with the second component of what he thinks is required in a satisfactory the-
ory. But recall that the first component required a complete dictionary. Newtonian mechanics
and the implied space–time have planes of absolute simultaneity. Yet, Einstein’s analysis of
the concept of a frame of reference revealed that we did not have a definition of simultaneity
apart from light signalling, and that determining simultaneous events depends on an arbitrary
choice of reference-frame. Of course, this is not the place to go into the detail of Einstein’s
empirical construction of both spatio–temporal measurement and dynamically distinct refer-
ence frames30, but rather to see that Ramsey’s concern that theoretical parameters be not just
evaluable but appropriately defined, has a kinship with Einstein’s injunction that we require
a method of yielding an empirical decision for simultaneous events. Like Newton’s theory
29. Though in this case it was not a matter of principle that the velocity of the ether could not be determined.
The effects of motion through the ether could be calculated as a function of the ratio of the velocity of a thing
relative to the velocity of light. This began as a question that seemed beyond the reach of experiment, then it
proved to be within reach. This experimental question, however, failed to yield a positive result.
30. Cf. (DiSalle 2006, Ch.4)
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of gravity with respect to the laws of motion, Einstein developed his theory by coordinating
simultaneity, and more generally time, not just with a concrete empirical procedure (as a logi-
cal positivistic coordinative definition might), but with the system of natural laws of classical
electrodynamics.
Ramsey’s own analysis of Newtonian mechanics suggests that he would have seen the
philosophical and physical motivation for Einstein’s theory over that of Lorentz. More gener-
ally, Ramsey’s broader view of theories is well placed to make sense of Einstein’s revolutionary
analysis. And of course, in the same way that Ramsey asked of Newtonian mechanics, what
kind of space–time structure was implied by the theory, he could well have done the same
for special or general relativity. That approach would not only be consistent with the recon-
struction and extension of Ramsey’s view, but consistent with maintaining an internal–external
distinction following Demopoulos which remains open to subsequent theoretical discoveries,
be they the confirmation of the atomic hypothesis, or the null results of measuring velocity
relative to the ether. Fundamentally, this rejects the reduction of Ramsey’s view of theory’s to
be a characterization of our theoretical knowledge by the Ramsey-sentence.
4.4 Summary
In this chapter we began by further distancing Ramsey’s view of theories from the way in
which his writings, and the Ramsey-sentence in particular, have been imported and adapted in
later issues in twentieth-century philosophy of science. In 4.1 I argued that while Ramsey has
been variously interpreted as advocating a form of instrumentalism or scientific realism, if he
was to be categorized it seems that he is an instrumentalist. However, I challenged the idea
that the terms of the realism/instrumentalism debate are appropriately applied to Ramsey’s
thought. Indeed, as we saw in 4.3, the reconstruction of Ramsey’s view I have developed
does not obviously constrain someone’s meta-theoretical attitude to how we should interpret
theories. In 4.1 I also argued that the issues between the syntactic and semantic approach
to theories are tangential at best to the considerations Ramsey was developing. Moreover, I
suggested that while contemporary forms of structural realism embrace the Ramsey-sentence
reconstruction of a theory, their uses of Ramsey’s thought do not imply that he held or was
advancing any of their own metaphysical or epistemological theses.
In 4.2 I further developed the considerations from 4.1 by considering Carnap’s adoption of
the Ramsey-sentence and his attempt to elaborate, according to Michael Friedman, a form of
structuralism without metaphysics. This structuralism of Carnap’s, because of it’s purported
neutrality, is to be distinguished from modern structural realism. Carnap sought to deflate
the realism/instrumentalism debate by analyzing it as a conventional choice of language form.
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This section, while articulating the notion of structuralism without metaphysics, provided a
context in which we could ask whether the reconstruction of Ramsey’s thought that I have
developed is subject to similar problems that faced Carnap. In particular, Carnap’s internal–
external distinction seems to face serious problems for accounting for a posteriori empirical
discoveries in science, like the confirmation of the atomic hypothesis, which fundamentally do
not amount to a matter of linguistic stipulation. The crucial issue 4.3 addresses is a dilemma
Ramsey’s view faces insofar as he seem to anticipate an internal–external distinction. If he
embraces an internal–external distinction, does his view suffer from similar defects as Carnap’s
view? If he does not embrace such a distinction, how are we to understand Ramsey given the
susceptibility of his view to Newman’s objection?
I argued that Ramsey’s anticipation of the internal–external distinction is capable of an
extension similar to the extension Demopoulos offered to salvage Carnap’s view. Moreover, I
argued that the extension I developed is not only consistent with the reconstruction of Ramsey’s
view that I have articulated, but seems to be endorsed by several analyses given by Ramsey.
Here, we see that Ramsey, even if he was an instrumentalist, did not develop a view of theories
which crucially relied on meta-theoretical attitudes for the interpretation of theories. Rather,
his view is compatible with a theoretical framework providing methods to resolve questions
concerning the existence of theoretical entities internal to that framework which do not reduce
to a notion of linguistic convention, but instead emphasize whether our methods of proof and
evidence allow us to stabilize on an answer to our question. Moreover, Ramsey’s analysis of
Newtonian space–time provides a compelling case where he investigates the physical implica-
tions of a given theoretical framework and clearly does not articulate the issue as a matter of
convention. Ramsey’s view seems threatened when we consider the Ramsey-sentence as an
analysis of our theoretical knowledge. However, when we analyze the larger context of the
reconstruction and extension of Ramsey’s view, we see a view that is capable of accounting
for advances in theoretical knowledge as significant a posteriori discoveries, and a view which




In twentieth-century philosophy of science there has been, among other issues, a preoc-
cupation with providing an adequate analysis of theoretical knowledge in terms of structure.
Advances in nineteenth century mathematics both expanded our understanding of mathemati-
cal structure and produced a multiplicity of abstract structures. While these developments were
revolutionary and prompted deep reflections in the philosophy of mathematics about how to in-
terpret these structures, including how to understand geometric developments using imaginary
numbers, lines, etc., and points moving to infinity, the great advance was the notion that math-
ematical structures could be rigorous and uninterpreted: not only the content of the axioms,
but the methods of proof were liberated from the appeal to intuition. The crucial problem in
the philosophy of science became giving an empirical interpretation to the abstract structures
whose development were so useful to physics and other sciences. This was a problem that
could not arise for Kant. He could not acknowledge the possibility of uninterpreted mathemat-
ics because he believed all mathematics to be essentially interpreted through the form of spatial
and temporal intuition. The synthetic a priori character of mathematics arose from the extra-
logical intuitive content of those forms. This is one problem of interpretation: the empirical
interpretation of abstract structure.
Another closely related, though distinct, problem of interpretation involves the interpreta-
tion of theoretical claims. Kant seemed to think that because of the inherently intuitive content
of mathematics, and empirical theories more generally, they could not be about anything other
than the world of possible experience. That is, theoretical knowledge was limited to the phe-
nomenal world. Empirical knowledge, and science more generally, had nothing to say about
things in themselves, and the notion of explicating the world beyond experience by appealing
to the structure of our experience would make no sense to Kant. Rather his project involved
showing the a priori necessity of the underlying structure of all empirical experience. That Kant
was deeply mistaken about the necessity of Euclidean space, and the role of physical principles
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in informing our spatial intuition (i.e., the group of rigid displacements which Helmholtz used
to construct a non-Euclidean geometry expressible in intuitive terms), is crucial to understand-
ing the development of space–time theories; however, it is important to note that the Kantian
approach to structure and interpretation was not intended to shed any light on the world beyond
experience, nor did it countenance the possibility of abstract mathematical structures standing
in need of interpretation. Fundamentally, scientific theory characterized the world of possible
experience, and the principles which governed it.
Russell, as I have argued, took up the Kantian problem. He sought to show that Kant
was wrong in restricting our knowledge to only the phenomenal. The adequacy of Russell’s
understanding of Kant and Kant’s approach to scientific knowledge can largely be set to one
side: Kant’s conception of ‘experience’ and the phenomena have a much larger scope than
Russell’s analysis in terms of knowledge by acquaintance in conjunction with his theories of
sensa, propositional understanding, and causal theory of perception. For Russell, the problem
was to account for the relation of experience and the world beyond experience, and moreover
to explicate the classical problem of empiricism of demarcating what is real from what might
only be illusion. Russell was convinced that the modern advances in mathematical logic could
provide the means to give an account of the world beyond our experience. Russell recognized
that a more abstract notion of structure transcends empirical or intuitive content, which in turn
provides a more general conception of mathematics as abstract structure, thereby freeing the
truths of mathematics from what seems to be an inherently subjective element. He thought that
this notion of abstract structure could then allow us to ask questions about the relation between
the world of experience and things in themselves, which would transcend the subjective limits
on our knowledge of how the objective world can be structured. While Russell agreed with
Kant that we cannot know any intrinsic properties of the world beyond experience, he believed
that mathematical logic gave an adequate notion of similarity to explicate how the world of
acquaintance resembles the world as it is. Precisely, they resemble one another in their logic-
mathematical, that is structural, properties.
Newman’s objection to Russell demonstrated the inadequacy of Russell’s account, by show-
ing that Russell’s abstract structural idea of the connection between our theory and the world
essentially trivializes the connection. It would be a mistake to think that the problem that
Newman identified with Russell’s view depended on his metaphysics, i.e. on his aim to tran-
scend the limitations, alleged by Kant, on our knowledge of the real structure of the world,
independent of the forms of our intuition and categories of our understanding. Rather, the
flaw Newman identifies is the dependence on a conception of theories as abstract structures
that are satisfied by sets of objects. The objection thereby applies to a variety of philosophi-
cal accounts of theories, whether they attribute such structures to “the world”, or real things,
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or only to “the phenomena.” Those approaches, whether they were semantic, syntactic, or
something else, shared an underlying principle that resulted in a common problem. This com-
mon principle—the structuralist principle—made these approaches vulnerable to Newman’s
objection and thereby threatened to divest our claims to theoretical knowledge of its signifi-
cant a posteriori character. While Russell’s account of theoretical knowledge is strongly tied to
his philosophical context, Demopoulos shows that the problem Newman raises is much more
generally applicable: the difficulty depends on this general conception of the interpretation of
theories, not with whether theories are regarded as describing reality or as “saving the phenom-
ena.”
Demopoulos’ arguments and his account of the historical progression from Russell, through
Ramsey, to Carnap are instructive. They show the development of this abstract view of theories,
and the different forms it has taken in connection with differing philosophical conceptions of
the import of theories. Moreover, he gives a clear account of how Ramsey’s work on theories
in “Theories” has been used in this tradition, especially by Carnap. Reading Ramsey in the
context of Demopoulos’ account, and the way Ramsey’s work on theories has been adopted
by other philosophers, suggests that Ramsey too subscribed to the abstract view of theories
and was therefore susceptible to Newman’s objection. My major contention has been that
this view is inadequate to Ramsey’s approach to scientific theories. In a sense, it is a matter
of anachronism: looking back to Ramsey’s paper “Theories” from the late twentieth-century
perspective that has seen Carnap’s use of Ramsification as well as other attempts to explicate
theoretical knowledge by means of structure, or in the case of structural realism, by means of
the structure expressed by a theory’s Ramsey-sentence, it becomes very easy to read Ramsey
as articulating a nascent form of those other views. This, however, is an inadequate account of
Ramsey’s broader perspective on the role of theories in science, and fails to do justice to the
complexity of his perspective.
My reconstruction begins from the premise that to adequately understand Ramsey’s ap-
proach to theories, his paper must be situated in its philosophical context. This involves two
contextualizations. First, “Theories” is developed out of Ramsey’s response to Russell’s ap-
proach, as well as issues concerning theories posed by other thinkers. So, Ramsey’s principal
concern was to address and clarify the relevant problems that were already on the table, rather
than posing his own agenda. Second, to adequately appreciate “Theories,” it must be under-
stood in light of Ramsey’s other writings on general propositions and in light of his remarks
on how theoretical principles such as scientific laws actually function. What emerges is a
reconstruction of Ramsey which does not consider “Theories” to be Ramsey’s philosophical
explication of a theory. Rather, as Ramsey himself says, it is an investigation into what kind of
language a theory would be, if it were one at all; moreover, the analysis as language need not
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exhaust a philosophical account of the nature of theories. Ramsey’s concerns in this linguistic
analysis have a greater affinity with logico-mathematical investigations into the properties of
a theory-as-language, than they do as epistemologically or metaphysically motivated explica-
tions. It is true that Ramsey frames “Theories” by partitioning the language into a primary and
secondary system. This alone is not sufficient to classify Ramsey as an adherent to the abstract
view of theories, nor the structuralist thesis. This partition makes sense when considered as
a response to Russell’s view. Moreover, Ramsey’s use of a ‘dictionary’ and his reference to
‘partial interpretation’ are not endorsements of any epistemological tenet, but rather devices to
clarify the role of the theoretical terms in the language, and more precisely their role in the for-
mation of judgements. Notably, Ramsey addresses the partition as ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’,
but not explicitly along Russell’s lines of acquaintance and the world beyond experience. With
this in view, we can see Ramsey’s analysis of a theory as a language (if it is a language at all),
not as an endorsement or assertion of the partition, but rather his picking up the issue in the
terms furnished by its philosophical context.
Russell distinguished two notions of truth and advocated the stronger; Ramsey by contrast
advocated the weaker notion, whereby truth was equated with our having the perceptions a
theory would lead us to expect. Ramsey made this point in the earliest Nachlass fragment
dealing with theories, which predates his “Theories.” This weaker notion of truth and its in-
vocation of perception was a direct response to Russell. In later writings, Ramsey replaces
the notion of perception with experience. Granting that he does not provide a philosophical
analysis of experience, we may note that Ramsey does not require the primary system to be
one of sensa or acquaintance, but also considers expansions of the primary system. We may
refer to Kant again: there is nothing in Ramsey’s remarks on theories or general propositions
to rule out that for him, the world which science sought to represent was the world of phe-
nomena in the Kantian sense. Kantian phenomena, or objects of experience, include the causal
and dynamical information which Newton deduced from his notion of phenomena and the
laws of motion. Similarly, we can understand Ramsey’s notion of phenomena to exclude those
causal and dynamical principles, and like Newton, arrive at those principles as a deduction
from the phenomena through experience.1 In other words, the notion of a primary system can
include what Newton called phenomena, i.e. the planetary positions relative to the fixed stars
as constructed by observation and measurement, or it is compatible with a broader notion of
phenomena that include the sort of causal and dynamical information which Newton deduced.
The distinction of primary and secondary systems need not imply that phenomena are objects
of immediate acquaintance. While the partition into a primary and secondary system could
risk developing along the lines of the abstract view of theories, instead, in Ramsey’s use, it
1. Friedman (2020) instructively presents the differences in Kant and Newton’s methodologies of abstraction.
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allows for a relative distinction between primary and secondary systems correlated not with
‘acquaintance’ but rather with the richness of what we take to be represented by experience
and on the independence of the relevant theory from experience in this sense.2 In this way
Ramsey’s position is entirely compatible with deducing an inverse-square force from celestial
motions, or with deducing a quantitative value for the theoretical property of (planetary) mass
on the basis planetary orbits.
Ramsey’s analysis of Newtonian space–time justifies an interpretation of experience as
authoritative, yet which does not adhere to the abstract view of theories, insofar as Ramsey
appeals to a course of experience deciding theoretical parameters. Notably, when he does deal
with structural knowledge explicitly, the direction of inference is not the same as adherents of
the structuralist thesis. They would have it that our theoretical knowledge arises from or con-
sists in knowledge of structure. Typically, this knowledge of structure would arise from (the
misappropriation of) the Ramsey-sentence of a theory. Yet when Ramsey considers structural
knowledge it is not by appeal to the Ramsey-sentence, nor an appeal to knowing the structure
of the world beyond experience through some relevant notion of similarity. Instead, Ram-
sey asks what structure is implicit in a properly formulated theory of space–time that obeyed
Newton’s laws, respected absolute acceleration as a dynamically meaningful notion, and yet
dispensed with absolute velocity. That implicit structure, is the space–time structure of the
world according to the theory thus formulated.
Clearly there is a gap between Ramsey’s thought and the debate among scientific realists,
instrumentalists, and structural realists. The adoption of ideas found in Ramsey’s work by
each of those parties suggests that Ramsey’s analyses were not concerned with addressing a
meta-theoretical question about the interpretational framework of theories in general. Ram-
sey’s adoption of Russell’s weaker notion of truth is the most explicit evidence that he adhered
to such a meta-theoretical position. While this would put him in line with modern instru-
mentalism, it seems a hasty categorization. Kant’s restriction of theoretical knowledge to the
phenomenal world does not justify categorizing him as an instrumentalist; indeed, it seems like
a category mistake.3 We are reminded of Eddington’s injunction that the world of physics is
the physical world—we need not, like Russell, try to peak behind the curtain.
Newton was clearly a realist, but he also acknowledged that his principles could have an
instrumental value even if they turned out to be untrue. Without hypothesizing regarding the
cause of gravity, it proved an instrument for discovering new dynamical properties (or phenom-
ena in Kant’s sense). Newton also recognized the difference between establishing a systematic
2. e.g. the Newtonian phenomena are not theory–independent in a general sense, but they are independent of
the dynamical principles that Newton applies to them, and which therefore can be called secondary with respect
to those phenomena.
3. In the sense made famous by Gilbert Ryle.
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feature of nature according to a mathematical law it can only approximate, and establishing
the truth of a mathematical law. We see a parallel when Ramsey recognizes that an empirical
generalization cannot be ‘proven’, and the evidence leading to it and its holding in other cases
are separate facts. Ramsey’s characterization of his theory of science shows a twofold neutral-
ity. First, concerning the scope of the phenomenal world, and hence the related question of
the basis of a primary system. Second, his analyses of theories may be read indifferently to
a particular theoretican’s meta-theoretical attitude. Ramsey’s analyses explicate the functional
and inferential role of a theory’s theoretical terms and the Ramsey-sentence is a tool to that
purpose. Nevertheless, his theory of science was more than a deductive systematization, but
rather a ‘forecasting theory’. His theory of general propositions embeds that inductive charac-
ter insofar as they serve as schema for judging and for acting—but the general propositions do
not only suggest a course of experience that we should expect, but serve as schema for inter-
preting phenomena as instances of theoretical concepts. One’s meta-theoretical attitude to the
interpretation of theories in the sense of realism and instrumentalism seem orthogononal to the
illuminating features of Ramsey’s analyses: trying to press his thought into that mould only
serves to further obscure his method and purpose.
We do not see in Ramsey’s work a commitment to theories as uninterpreted structures.
Nor do we see a preoccupation with many of the debates that detained his peers and succes-
sors. Instead we are given an analysis of theories in terms of how they are used, and the
logical structure of the inferences and judgements they enable. Ramsey did not leave us with
a complete philosophy of science. He did, however, leave us with an analysis compatible with
paradigmatic cases of scientific success. Demopoulos is right to criticize the abstract view of
theories and the division between structure and interpretation in the ways it has been upheld
by many philosophers of science. My reconstruction of Ramsey has sought to show that Ram-
sey’s analysis does not rest easily with those assumptions, and moreover that he presents a
subtle view that is sensitive to, and compatible with, the idea that our advances in theoretical
knowledge are often the result of significant a posteriori discoveries. Crucially, Ramsey’s views
are compatible with the authoritative role of experience in our theoretical judgements without
being trivialized by being overly abstract. The emphasis on meta-theoretical issues concerning
the interpretation of theories obscures the notion that physical, and more generally theoretical,
principles can themselves be principles of interpretation. I hope that my reconsideration of
Ramsey has shed some light either on his, or toward some truer, understanding of theory.
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